Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu repeatedly declared that the war’s objective was to eliminate Hamas. Israel failed. Whether one believes it was always unrealistic or was cut short by U.S. pressure, the result is undeniable—Hamas survives, governs and is rebuilding.
By late summer, Israel had launched what was billed as the decisive campaign to capture Gaza City. Sone 60,000 reservists were mobilized. The Israel Defense Forces warned that the operation could take a year, given Hamas’s vast tunnel network, booby traps and the presence of Israeli hostages. Roughly 800,000 civilians were expected to evacuate, even as Hamas urged them to defy Israeli orders and remain in place.
By the 699th day of the war, Israel controlled roughly 40% of Gaza City, and on Sept. 16 launched a major ground offensive to capture the rest. But a week earlier, a botched Israeli attempt to assassinate Hamas leaders in Qatar had infuriated U.S. President Donald Trump and set in motion negotiations that resulted in his 20-point peace plan. Trump then compelled Netanyahu to halt the offensive to implement the plan’s first phase—an immediate ceasefire and the release of all remaining living hostages. In an extraordinary step, the president personally assured Hamas that Israel would not be permitted to resume fighting, as it had after the March ceasefire.
In accordance with the plan, Israel withdrew to a “yellow line” that left Hamas in control of roughly 47% of Gaza. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz later disclosed that 60% of Hamas’s tunnel network remained intact. Israeli intelligence estimates that roughly 20,000 Hamas fighters are still active.
Assessments of Hamas’s condition diverge sharply. Former Mossad counterterrorism chief Oded Ailam argued that by mid-September 2025, the terror group’s centralized rule had collapsed. When Israel ordered evacuations from northern Gaza, some 350,000 civilians complied—openly defying Hamas threats. Senior commanders were dead, finances depleted, governance shattered. Power was fragmented among clans, and Hamas appeared reduced to scattered cells carrying out sporadic attacks reflecting desperation rather than strategy.
Other reporting paints a far darker picture. The Palestinian Authority daily Al-Hayat Al-Jadida reported that Hamas redeployed its police and Al-Qassam Brigades across areas outside Israeli control. It resumed taxing aid, auditing international agencies, summoning employees and running civilian life. With no rival authority, Hamas restored order, reduced looting and reasserted its grip.
The New York Times reported in December that Hamas had re-established control wherever Israel withdrew. Police patrols resumed. Fighters erected checkpoints. Rivals were executed, opponents detained, and fees imposed on goods entering Gaza. Its redeployment reduced looting and street crime, leading some residents to view its renewed presence as stabilizing despite the destruction it caused.
Reports suggested that Israel succeeded in choking off key funding channels in the West Bank, leaving Hamas unable to meet full payroll obligations for the first time in years. Cash shortages led to partial salaries and internal scavenging, exposing real economic strain. Yet this, too, is contested. Hamas is profiting from taxing aid, currency exchange fees, smuggling and informal money-transfer networks. Since the ceasefire, it has revived its tax system, expanded revenues and redirected funds to rebuild military infrastructure, including tunnels.
Israeli intelligence estimates that Hamas holds between 400 million and 1 billion shekels (roughly $127 to $318 million) in cash inside Gaza, much of it hidden in tunnels or seized early in the war from banks. According to this analysis, Hamas is financially secure for years to come.
Despite agreeing with Netanyahu on the need to defeat Hamas, Trump does not want a resumption of fighting. Instead, he is preparing to announce a “Board of Peace” and is pressing Israel to move to phase two of his plan—despite Hamas remaining armed and at least one hostage, Ran Gvili, still in Gaza. Adding insult to injury, Trump wants Hamas’s backers, Qatar and Turkey, to sit on that board.
The plan’s linchpin—an International Stabilization Force—has not materialized. No country has volunteered to disarm Hamas or risk confrontation with it. Nevertheless, Washington is pushing for a technocratic Palestinian administration to assume control of Gaza. Hamas has reportedly said it will cooperate—without disarming.
After more than two years of war, Hamas may be incapable of another Oct. 7. But it is alive, armed and ruling nearly half of Gaza. Israel did not achieve the war’s central objective. A campaign meant to destroy the terrorist organization ended instead with a ceasefire that preserved it.
That is not victory. It is, at best, a 53% one—and Israel is being told to accept it as final.
