With the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s intransigence on nuclear issues and the Hezbollah front on the verge of escalating into a broader ground conflict, it is understandable that American policymakers and much of the media have shifted their attention away from the Gaza Strip. From a U.S. national security perspective, Gaza appears relatively quiet.
But that quiet is deceptive. My analysis is based on numerous visits and meetings in and around Gaza over the last 30 months, including discussions with military intelligence, and brigade and division officials in the Israel Defense Forces, strategic defense and security experts, politicians and residents of nearby communities.
Unsurprisingly, Hamas has refused to disarm. In fact, it has grown stronger since the ceasefire began, rebuilding its infrastructure, reconstituting its forces and tightening its grip on the population. It now controls roughly 41% of Gaza’s territory and effectively dominates civilian life.
According to military intelligence, Hamas continues to divert and resell humanitarian and commercial goods entering Gaza, using the proceeds to finance its military capabilities. Any food insecurity is therefore a direct result of Hamas’s actions, as the quantity of foodstuffs entering Gaza has been more than sufficient over the past two years, according to my sources.
U.S. President Donald Trump and the international coalition he has helped to form face a choice: Confront the reality of an irreconcilable Hamas or obscure it.
Nickolay Mladenov, a key figure on the Board of Peace, along with other officials, may frame Hamas’s latest response on disarmament as progress, but it should not be interpreted as a concession. Hamas’s demand that Israel withdraw from Gaza before disarmament begins is a complete nonstarter. The Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC) has also struck an optimistic tone, emphasizing the durability of the ceasefire and pointing to a pathway toward a nonpolitical, technocratic government not under Hamas’s control, alongside an International Stabilization Force (ISF) to enforce order.
But this optimism ignores hard truths.
Recent Palestinian elections offer a cautionary precedent. Even when formally excluded, Hamas has demonstrated its ability to exert behind-the-scenes influence, vetting candidates and shaping outcomes. It is no surprise that these elections drew so few voters. Any future “technocratic” government in Gaza would likely face the same reality: Comply with Hamas or risk violent retribution.
The proposed ISF raises similar concerns. Because Hamas is unwilling to disarm, the ISF may serve less as a stabilizing force and more as a constraint on Israeli military action, in effect, a human shield. It would likely act as a buffer between the IDF and Hamas operatives, entrenching Hamas rather than facilitating its dismantlement.
Meanwhile, conditions on the ground tell a more sobering story.
Based on my most recent interview with a divisional lieutenant colonel in military intelligence, extensive tunnel networks continue to be uncovered daily in areas under Israeli control in eastern Gaza, the so-called Green Zone. These are not makeshift passages but sophisticated, deeply embedded systems. Discovering and dismantling them is a painstaking process: massive above-ground rubble must be removed, tunnels exposed and then dismantled from their foundations to prevent reconstruction. Military officials estimate this effort could take months, if not years. Many of these underground structures were built for long-term use, making them particularly difficult to neutralize.
In Hamas-controlled areas (the “Red Zone,” comprising roughly 41% of western Gaza), including Gaza City and Khan Yunis, the situation is even more dangerous and complex. Tunnel networks remain largely intact; those damaged have often been rebuilt during the ceasefire. These systems are frequently multilayered beneath densely populated urban environments, effectively shielded by a civilian population of around 2 million Gazans.
If Israel ultimately moves to dismantle Hamas militarily—because it will not disarm voluntarily—it will almost certainly require sustained U.S. backing over the extended time needed to complete the mission. Yet the political and media environment in the United States complicates this calculus. The inevitable images of destruction and human suffering, regardless of context, will once again dominate coverage, reinforcing narratives that portray Israel as the aggressor.
At the same time, shifting political dynamics in Washington could further constrain Israeli action. Growing voices within the Democratic Party are calling for restrictions on military aid to Israel, even for purely defensive systems. Should those voices gain power, particularly in Congress, which is plausible, the pressure and scrutiny on Israel will intensify, especially if conflicts on the Lebanese and Iranian fronts remain active.
For Trump, the pursuit of visible foreign policy achievements may also shape decision-making. U.S. and Israeli interests do not always align perfectly. Gaza and Lebanon may present more immediate opportunities for short-term “wins,” particularly if the confrontation with Iran settles into a temporary stalemate. As a result, Washington may press Israel to maintain ceasefires in both the north and south and to avoid actions that could derail diplomatic initiatives, further constraining Israeli operations against Hamas and Hezbollah.
This creates a strategic dilemma for Israel and its American partner.
While the threat from Gaza is real and growing, the broader confrontation with Iran must remain the priority. Escalation in Gaza risks diverting attention, resources and political capital away from Tehran at a critical moment. Persistent disruptions to global energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz will command the president’s attention, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will likely have limited room to maneuver.
In this context, restraint in Gaza may be strategically necessary, even if operationally frustrating. The longer Hamas remains entrenched, the less likely the Board of Peace and its affiliated mechanisms will ultimately succeed in disarming it. Only the IDF is willing and capable of disarming Hamas. Israel’s leadership may therefore need to defer action in Gaza to maintain focus on Iran, the more consequential front.
The challenge is not choosing between threats, but sequencing them wisely.
