Many wonder why the Houthis have largely held back from striking Israel, despite the escalating confrontation with Iran.
Two factors help explain this restraint: a split among operatives of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Yemen over whether the Houthis should intervene, and the Houthis’ own interest in consolidating power at home after the coalition that once fought them—led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—has effectively collapsed.
Over the past month, many observers expected escalation across the Middle East as tensions around Iran intensified. Yet few anticipated the scale and timing of the latest developments. Among the most surprised appear to be the movement’s leaders in Yemen. While they were aware that confrontation was possible, the current situation seems to have unfolded faster—and more dramatically—than they had anticipated.
Inside Yemen, reports from analysts and regional watchers suggest that operatives linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps are not entirely aligned on how the Houthis should respond. Some argue that they must immediately escalate in support of Iran and demonstrate that the so-called “axis of resistance” remains united. Others believe that restraint is strategically wiser.
Their argument is straightforward: If Iran itself faces severe internal or external pressure—even collapse—then Yemen could become the last intact operational base for the “axis of resistance.” Preserving the Houthis’ military capabilities today may therefore be more valuable than expending them in a premature confrontation.
For now, uncertainty dominates. Even those who closely follow the Houthis acknowledge that the movement is under mounting pressure to act.
In his recent speech, Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi reaffirmed strong support for Iran, warning that the group’s “hands are on the trigger” should circumstances require military intervention. Framing the conflict in ideological terms, he portrayed the ongoing U.S.-Israeli campaign as a broader war against Islam and Muslim nations. “America came to us,” he said, repeatedly pointing his finger as he delivered the message.
From the outbreak of the war following the Oct. 7 attacks until the eventual ceasefire between Hamas and Israel, the Houthis carried out one of the longest sustained campaigns against Israel. According to the Israel Defense and Security Forum, they launched approximately 899 aerial attacks, including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and long-range drones aimed at Israeli territory. At the same time, the Houthis targeted international shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, disrupting one of the world’s most critical trade corridors and effectively forcing the closure of Israel’s southern port at the Port of Eilat.
Their continuous attacks against Israel during the Gaza war were aimed at positioning themselves as defenders of Jerusalem and the Al-Aqsa Mosque. Through this campaign, the Houthis sought to cultivate legitimacy both within Yemen and across the Arab world.
By presenting themselves as the only actor willing to act militarily in solidarity with Gaza, the Houthis strengthened their domestic political standing while boosting their prestige across the Arab and Muslim world. In that sense, the attacks were not only a strategic service to Iran’s resistance axis but also a calculated effort by the Houthis to enhance their own legitimacy and influence.
The Houthis’ behavior during the brief “12-day war” between Israel and Iran in June 2025 offers important insight into their strategic approach. Despite strong rhetoric and declarations of solidarity with Tehran, the Houthis refrained from military escalation against Israel. Rather than acting as an immediate strike force, they functioned as a strategic reserve within the resistance axis, signaling both readiness and caution.
Yet the Houthis’ calculations are shaped not only by their loyalty to Tehran but by their growing political ambition inside Yemen. The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which ultimately led to the collapse of the coalition against the Houthis (combined with Riyadh’s increasing tolerance), has created a new strategic reality.
For the first time, the Houthis see a realistic path toward consolidating long-term control over much of Yemen. Engaging right now in a major confrontation with Israel and the United States would risk devastating strikes on their infrastructure and leadership just as they are working to solidify power at home.
The IRGC operatives in Iran and the Houthis themselves now face a difficult strategic calculation: Should they respond immediately—risking heavy retaliatory strikes from both Israel and the United States that could significantly degrade their capabilities—or remain quiet to preserve themselves as a long-term deterrent force, capable of threatening maritime routes and regional targets if the conflict escalates in the future?
In many ways, the Houthis represent Iran’s most resilient, but also more autonomous, remaining proxy force. While the Houthis identify as Shia, their beliefs and practices diverge in significant ways from mainstream Shia Islam. The death of Ayatollah Khamenei, though a blow to their ideological patron, is unlikely to provoke Abdul‑Malik al‑Houthi to act recklessly or engage in suicidal attacks in response to Israeli strikes.
The question is not whether they can act, but whether Tehran decides that the moment has arrived—and whether the Houthis are willing to risk the unique opportunity now created in Yemen, where the Saudi-UAE rivalries have shifted in their favor.
Until that decision is made, Yemen may remain what some strategists believe it has quietly become: the final strategic reserve of Iran’s regional axis.
The dilemma for Washington and Jerusalem is whether to launch a preemptive strike against the Houthis while U.S. carriers are present to prevent the group from consolidating capabilities that could threaten Israeli and U.S. interests.
