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Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen

The 1990s interim agreements with the Palestinians are based on failed premises that have created terror hotbeds. It is time to chart a new path forward.
At this strategic watershed moment, the policy that has guided the Netanyahu government for the past decade—that it is in Israel’s interest for Hamas to remain in control in Gaza—becomes clearer.
When former security officials justify far-reaching territorial concessions “because the preservation of certain values overrides the importance of land,” they do so from a clear political vantage point.
Surrender to a potentially hostile Palestinian state would make the defense of the Israeli hinterland virtually impossible.
Israel has laid out three goals it wants to achieve in Syria: stopping the development of the terrorist front on the Golan Heights; preventing Iranian military entrenchment in Syria; and preventing Hezbollah and Iranian forces from arming themselves with long-range weapons.
Israel’s attitude towards its presence in a temporary space—an attitude that has us waiting for an agreement and eventual withdrawal—is what gives hope to terrorism.
The Hamas leadership, which apparently is not interested in war, nevertheless chose to respond by escalating to the very brink. Why has the Israeli government refrained (yet again) from instructing the IDF to settle the Hamas threat?
Extricating itself from President Bill Clinton’s December 2000 “peace” parameters is a supreme Israeli interest. Ironically, this goal is being made feasible by the crystallizing deal with Hamas over the Gaza Strip.