Since Hamas rose to power in Gaza in 2007, its complete dependence on Israeli electricity and diesel fuel was considered a strategic advantage by Israeli policymakers.
Before the outbreak of the current war, half of Gaza’s electricity was supplied by Israel through 10 power lines. This supply continued despite the Palestinian Authority’s refusal to pay for it, creating a 2 billion shekel ($530.3 million) debt in the budget of the Israel Electric Corporation (IEC). The other half was produced domestically in Gaza—partly by the Strip’s single power plant, which ran on diesel fuel supplied by Israel, and partly by thousands of small-scale diesel generators in public buildings and private homes. In other words, almost all Gaza’s energy needs were provided by Israel through unpaid debt.
In theory, the resulting economic burden on Israeli companies and taxpayers was compensated by the perceived strategic advantage of leverage over Hamas. Israeli decision makers assumed that the threat of cutting off electricity and diesel to the Strip would deter Hamas and provide tactical advantages during periodic rounds of violence. This assumption was quickly discredited during the first month of the war, when Israel reversed its initial decision to cut power to Gaza and the Israel Defense Forces began sending fuel trucks back into the Strip.
Israel soon discovered that its ability to use electricity and fuel supply as a weapon of war is severely limited, for two main reasons. The first is that the residents of Gaza, including Hamas, are accustomed to living without electricity from the main grid and have already developed alternative solutions. In the past decade, over 9,000 off-grid solar PV installations have been installed on Gaza’s residential and commercial rooftops that together can provide between 25%-40% of Gaza’s electricity during the day. Hospitals, schools, government buildings and logistical warehouses all complement solar power with private generators that provide electricity the rest of the time. Hamas itself connected its tunnels to underground generators for lighting and ventilation and stockpiled over one million liters of diesel fuel, enough to keep them running for many months, in preparation for the war. As such, Hamas was not directly affected by Israel’s electricity cut.
The second reason is that the energy cut-off also blocked the ability to produce potable water in Gaza, leading to a humanitarian crisis. Groundwater in Gaza is mostly contaminated and not fit for human consumption. This is mostly the result of local over-production and unregulated well drilling, which allowed sewage and seawater to penetrate underground aquifers. As such, Gaza’s water must go through special treatment facilities to become drinkable. Alternatively, water can be produced by a large desalination plant in Deir al-Balah. Neither facility can function without a direct connection to a working power grid or constant supply of diesel fuel to their private generators. The facility in Deir al-Balah alone requires over 3,200 liters of diesel per hour to operate at peak capacity. As a result, Israel rushed to supply its own drinking water, but the amount was insufficient. The lack of functioning water and sewage treatment facilities led to a serious water shortage and an outbreak of disease in the Gaza Strip, including polio.
The ensuing crisis resulted in unprecedented international pressure that forced Israel to supply diesel fuel to Gaza. Starting in mid-November 2023, Israel trucked almost 60,000 liters of diesel into Gaza every day, at its own expense. This was despite concerns that Hamas was likely to steal some of the fuel and replenish the supply to its underground generators. Moreover, the mere threats of then-Energy Minister Israel Katz to cut Gaza’s power and water supplies were later used by the International Court of Justice as evidence that Israel is carrying out illegal collective punishment in Gaza. The Court’s interim ruling in January 2024 required Israel to ensure the continued supply of fuel and water to the Strip, even if it makes the IDF’s operations more difficult.
Faced with the problem of supplying energy to the Strip without its falling into the hands of Hamas, Israel began reconnecting facilities in Gaza directly to the Israeli grid. For example, at the beginning of July 2024, Israel connected its grid to the Deir al-Balah desalination facility, garnering harsh criticism from members of Israel’s ruling coalition. The logic behind the decision was to alleviate Gaza’s water crisis without needing to constantly transport diesel to the facility’s generators using trucks that could be hijacked by Hamas. However, it marked a worrying trend of restoring Gaza’s complete dependence on direct Israeli electricity supply.
An important lesson of the war is that the post-war reconstruction of Gaza should include a more self-sufficient energy sector in Gaza. Without it, Israel will not be able to escape the responsibility of indefinitely providing for the basic needs of Gaza’s two million residents. To this end, Israel must promote the establishment of more autonomous energy infrastructure in Gaza. While the projects would be financed, established and maintained by international parties, Israel should maintain control over the approval and planning process to make sure they aren’t used once again as cover for the construction of underground military facilities.
In the first stage, Israel should promote the rapid adoption of rooftop solar PV panels in Gaza to generate electricity independently of the grid. These panels would replace and double those destroyed during the war. Gaza already had impressive solar capabilities before October 2023, but the installations were often built without any safety measures or regulation to improve efficiency. These installations can be supplemented by batteries and additional energy storage solutions that would promise grid stability and additional hours of electricity in the evening. Israeli companies can even take part in at least some of these projects, or use Israeli products as a condition in the tender for foreign financing to make it more palatable for the current Israeli government.
In the second stage, Israel should push to connect Gaza’s electricity grid to those of neighboring countries so it can gradually disconnect from Gaza completely. At the top of the list is Egypt, which is already connected to Gaza by four power lines. Jordan and Saudi Arabia can be added later. The inclusion of Gaza in the “Great Sea Interconnector” project, which is designed to connect Israel’s electricity grid with that of Cyprus via a subsea power line, may make this ambitious project more attractive for European entities to finance.
Over the next few years, the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank should also be able to serve as an electricity supplier to Gaza following the planned construction of several gas-powered power plants in Area A. By connecting the Gaza grid with that of the West Bank, the P.A. will have to take on the difficult task of collecting payments from Gaza’s residents on its own, rather than going through Israel.
In the third stage, Gaza should turn to the sea to meet its energy needs as part of the “Gas 4 Gaza” project. This will first include development of the “Gaza Marine” gas field off the coast of Gaza. The field contains about 30 BCM of natural gas and can theoretically supply the Strip’s electricity needs for at least 10 years. The current Israeli government already approved the development of Gaza’s gas field in June 2023, with the intention that an Egyptian energy company would develop it and purchase some of the gas for its own needs. Secondly, the move requires the construction of a new power plant in the Gaza Strip that can be powered by natural gas. This plant was already in the final stages of approval by Israel before the war erupted, and was planned to be built over the next few years. The station will also be able to connect to Egypt via its gas pipelines, eventually purchasing Egyptian gas once the Gaza Marine reserves dwindle.
Independent electricity generation in Gaza can also help alleviate Israel’s responsibility to provide potable water to Palestinian residents in both Gaza and the West Bank. Domestic water needs can be supplied in full following the construction of two additional desalination facilities on Gaza’s shoreline. These facilities could then be connected to the West Bank, providing water for Palestinians in both areas without the need for Israel to maintain the infrastructure or chase the Palestinian Authority for payment.
There are other solutions to promote energy independence in Gaza, some even more ambitious than those mentioned above. These include establishing an artificial island off the coast of Gaza to receive imported diesel fuel and other products by sea. This would allow Israel to monitor goods and resources entering Gaza before they reach the mainland. Such projects obviously depend on three main factors: 1) the identity of the government in the Gaza Strip in the coming years, 2) the identity of the donors willing to finance these projects, and 3) Israel’s willingness to be involved in their approval and establishment.
Whether Israel wants it or not, the Gaza Strip will eventually be reconstructed, and energy and water infrastructure will be the first to be rehabilitated. Israel can choose to ignore this reality, but in doing so, it will open Gaza’s energy sector to other forces that will determine what the Strip will look like in the future and to what extent Israel will remain responsible for the needs of millions of Gaza’s residents. Israel would do well to be the side that initiates long-term plans to reshape Gaza’s infrastructure in a manner that benefits both Gazans and Israelis for decades to come.
Originally published by the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.
