Sudan’s collapse is both a humanitarian and strategic crisis. Islamist networks aligned with Iran are exploiting the country’s turmoil, turning Sudan into a potential launchpad against Israel—another Yemen, but closer and far more dangerous. Stopping Sudan from becoming Iran’s next Red Sea proxy is Israel’s key strategic test.
Israel’s primary threat is no longer conventional armies or hostile Arab regimes. The real danger comes from failing states controlled by Islamist militias, whose legitimacy depends on attacking Israel and serving as proxies for Iran. These groups exploit governance vacuums, ignore international norms, and use Iranian-supplied rockets, drones and missiles to project power. Sudan is emerging as the next front in this expanding network of Iranian proxies, creating a strategic challenge Israel must address decisively.
Sudan, less than 1,000 kilometers (about 620 miles) from Eilat, has joined the ranks of failed states like Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, Somalia and Iraq. This proximity creates a dual threat: armed jihadist groups on the ground and a major political crisis if Israel is compelled to respond. Like Hamas and Hezbollah, Sudanese Islamists would exploit schools and hospitals, in addition to using civilians as human shields. The threat from Sudan would be far worse than the Houthis in Yemen. Allowing Iran to control Sudan would put deadly weapons and hostile forces right on Israel’s doorstep.
For nearly 40 years, Sudan has functioned as a major hub of terrorism, and its post-independence history has been defined by wars, coups and state collapse. The Muslim Brotherhood’s Islamization project under Omar al-Bashir, a Sudanese former military officer and politician who served as head of state under various titles from 1989 until 2019, when he was deposed in a coup d’état, transformed internal disorder into genocide, radicalization and the export of terrorism across the region. Sudan’s structural problems—its geography, tribal fragmentation, environmental stress and long-standing geopolitical marginalization—remain deeply entrenched and difficult to resolve.
Sudan has long been a hub for Islamist militancy and transnational terrorist networks. In the 1980s and 1990s, Khartoum openly hosted Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Abu Nidal and Al-Qaeda. In 1997, Hamas founder Ahmed Yassin was welcomed to Sudan, granted land and offices, and publicly celebrated as a hero of the anti-Israel struggle. Sudan facilitated militant training, financing and operations, including Abu Nidal’s 1988 attacks and networks behind the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.
Iran’s ties to Sudanese Islamists date back decades. Tehran supplied weapons, training, intelligence and helped build Sudan’s military-industrial base. Khartoum became a rare bridge between Sunni and Shi’a Islamist movements, enabling joint operations. Today, Tehran is exploiting Sudan’s civil war and the vulnerabilities of Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)—dominated by Islamist factions—to build a proxy state on the Red Sea, replicating its success with the Houthis in Yemen.
Al-Burhan attempts to distance himself from the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran since he needs the United States and Europe on his side. His career, however, was built inside the Brotherhood-aligned National Islamic Front/National Congress Party. The SAF’s senior officers remain dominated by the Islamist elite. He has rehabilitated leading Islamists and sidelined secular rivals. He increasingly relies on Iranian and Belarusian arms shipped via Eritrea’s dictator, Isaias Afwerki, one of Tehran’s closest non-Arab partners. And in fighting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the SAF has deepened its dependence on Islamist networks and Iran.
Sudan’s large territory, advanced military infrastructure and trained personnel could support multiple Islamist factions equipped with Iranian drones, missiles and maritime strike capabilities operating dangerously close to Israel. Gaza already showed how quickly the world isolates Israel when it defends itself. A collapsed Sudan—hosting several militant factions instead of one—could become Gaza amplified.
Israel’s security and military establishment underestimated the capabilities of the Houthis based in Yemen—their long-range missiles, Red Sea blockades, and coordination with Iran and other jihadist networks. When the Houthis struck the United Arab Emirates in January 2022, it became clear that Eilat could be next. If Israel and the United States continue to overlook Sudan’s war, new Iran-backed and Islamist factions will emerge to destabilize the Red Sea corridor and threaten U.S. interests, as well as launch attacks and missiles against Israel and Western vessels.
The UAE is the only state actively resisting the Muslim Brotherhood’s return to power in Sudan, both to prevent a regional security disaster and to halt decades of genocide against non-Arab Sudanese. For this stance, the UAE is targeted relentlessly by the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies in the West. However, as in Yemen, the UAE cannot contain Iran alone. Unfortunately, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, pursuing short-term tactical gains, are now backing the SAF Islamists. Just as the Houthis avoid attacking Saudi Arabia or Egypt, Sudan’s Islamists will target Israel to gain legitimacy while sparing their Arab backers.
Israel must lead a peaceful strategy to secure Sudan and the wider Red Sea region, including the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, Yemen and the Horn of Africa. The plan should focus on three steps:
- Forge strategic alliances with Ethiopia, the UAE, Yemen and the Tigrinya movement.
- Remove the Eritrean dictator by breaking his media monopoly through 24/7 satellite radio and TV broadcasting.
- Build a security partnership with NATO to ensure naval support.
Once Isaias, who not only enables Iran but also destabilizes Ethiopia and Sudan, is removed, stabilizing both countries becomes achievable. A combined 200,000 to 250,000 Ethiopian-Eritrean force could defeat the Houthis, support a legitimate Yemeni government and prevent eastern Sudan from becoming a missile launchpad. Israel and NATO would provide air and naval support, while Gulf States, India, Japan, the United States, Europe and other users of the shipping lanes would finance the operation. As momentum builds, Egypt and Saudi Arabia would be expected to join, reinforcing regional stability.
This coordinated effort would secure Sudan, stabilize the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, and give Israel, Eritrea and Ethiopia new regional influence, strategic access and global leverage in the emerging order.
Sudan is not a peripheral concern. It is a defining test of Israel’s security, deterrence and long-term regional influence.
