The collapse of Bashar Assad’s regime—brought about by Syrian opposition forces with Turkey’s backing—has created an unprecedented opportunity for Ankara to redefine its role as a regional power in line with its broader Neo-Ottoman aspirations. By championing the Sunni opposition and dismantling the Alawite-led regime, Turkey has succeeded in shifting the Mideast balance of power, installing in Damascus a regime dependent on Turkey and curbing the influence of rivals such as Iran and Russia.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s policy has also been driven by Ankara’s attempt to contain the emergence of Kurdish autonomy or statehood, which, in Turkish eyes, would have a destabilizing effect, threatening the territorial integrity of Syria, Iraq, Iran and Turkey.
Ankara envisions a comprehensive role in Syria’s reconstruction and governance, leveraging its Neo-Ottomanist vision to establish lasting cultural, economic, and military influence.
For years, Erdoğan faced harsh criticism at home for his interventionist foreign policy in Syria. This criticism stemmed largely from the influx of Syrian refugees, which, according to official figures, surpassed 3 million people. However, Erdoğan refused to alter his stance. On the contrary, he adopted a Pan-Islamist approach, consistently emphasizing the importance both of hosting Syrian refugees as an expression of Islamic brotherhood and maintaining Turkey’s military presence in Syria.
It is crucial to note that even during the critical 2023 general election campaign, Erdoğan did not change the stubborn approach that had already shaken his government’s political stability. For the first time in his political career, he failed to secure victory in the first round of elections, largely due to Turkey’s faltering economy. However, the electorate did not separate economic issues from the Syrian civil war. The Syrian refugee issue, which fueled xenophobia and rising unemployment, along with the rising costs of sponsoring a deadlocked war were seen as the reasons behind the deterioration of the economy. This was Erdoğan’s Achilles’ heel. Yet, against all odds—and partly due to the Turkish opposition’s failure to unite behind a charismatic leader such as the mayors of Istanbul or Ankara—Erdoğan once again managed to secure political survival.
Today, with the regime in Syria ousted, Erdoğan’s popularity is soaring. His supporters portray him as “the conqueror of Syria.” Unsurprisingly, Neo-Ottoman rhetoric has become a prominent feature of public discourse. Both mainstream institutional media and Erdoğan’s propaganda outlets frequently reference Ottoman history to emphasize Turkey’s organic ties to Syria.
These media outlets not only highlight the historical fact that the Turks dominated the region for 402 years but also seek to deepen the Turkish public’s connection to Syria by invoking the armed struggle of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, founder of the Turkish Republic. In 1918, as commander of the 7th Army, Ataturk fought the British on the “Palestine front.” The emphasis on Ataturk’s battles, along with his view that Syria and “Palestine” were integral parts of the Ottoman-Turkish homeland, aimed to win over nationalist and secularist segments of Turkish society in support of Erdoğan’s Neo-Ottomanist foreign policy.
Turkish authorities have already transformed Mustafa Kemal’s former headquarters in the Syrian city of Afrin into a pilgrimage site adorned with Turkish flags and portraits of Ataturk. As Ankara seeks to persuade the Turkish public to embrace an expanded Turkish presence in Syria, turning the country into a new Turkish-Ottoman-style province makes it easier for the government to justify its ambitious investments.
The blueprint for this policy is evident in the significant statements made by Turkey’s transportation and infrastructure minister, Abdulkadir Uraloglu, on Dec. 24. When asked about Turkey’s potential investments in a post-Assad Syria, the minister stated that just as the administration provided essential humanitarian aid, goods and services for victims of the Feb. 6, 2023 earthquake in Turkey, Ankara is now delivering all necessary support to Syria, as if the country were already part of Turkey.
This Turkish modus operandi is also visible in other regions where Turkey has already established a presence. The minister declared Turkey’s willingness to build, repair and equip Damascus and Aleppo airports with radars, which could also serve military purposes. In addition, Turkey will most likely provide mobile phone networks and electricity infrastructure to address Syria’s needs in these sectors.
Furthermore, as an administration deeply connected to Ottoman heritage, Uraloglu emphasized Ankara’s ambition to revive Sultan Abdulhamid II’s Ottoman Hejaz Railway to establish a direct line between Istanbul and Damascus. Syria’s new Transport Minister, Bahaddin Sharma, endorsed the project and described the construction of the Gaziantep-Aleppo line as the first step.
Uraloglu also drew attention to Syria’s poor highway infrastructure and the strategic importance of highways during wartime. In this context, he stressed the significance of the M4 and M5 highways, and signaled plans to construct new bridges and highways to meet the needs of the Turkish Ministry of National Defense. These new highways will be designed according to the strategic priorities of the Turkish chief of staff—a clear indication of Turkey’s long-term objectives in Syria.
According to reports in the Turkish and Arab media, Turkey also intends to expand its military presence in Syria. In addition to existing deployments in northern Syria, particularly in the Afrin, Jarabulus and Tel Al-Abyad cantons, Turkey now seeks to establish new army bases in various locations, especially in Damascus and Tartus. Arab sources have said that the future Turkish military presence in Syria is also intended to deter Israel from taking unilateral actions in the country.
Turkish ambitions in Syria appear to extend beyond the territorial. Uraloglu noted that Turkey plans to sign a maritime delimitation agreement to conduct hydrocarbon seismic research with the new Syrian government to maximize its own interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. This treaty will most likely be shaped at the expense of the Republic of Cyprus’ exclusive economic zone and territorial waters as defined by the European Union’s “Map of Seville” which is based on the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
As part of its “Blue Homeland” naval doctrine, Turkey rejects the UNCLOS provisions referring to every island’s right to declare its own continental shelf i.e., 12 miles of territorial waters and an exclusive economic zone. In 2019, Turkey signed a maritime delimitation agreement with Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA), challenging the E.U.-backed maritime claims of Greece and Cyprus. Therefore, the new agreement with Syria is likely to further undermine the legitimacy of UNCLOS and the Map of Seville.
The signing of the treaty can only be delayed if the European Union invests in Syria’s reconstruction, as E.U. Commission president Ursula von der Leyen pledged to the Turkish president during her visit to Ankara on Dec. 17 last year.
In conclusion, the fall of the Assad regime and Turkey’s involvement in shaping post-war Syria signifies a shift in the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. Through its assertive Neo-Ottomanist policies, Ankara has sought not only to dismantle the Alawite-dominated regime and counter Iranian and Russian influence but also to become the primary architect of Syria’s future—provided that Qatari-E.U. reconstruction money is channeled via Turkey. Turkey aims to extend its sphere of influence and consolidate its position as a regional power in line with Ottoman legacy. The proposed maritime delimitation agreement, the emphasis on infrastructure development and a deepening military presence all signal Ankara’s ambition to entrench its influence in the region.
This strategy, while bolstering Erdoğan’s domestic image, also presents significant challenges, particularly for neighboring states and above all for Israel and the Republic of Cyprus. In this context, Jerusalem must proceed with great caution. While maintaining close relations with the Hellenic states, the Jewish state should do everything possible to avoid turning Turkey into an active enemy while simultaneously safeguarding its freedom of operation in Syria without making any concessions. This is a challenging task, but not an impossible one.
Originally published by the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.