In early January, an Israeli official met with Minister of Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer on the eighth floor of the Prime Minister's Office in Jerusalem. A week later, the same official met with then-IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi on the 14th floor of the General Staff Tower at the Kirya military headquarters in Tel Aviv.
From both meetings, the official emerged with a clear realization—Israel had crossed the Rubicon: An attack on Iran was only a matter of time.
Six months later, the synergy between the eighth and 14th floors—the political and military echelons—enabled the launch of a preemptive strike on Friday, June 13. The military option against Iran, which had been on the table for at least a decade, came to fruition with perfect timing and political approval.
As the IDF finalized the details of the impending attack on Iran, planners realized they needed to replicate the Lebanon strategy—a concentrated, surprising blow to throw the enemy off balance, a sort of "Dahieh Doctrine 2.0," referring to the systematic bombardment of the Hezbollah stronghold in Lebanon during the 2006 Second Lebanon War and later.
"The difference is that with Hezbollah, it took 10 days; with Iran, we did it in the opening strike, within one hour," said an official in the know.
Plans for a confrontation with Iran, targeting its nuclear facilities, had been in development within the defense establishment for years, shaping the IDF's force buildup over the past two decades. Yet, in typical Israeli fashion, those plans were discarded at the last moment to make way for a bold, creative and swiftly crafted new strategy.
"In reality, we began the operational planning for the strike in its current form only in October 2024," said an official privy to the details. "That's when we realized the IDF needed to prepare not just for a pinpoint strike in Iran but for an entire campaign."
Until recently, even senior defense officials considered the idea of attacking Iran far-fetched, a plan destined to remain theoretical. However, three months in the fall of 2024 completely changed that perspective.
Three strikes in September—"Operation Pagers," the air campaign to neutralize Hezbollah's rockets, and the successful elimination of the group's leadership, including Hassan Nasrallah, turned Hezbollah into a weakened force.
"We always said Israel doesn't share a border with Iran, but Iran has a border with Israel—Hezbollah, standing at the fences, ready to respond fiercely if we attacked," said a former military official. "Once that border was erased, a new game began."
In October, the Israeli Air Force executed "Operation Days of Repentance," which included widespread strikes on Iran's air defense systems for the first time, fueling the pilots' appetite for more.
In November, Donald Trump's election to a second term in the White House further emboldened strike advocates, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. By December, Israel's top echelons no longer debated whether the strike would happen—only when.
The target validation process
In the early 2020s, the IDF Intelligence Directorate underwent a structural shift, redirecting resources and personnel toward Iran. "What you're seeing now is the result of those years of effort in the Iran arenas of Military Intelligence and the IAF," said a source.
The target validation process on Iran carried out by IDF Intelligence and the IAF focused on three legs of the nuclear program—the missile array, enrichment facilities and the "weapons group" (mounting a nuclear device on a ballistic missile). Accordingly, more and more intelligence on launchers, warehouses and factories in the Iranian missile array was collected.
Missile systems and enrichment facilities presented their own difficulties, but the intelligence community identified the weaponization group as the toughest challenge.
The deeper intelligence efforts delved, the clearer it became that the bottleneck was the scientists themselves. "We realized we needed to focus on the human factor," said the source.
In 2020, physicist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, head of Iran's nuclear program, was assassinated in a sophisticated operation on Iranian soil. "A beautiful operation," said someone familiar with many such missions.
The success of the September 2024 strike on Hezbollah, which destabilized the group and effectively decided the campaign, inspired IDF Intelligence. Weeks later, those working on Iran began discussing replicating the Lebanon strategy in Iran.
"Taking out their entire military leadership in one blow," said a source in the intelligence community.
Unlike the scientist operation, where the target list was narrowed over time, here Intelligence expanded it. What began as a plan to kill one or two senior Iranian officials grew to include the commander of the Revolutionary Guards' air force, the Guards' overall commander, Iran's chief of staff, and his deputy.
"When the idea came up, no one believed it could be pulled off simultaneously," said a knowledgeable source. But Intelligence persisted, forming a dedicated team that worked around the clock. The team's findings were presented to the Intelligence Director chief, Maj. Gen. Shlomi Binder, and later shared with the IAF.
In recent months, Binder, IAF commander Maj. Gen. Tomer Bar and Operations Directorate chief Maj. Gen. Oded Basyuk held numerous meetings to synchronize the operation down to the smallest details. Over time, the three generals and their teams grew confident that the ambitious plan could succeed.
Unlike the scientists, targeted in their homes, the "generals operation" was planned for a joint meeting of Iran's security elite. To ensure they gathered in one location, a sophisticated deception operation—details of which will remain classified for years—was executed.
Remarkably, the scientist and generals operations matured almost simultaneously. The small team of three Israeli generals, fully aware of both plans, completed this in the final weeks. The opening strike was ready.
Beyond the "decapitation operation," Israel's war plan included other components. The most discussed recently is air superiority. This, too, was addressed only recently.
As plans to strike enrichment facilities developed, it was clear the IAF needed a clear path to Natanz and Fordow. The Iran branch in the Intelligence Directorate's Research and Analysis Division allocated vast resources to mapping Iran's air defense systems, which were plentiful.
As Iran's air defenses were mapped, Intelligence and IAF concluded they could not only clear the path to nuclear facilities but also to Tehran and beyond. The phrase "air superiority in Iran" began as a whisper and grew into enthusiastic discussion.
Creating the appearance of a US-Israel rift
From late May, two weeks before the strike, a "perception operation" began to lull Iran into believing Israel would not attack soon. Orchestrated by the Prime Minister's Office, it included feeding information to Israeli journalists, particularly those not aligned with Netanyahu. The operation centered on nuclear talks between the White House and Tehran, creating the appearance of a U.S.-Israel rift.
Six months before Oct. 7, 2023, the IAF formed a small team of aircrew, mostly reservists, to plan the path to air superiority. The team received an ever-growing list of Iranian air defense battery locations and critical intelligence from Intelligence Directorate Unit 8200's secret unit.
The air superiority team presented the plan to the Air Force commander, who understood the risks but was willing to lose a few planes to achieve the mission. "The goal was no losses, but the Air Force commander's policy allowed for some losses while continuing the plan," the source said.
"Fortunately, we succeeded far beyond expectations, with no planes lost. I think it worked because the enemy didn't expect Israel to strike like this. They lacked drills that prepared them for the moment."
Skeptics in Intelligence doubted the Air Force's ability to achieve air superiority without losses. "When we started, it seemed impossible," said another source familiar with the operation. "Iran's air defenses are both high-quality and numerous. You need to neutralize them quickly, or Israeli pilots start dying in Iran."
Ultimately, the mission was accomplished in just 36 hours with no losses. On the first night, 30 Iranian air defense batteries and a double-digit number of radar systems were destroyed. "The greatest air superiority operation in history," said someone familiar with the details.
The Mossad joined in recent months, deploying drones operated by local agents in Iran to target additional air defense batteries.
While the scientist and generals operations could have proceeded without air superiority, the Air Force's control of Iran's skies greatly facilitated strikes on Natanz, missile sites and other nuclear facilities. It also enabled extensive hunting of ballistic missile launchers, as dismantling Iran's air defenses allowed more drones to operate freely from Israel to Tehran.
"This means you can strike munitions wholesale, from Tehran westward, drastically reducing missile launches toward Israel," said a knowledgeable source. "Instead of hundreds of missiles on day one, we faced dozens. That's a game-changer, reducing pressure and strain in Israel."
‘Preparations began 20 years ago’
Another component, built meticulously over time, was defense. "You can't attack without defense," said Brig. Gen. (res.) Ran Kochav, former air defense commander and Arrow missile head. "Preparations for war with Iran on the defensive side began 20 years ago. That was the reference threat we trained for, building a multi-layered air defense system and conducting joint exercises with U.S. Central Command."
Indeed, IAF officers confirm that air defense and air superiority are two components that could not have been achieved without full cooperation from Washington.
Which brings us to the last component in Israel's war plan against Iran, "the Americans," said an official well-versed in the war plan. "The plan was indeed built without them, but it was impossible to execute it without getting tailwind from them."
Shortly after Trump's January 2025 inauguration, messages from his circle reached Netanyahu, indicating he would not strongly oppose turning the "military option" operational if nuclear talks with Tehran stalled. Trump reportedly lifted restrictions on intelligence sharing, including access to U.S. satellites and radar systems.
While Trump did not commit to joining the strike, several Israeli officials confirm he was "deep in the inner circle."
"Full coordination," one described it. Trump also participated in the deception operation in the days leading up to the surprise attack.
Before June 13, sources continued to push a narrative to Israeli journalists that a U.S.-Iran nuclear agreement was a done deal and that Trump firmly opposed an Israeli strike. "This information was spoon-fed to journalists, unlike similar cases in the past," said one journalist.
An Israel Hayom investigation found that some misleading messages to the Israeli media came directly from Netanyahu's spokespeople. The Prime Minister's Office did not deny quotes attributed to Trump-Netanyahu talks, aiming to project a U.S.-Israel dispute.
An Israeli official familiar with the office said, "Israel surprised Iran with psychological maneuvers.
"The goal was to make Iran's leadership think there'd be no attack, or if there was, it wouldn't be imminent," he added.
Originally published by Israel Hayom.
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'Topics': 'paris-olympics,france,olympics,paris,anti-israel,sports',
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