Opinion

Besa Center

Iran is desperate to keep the nuclear deal

Right now, it looks like the only party focused on nuclear nonproliferation is the Trump administration, while the others are cynically brushing nuclear dangers to the sidelines in favor of economic gain.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu exposes files smuggled out of Iran which Israel claims detail the Islamic Republic's illicit military nuclear program, April 30, 2018. Credit: Amos Ben-Gershom/GPO.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu exposes files smuggled out of Iran which Israel claims detail the Islamic Republic's illicit military nuclear program, April 30, 2018. Credit: Amos Ben-Gershom/GPO.
Emily B. Landau, Senior Research Fellow, head of the Arms Control and Regional Security Program. Credit: INSS.
Emily B. Landau

The next chapter in the Iran nuclear saga, after U.S. President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action will depend on the decisions made by the parties that agreed to the deal. At present, it is clear that Iran desperately wants to keep the deal—not a surprise taking into account that the JCPOA has major benefits for it, while requiring only minimal nuclear concessions—and the European states would like to go along, as would the Russians and Chinese.

The Europeans are focused more on business opportunities than nonproliferation and want the United States to allow them to move forward with economic deals with Iran. But this is at direct odds with the aim of President Trump—namely, to implement the harshest sanctions on Iran, with the hope that renewed severe economic pressure will help in ultimately renegotiating a better nuclear deal.

There is one significant piece missing from the puzzle of the past months, and that is what transpired between Americans and the Europeans in their attempts to come to agreement on strengthening the deal. How committed were the parties to this effort? The Europeans only grudgingly agreed to enter discussions in February, after Trump threatened to leave the deal, and then complained they had done “everything possible” to answer Trump’s demands but he remained set on withdrawing.

Is that true?

Were the parties close to agreement? What was the content of their “fix”? And what were the remaining sticking points? Unfortunately, the answers are not available. If there’s any hope of getting a better deal—either strengthened or renegotiated—the answers to these questions are crucial and should be public knowledge.

Right now, it looks like the only party that is focused on nuclear nonproliferation is the Trump administration, while the others are cynically brushing nuclear dangers to the sidelines in favor of economic gain.

Emily B. Landau is a senior research fellow, head of the Arms Control and Regional Security Program, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Tel Aviv.

Published as part of an article by Dr. George N. Tzogopoulos for BESA Center.

The opinions and facts presented in this article are those of the author, and neither JNS nor its partners assume any responsibility for them.
You have read 3 articles this month.
Register to receive full access to JNS.

Just before you scroll on...

Israel is at war. JNS is combating the stream of misinformation on Israel with real, honest and factual reporting. In order to deliver this in-depth, unbiased coverage of Israel and the Jewish world, we rely on readers like you. The support you provide allows our journalists to deliver the truth, free from bias and hidden agendas. Can we count on your support? Every contribution, big or small, helps JNS.org remain a trusted source of news you can rely on.

Become a part of our mission by donating today
Comments
Thank you. You are a loyal JNS Reader.
You have read more than 10 articles this month.
Please register for full access to continue reading and post comments.
Never miss a thing
Get the best stories faster with JNS breaking news updates