When South African President Cyril Ramaphosa sent the United States packing—telling them he would not hand over the G20 to someone not of his stature at the closing of the summit in Johannesburg—everyone cheered. Finally, someone was “standing up to Trump” and putting him in his place. Living in the moment of adulation, he went further.
The U.S. charge d’affaires, Marc Dillard, received the G20 presidency at a low-key ceremony in the Department of International Relations and Cooperation offices in Pretoria a few days later.
It was curated political theater, and it was loudly applauded. European leaders clapped the hardest. They, of course, would never confront U.S. President Donald Trump themselves because of their concern for their trade relationship. In Ramaphosa, they had found someone who didn’t care about such trifles and was willing to roll the dice on his economy for a moment in the global spotlight.
The cost for South Africa of this moment of anti-Trump theater will be severe, including a total review of all U.S. aid and trade concessions, in addition to rescinding an invitation to next year’s G20.
Pretoria had turned down a U.S. request to be part of the handover at the G20; therefore, said the president, “at my direction, South Africa will NOT be receiving an invitation to the 2026 G20, which will be hosted in the Great City of Miami, Florida, next year.”
The South African government’s response was, incredibly, the diplomatic version of “whatever.” Ramaphosa’s spokesman said it should be accepted that “there won’t be a reset of the relationship.” “President Trump continues to apply punitive measures against South Africa based on misinformation and distortions about our country,” said Ramaphosa. Trump should act “in the spirit of multilateralism, based on consensus, with all members participating on an equal footing.”
This spat with Washington plays into the strategy being used by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) to realign South Africa, building relations with Iran, Russia, China and even Hamas, as it drifts purposefully away from the world of democratic nations.
DIRCO, which behaves like Tehran’s Africa chapter, is misleading the South African president over the extent to which this is all about Trump. “Despite the challenges and misunderstandings that have arisen, South Africa remains a firm and unwavering friend of the American people,” said Ramaphosa, when he wasn’t reciting congratulatory anonymous comments about the warmth of his country’s hospitality, not to mention the generosity of its taxpayers towards the world. “We value the United States government and its people as a partner. We have common interests, common values and a shared wish to advance the prosperity and well-being of the people of both our countries.”
This is empirically incorrect. It neglects just how consistently South Africa has voted against the United States this century on all matters in the United Nations—one bellwether of the extent to which the ANC government shares values with Washington, no matter the political stripe of the party in power there. Between 1994 and 2018, for example, voting coincidence in the U.N. General Assembly between South Africa and the United States averaged 26%, meaning the country agreed on just one in five issues in the world body with its second-largest trade partner and largest investor. On human rights, voting overlap peaked at 62.5% in 1995 and reached its nadir at 8.3% in 2013, early in the second term of President Barack Obama. On issues of economic development, the coincidence of interest was just 8.2%.
Even the most celebrationist American president would have to realize that Pretoria doesn’t like them or share its worldview, no matter who sits in the Oval Office.
Relations with China—that bastion of human rights and freedoms about which South Africa loves to reminisce—are strikingly positive. It voted with Beijing most of the time in the 23 years from 1994: in the late 1980s and early 1990s, averaging 89.1%.
It is now forgotten in the Trump frenzy, but the relationship with Washington was even in peril under his predecessor, Joe Biden. It was he who sharply criticized South Africa’s decision to accuse Israel of genocide, and it was his ambassador who said Pretoria was supplying arms to Russia.
It is perhaps even more forgotten that U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris, whom Trump defeated to ascend to the presidency, did not believe that Israel was committing genocide. When asked about the genocide issue, her campaign clarified that “this is not her position.”
South Africa now blames Trump for the breach, misunderstanding the depth of the rift.
There was a different avenue open to Ramaphosa. Instead of a thin-skinned giving up on the intemperate Trump, would it have killed him to have played the closing ceremony differently? He could have handed the G20 over to Dillard, saying he valued the U.S. relationship and was glad that he attended, albeit just for the closing ceremony. That would have been the smart play.
But DIRCO and Ramaphosa appear unable to stay calm and analyze the Trump administration’s messaging. They don’t seem to get it that when Trump accused the government of implementing “genocide” against Afrikaners, this was a direct response to South Africa accusing Israel of “genocide” in Gaza.
South Africa views Trump’s genocide accusation as subjective and a deliberate misrepresentation. But they can’t see that America views South Africa’s Israel genocide claim against Israel in the same terms.
This dysfunction is at the core of the meltdown in relations. Instead of ignoring it and acting with the same petulance as Trump, South Africa needs to find a way to sort this core issue out.
The failure to understand and deal with the Israel problem has led to several false starts. Ramaphosa’s visit to the White House was an attempt to reset relations, but Trump put the genocide matter on the table, and South Africa didn’t seem to get the message, focusing instead on the exaggerations in Trump’s presentation.
Trump sent South Africa’s U.S. representative home because of his perceived alignment against Israel. Still, Pretoria didn’t get the message.
When Trump negotiated a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, South Africa was inexplicably subdued. Instead of congratulating Trump as world leaders did at a mini-summit in Egypt, South Africa sulked, apparently bereft that the foreign policy gift of Gaza was in danger of vanishing due to an outbreak of peace.
Or perhaps this was due to the realization that South Africa would, in the interests of peace, actually have to start talking to Israel rather than simply hurling claims of genocide, starting with exchanging ambassadors. That would be inconvenient to the ideologues at DIRCO headquarters and would take some explaining back in Tehran.
Abandoning a reset with America and placing high-end manufacturing jobs at risk is a poor strategy. A better way would be to start understanding what is at the core of the broken relationship and being prepared to find some compromises that will take it forward.
Ramaphosa knows that for the rest of his presidency (barring one of those ANC recalls), Trump will be in the White House, and he has decided he has nothing to lose. Unfortunately, the country has a lot to lose by cutting ties, and a more patient, more sophisticated strategic approach is needed.
Since the road to improved relations with Washington runs through Jerusalem, don’t hold your breath.
