Colombia’s cancellation of its free-trade agreement with Israel and the expulsion of the remaining Israeli diplomats have become the latest signal of a broader diplomatic shift sweeping Latin America. The move, officially framed as a response to the interception of a Gaza-bound flotilla carrying Colombian citizens, extends a pattern of distancing that began soon after the Gaza war erupted last year.
Across the continent, governments have moved in sharply divergent directions. Left-leaning administrations in Brazil, Chile, Bolivia and Colombia have hardened their criticism of Israeli policy, recalling ambassadors and suspending cooperation in defense and trade. Others, most notably Argentina and Paraguay, have taken the opposite path, deepening partnerships, opening or relocating embassies in Jerusalem, and emphasizing technological and agricultural collaboration. What once was a region of cautious neutrality has, within two years, split into two discernible camps.
The Colombian announcement did not cause that division, but underscored its long-term implications. A series of steps, diplomatic recalls, trade freezes and symbolic gestures has transformed Latin America from a secondary theater of Israeli foreign policy into a polarized hotbed of diplomatic threats.
Before the Gaza war, Israel’s relations with Latin America were defined by a mix of strategic cooperation and political restraint. Professor Raanan Rein, a historian of modern Spain and modern Latin America at the University of Florida and former Vice President of Tel Aviv University, noted that “Israel has had very strong ties with most Latin American countries. In fact, the UN vote to establish Israel largely passed because of the support of most Latin American countries. Over the years, the relationship became more important and more substantial.”
The region served as an important market for Israeli defense exports and technology, while Latin states benefited from Israeli agricultural innovation, irrigation systems and intelligence training. Countries such as Colombia and Brazil were among Israel’s most consistent security partners. Bogotá’s purchase of Israeli Kfir fighter jets and counter-insurgency technologies reflected decades of military exchange, while Brazilian firms cooperated on water conservation, cybersecurity and precision agriculture.
Mauricio Dimant, Research Fellow of Latin American Studies at Hebrew University, noted that “after democratization in the 1980s, poverty became the central challenge in Latin America. For many countries, leaders saw technology as the way out, and Israel as proof that innovation can overcome limitations. They saw Israel as a positive example to imitate.” This network of trade and defense links gave Israel a quiet but enduring foothold in the hemisphere.
Diplomatically, most Latin American governments maintained what was often described as a “balanced” line. They endorsed a two-state solution and expressed solidarity with Palestinian aspirations, yet generally avoided public confrontation with Israel. Even under left-leaning administrations, cooperation in areas like counter-terrorism, border security and innovation continued. The tone of Latin foreign ministries was pragmatic, recognizing Israel as a valuable partner without allowing Middle Eastern politics to dominate bilateral agendas.
There were, however, periodic strains. Condemnations of building in Judea and Samaria, and disputes over U.N. resolutions, occasionally generated tension, but these rarely escalated to diplomatic breaks. Most states preferred to register symbolic protest through votes or statements while keeping commercial and security channels intact. By the eve of the Gaza war, Israel’s Latin American posture rested on that pragmatic equilibrium: strong economic integration and operational cooperation, offset by rhetorical criticism that seldom translated into policy.
Dimant explained that historically, Latin American countries have determined their Middle East foreign policy through their relations with Washington. According to Dimant, governments that were on good footing with the United States have traditionally mirrored that positive relation with regard to Israel. “Latin American countries usually shape their policy toward Israel through their policy toward the United States. The U.S. position sets the framework, and within that, they decide how close or distant to be with Jerusalem,” he told JNS.
However, the outbreak of the Gaza war in late 2023 set off a cascade of diplomatic reactions across Latin America that quickly reshaped Israel’s position in the region. Within weeks, several governments took unprecedented steps, turning long-standing criticism into concrete action. Bolivia became the first to sever relations outright, announcing in October 2023 that it was cutting all diplomatic ties and suspending security cooperation. Chile, Colombia and Honduras soon followed with the recall of their ambassadors and the downgrading of official representation. Across the hemisphere, foreign ministries issued statements condemning Israeli operations in Gaza and calling for international investigations. Multiple states backed legal initiatives at the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, framing the conflict as a matter of global accountability rather than regional diplomacy.
By early 2024, these actions had begun to cohere into a regional pattern. Left-leaning administrations increasingly linked their Middle East positions to domestic narratives centered on anti-imperialism, anti-westernism, socialist economic policy and a rejection of long-standing U.S. hegemony in the region. Dimant explained that the Gaza conflict became a political shorthand that allowed leaders in Brasília, Santiago, La Paz and Bogotá to project what they called “moral leadership” beyond their borders. “For many left-wing governments, attacking Israel plays well at home,” Dimant observed. “It connects them to the language of anti-imperialism and shows their base they’re on the ‘right side’ of global issues,” he observed.
Emmanuel Navon, a scholar of international relations at Tel Aviv University and a senior fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS), added to this assessment, explaining that the primary motivating factor for the anti-Israel stance was ideological.
“It’s emotional and ideological; they have a very strong anti-U.S. position, and anything that’s aligned with the U.S. is automatically evil. They think in black and white, and for them, Israel clearly falls on the side of the black. It’s not a question of interest, just of ideology,” Navon told JNS. “The left in Latin America is generally very anti-U.S., anti-Western, and anti-capitalist. On an ideological level puts them on the anti-Israel side as well,” he added.
Navon pointed out that in addition to the ideological motivator, economic incentives had also shifted, creating a perfect storm of anti-Israeli sentiment. “There were some economic incentives for these countries to seek a good relationship with Israel, but overall, the anti-Israel axis has been putting a lot more money into these countries. Hezbollah has a significant economic empire in South America. Iran has also historically put a lot of money into these countries. Most importantly, China has had massive investments in this part of the world in recent years,” Navon explained. “Compared to all of these influences, the economic benefit of aligning with Israel simply disappeared,” he said.
As all these factors came together, certain countries in Latin America consolidated into a significant anti-Israel diplomatic bloc. In the region’s largest economy, Brazil, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva described Israel’s campaign in Gaza as “a genocide against innocent women and children,” remarks that prompted Israel to recall its ambassador and formally protest to Brasília. Rein explained that in addition to ideological motivators, Brazil’s anti-Israel stance is also driven by political ambition. “Brazil has sought to establish itself as a political leader in the so-called third world, which influences it to align itself with many countries that are naturally predisposed to an anti-Israel position. This is a major driver in Brazilian foreign policy in the Middle East,” Rein told JNS.
Meanwhile, Chile’s President Gabriel Boric, long vocal on Middle East issues, called the conflict “an unacceptable brutality that demands accountability,” pairing that statement with the withdrawal of Chile’s military attachés from Tel Aviv. Rein explained that Chile’s antagonism towards Israel is likely driven by an additional demographic factor. “In Chile, there’s a very large Palestinian diaspora community, which obviously drives the government to take a much more anti-Israel stance,” he said.
Colombia’s Gustavo Petro struck an even harder tone, declaring that “no trade is possible with those who massacre a people” as he announced the cancellation of his country’s free-trade agreement. “In Brazil, Chile, and Colombia,” said Dimant, “the left sees the Palestinian struggle as part of the same story as colonialism. It’s not just foreign policy or political interests, it’s political identity.”
Colombia’s rupture with Israel in late 2025 offered a concentrated view of how the regional backlash against Jerusalem moved from diplomatic protest to formal disengagement on the back of ideological grievance. The decision to cancel the free-trade agreement and expel Israeli diplomats was framed domestically as an act of “moral consistency” rather than economic calculation. While the measure carried procedural hurdles, requiring congressional approval and a six-month termination period, it was presented by Petro as a statement of national principle, signaling that trade considerations would not override solidarity with Gaza. In practice, the move added little material pressure on Israel: bilateral commerce had already slowed, and most defense programs were dormant. Its significance lay in the message it sent to the Colombian electorate and other left-leaning governments.
On the other side of the spectrum, a smaller group of leaders has turned open support for Israel into a defining feature of their foreign policy. Argentina’s President Javier Milei pledged “unconditional solidarity with Israel as a natural ally of the free world,” and launched the Isaac Accords initiative to formalize cooperation among pro-Israel governments in the region. Paraguay’s President Santiago Peña, who reopened his embassy in Jerusalem in 2024, framed the move as “a reaffirmation of friendship and shared faith.” Even Uruguay’s Luis Lacalle Pou, while maintaining a more neutral posture, emphasized that his country sought “dialogue and coexistence, not rupture.”
Navon explained that the diplomatic situation in Latin America can be very dynamic for Israel. “When it comes to Israel’s relations with Latin American countries, it mostly depends on who’s in power. These countries do not have an established pro or anti position. It generally shifts from one government to another,” he explained. Dimant agreed with this assessment, saying, “It’s not the people, it’s the governments. Public opinion in Latin America isn’t necessarily anti-Israel; the vast majority of people really don’t care about these issues. The changes come from whoever holds power,” he noted.
In Brazil, for example, the government’s confrontational posture has faced resistance from segments of the opposition that favor a return to pragmatic engagement. Former president Jair Bolsonaro, now leading Brazil’s conservative bloc, praised Israel throughout his tenure and reiterated in 2024 that “Brazil owes its democracy to Judeo-Christian values and must not abandon Israel.” Similar voices remain active in Chile, where right-leaning figures such as José Antonio Kast criticized President Gabriel Boric’s decision to withdraw defense attachés, calling it “a symbolic gesture that damages Chile’s credibility.” Even in Colombia, where the rupture has been sharpest, opposition lawmakers have argued that canceling the trade agreement undermines national interests. Senator María Fernanda Cabal described the move as “a populist overreach that weakens Colombia’s global standing.”
Rein emphasized that there is a wide gap between government policy and popular sentiment in Latin America. “One has to distinguish between the position of one government or another in a particular country and the attitude of the general population toward the state of Israel,” he said. “Most Latin Americans are not particularly interested in the Middle East. It’s very far away and it has very little impact on their lives. However, the governments do have an interest in playing a role on the international scene and establishing their importance in foreign policy,” he added.
However, Navon also observed that for some countries, the anti-Israel agenda was likely to be a long-term fixture of their foreign policy. “Most of these countries will shift back and forth when Israel’s policy depends on the government. Some countries, like Chile and Venezuela, are more entrenched. Chile has a very large Palestinian community, Venezuela is an anti-U.S. dictatorship, with the regime not going anywhere in the near future, so those countries are pretty established in the anti-Israel camp. With everyone else, it depends on the ideological background of the government,” he explained.
