Three days before the Hamas-led massacre of 1,200 people in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, I stood on Mount Dov (Har Dov), overlooking the borders with Lebanon and Syria. At the base of the mountain sat a Hezbollah tent, erected squarely inside Israeli territory. I asked senior Israeli officials why an armed provocation by a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization committed to Israel’s destruction was tolerated.
The answers varied: containment, management, not making waves. I replied that if this were an American military, the tent would have been destroyed immediately.
On Oct. 8, it was.
Israel moved overnight from a strategy of containment to one of preemption in the wake of the Hamas-led terrorist attacks in southern Israel on Oct. 7.
I returned to Israel’s northern border this month to assess the current confrontation with Hezbollah, building on years of visits during previous rounds of fighting. From the Western Galilee near Rosh Hanikra to the Hula Valley, Israel’s narrow northern panhandle pointing toward Lebanon, I spoke with soldiers in the Israel Defense Forces, local officials and residents who chose not to evacuate. Over two years, I witnessed multiple live-fire incidents and heard firsthand what it means to live under constant threat.
After Oct. 7, an estimated 40,000 to 60,000 Israelis were evacuated from border communities due to fears of a mass Hezbollah incursion by its elite Radwan forces. While many residents are now attempting to rebuild their lives, they do so knowing that just across the border, the IDF strikes Hezbollah targets almost daily.
Why? Because the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are unwilling or unable to fulfill the ceasefire’s core requirement: the disarmament of Hezbollah south of the Litani River and, ultimately, throughout Lebanon. U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1701 and 1559 explicitly mandate such disarmament and have for decades. None have been enforced.
Lebanon must be understood in direct contrast to Syria. In Syria, more U.S. policymakers increasingly acknowledge that forcing a strong centralized authority, especially one dominated by jihadist elements, poses a grave threat to minority communities, such as the Druze, Kurds, Christians and Alawites, and that some form of decentralization may be necessary for stability.
Lebanon presents the opposite case. The absence of a strong, sovereign central government has allowed Hezbollah to function as a parallel military power with veto authority over national decisions. For Lebanon to escape permanent state failure, the restoration of a strong centralized government free of Hezbollah’s coercion is not optional. It is essential.
The LAF claims it has fulfilled ceasefire obligations and disarmed Hezbollah south of the Litani. The Lebanese prime minister even declared that “the role of the militias has ended.” Yet according to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Hezbollah has instead systematically embedded its military infrastructure within civilian areas, ensuring that superficial enforcement measures leave its core capabilities intact.
According to the Alma Research and Education Center, the LAF’s own documentation of “operational control” in Southern Lebanon never once mentions Hezbollah by name, and the evidence provided of genuine demilitarization is minimal at best.
Meanwhile, Hezbollah continues to demand an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory, an end to Israeli strikes and the return of captured terrorists without relinquishing its weapons.
During meetings with officers from Israel’s 91st Division, I learned that Hezbollah violations identified on a daily basis must first be passed to American mediators, who then ask the LAF to act. When the LAF does respond, it is often delayed and rarely accompanied by verifiable proof that weapons or infrastructure have actually been removed.
This is hardly surprising. Roughly half of the LAF is Shi’ite, many sympathetic to Hezbollah, which has long infiltrated state institutions. The Lebanese government’s overriding concern is avoiding another catastrophic civil war among Shiites, Sunnis, Druze and Christians, even if that means tolerating Hezbollah’s parallel army.
So what should be done?
First, the United States must push for a transition from indirect mediation to direct Israeli-Lebanese military communication to de-escalate and establish accountability for Hezbollah’s disarmament.
Second, Washington must insist that the Lebanese government authorize the LAF to enter private homes in order to uncover weapons caches and tunnel networks. Hezbollah has embedded its military infrastructure inside civilian villages for decades. Without addressing private property, disarmament efforts are a charade.
Third, any confiscation of weapons must include verifiable destruction, not temporary seizure followed by quiet return. American mediators should require photographic, forensic and on-site confirmation.
Fourth, Hezbollah’s extensive tunnel networks within and between villages remain largely intact and await reactivation. When Israel identifies a tunnel, the United States must insist that the LAF destroy it and that international personnel verify its elimination on the ground.
Israel currently maintains five fortified “shield” outposts inside Lebanese territory, positioned on key terrain. According to IDF officers, these positions serve Israel’s post-Oct. 7 doctrine: placing Israeli forces between civilians and terrorists. The IDF officers I spoke with believe that Hezbollah, if it retaliates, would limit attacks to these military sites rather than Israeli towns south of the Blue Line to limit Israel’s response. Others I spoke with believe Hezbollah would once again target Israeli civilians, underscoring the fragility of deterrence.
Finally, Lebanon’s appeal for increased U.S. funding to expand and better pay the LAF must be conditioned on performance. Additional aid should not flow until the LAF demonstrates genuine efforts to dismantle Hezbollah weapons depots, drone production and tunnel infrastructure—first in Southern Lebanon and then in Hezbollah’s stronghold in the Bekaa Valley.
Israel’s northern residents deserve more than promises. So do the Lebanese people. Disarmament cannot be symbolic, selective or reversible. Without accountability, enforcement, and verification, Hezbollah will remain armed, embedded and ready, leaving both countries on the brink of the next war.
