This week will mark 12 years since the Second ‎Lebanon War ended. Since then, the Israel-Lebanon ‎border has been the quietest it has been for ‎decades. ‎

It is true that Hezbollah has been using this peace ‎and quiet to build up its missile arsenal. It is ‎believed that the Shi’ite terrorist group is ‎currently in possession of more than 100,000 missiles—10 times more than it had in 2006—and it is no ‎secret that it currently strives to increase their ‎range and improve their accuracy.‎

Still, Hezbollah has made sure to avoid any ‎provocation along the border. The memory of the blow ‎Israel dealt it is still fresh, as is the memory of ‎the humiliation suffered by its leader, Hassan ‎Nasrallah. ‎

One cannot forget, however, that there are two sides ‎to this coin. Yes, Hezbollah remains deterred but ‎Israel is also careful not to target its interests, neither on ‎the border nor on Lebanese soil. Thus, in the shadow ‎of a balance of mutual deterrence, both parties are ‎careful not to violate the tacit understandings ‎formed between them following the 2006 conflict. ‎

A similar balance of mutual deterrence is also being ‎hammered out on Syrian soil, opposite Iran. Foreign ‎media outlets may keep reporting on alleged Israeli ‎strikes against Iranian assets in Syria, but since ‎Israel and Iran traded blows in May—after Iranian-‎backed troops fired missiles at the Golan Heights—Israel has been making a conscious effort not to ‎target Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps officials in Syria.‎

In Gaza, however, Israeli deterrence has ‎been eroded, at times to the point of seeming ‎hollow, and the last few weeks have taught us that ‎deterrence is not enough to prevent rocket fire and ‎flare-ups on the border. ‎

Hamas may avoid, at this time, firing rockets deeper ‎into Israel, but it does not hesitate to fire a ‎barrage of mortar shells and Qassam rockets at ‎Israeli border-adjacent communities. Israel, for its ‎part, has opted to exercise restraint, and while it ‎does not carry out lethal attacks in Gaza, ‎it has been pounding Hamas positions there.‎

In recent weeks, it seems that Hamas has become ‎envious of the equation reached with Hezbollah and ‎seeks to impose a similar one on the Gaza border, ‎meaning to deny the Israel Defense Forces its operational freedom ‎along the security fence by way of cementing a ‎reality in which any Israeli strike in Gaza would ‎trigger a rocket salvo on the south. ‎

In the absence of a comprehensive, long-term Israeli ‎strategy with respect to Hamas rule in Gaza, and in ‎the absence of a viable alternative to this rule, ‎Israel has, time and again, been forced to accept ‎understanding brokers with Hamas via Egyptian ‎mediation.‎

It seems that now, Israel is willing to undertake ‎even broader understandings that would limit its ‎operational freedom along the border. This time, ‎however, it is doubtful Hamas can ensure peace and ‎quiet along the border.‎

Hamas, unlike Hezbollah, lacks solid domestic ‎support, and it would struggle to enforce a ceasefire on the rival terrorist groups in Gaza, which ‎repeatedly flout its authority. ‎

Moreover, Gaza is under a maritime Israeli ‎blockade, as well as strict Israeli and Egyptian ‎limitations on land crossings, which have rendered ‎its economy to shambles. This means that Hamas has no ‎clear interest to enforce a ceasefire and prevent ‎an escalation.‎

One can only hope that despite the Swiss cheese-like ‎nature of any deal with Hamas, Gaza’s rulers would ‎be able to uphold the temporary truce for a while. ‎

Eyal Zisser is a lecturer in the Middle East History Department at Tel Aviv University.