Since the beginning of Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza following the Oct. 7 terrorist attacks, one question has been consistently raised: What will the day after look like for the Palestinians of Gaza?
Some creative ideas have arisen, including emigration to countries like the Sudan, Somaliland and Somalia. However, the most realistic logical solution is in plain sight: Egypt must be at the heart of a sustainable solution. Of course, Cairo has flatly rejected this idea and given various reasons for their decision, but the idea must still be considered. The Egyptians have the capacity to house Gazans and a responsibility to their fellow Arabs, as well as a level of culpability for the Hamas-led massacre inside Israel two years ago.
Egypt’s stance is that the Palestinian people must stay on their land, and that solutions must be found within the Strip itself. They cite security fears surrounding the Sinai, economic and demographic strains, and political opposition to undermining Palestinian sovereignty. One could argue that Egypt’s true intransigence is rooted in its own desire to fight against Israel, and its leaders see the Palestinian question as a way to weaken Israel in terms of its security and international standing. Sadly, the Palestinian civilians are the biggest losers in this equation. If their brethren authentically cared about the lives of the Palestinian people, they would make every accommodation to ensure their safety. Instead, they condemn those who want to escape the war to remain in Gaza.
The United States can create conditions to neutralize Cairo’s purported concerns and to apply pressure on Egypt to make this a reality. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s ability to stabilize Egypt has, in no small part, been supported by Israel’s military and intelligence services in recent years. Coupled with the economic and military hardware support of the United States, this assistance should create enough leverage for Cairo to act in accordance with said objectives.
From an economic standpoint, Egypt’s reliance on the United States should not be underestimated. In Fiscal Year 2023 alone, the United States pledged about $1.54 billion in aid to Egypt, of which some 80% (around $1.24 billion) was military financing. Only 19.6% (about $300 million) was economic assistance. In total, since 1946, Washington has provided Egypt with nearly $90 billion in bilateral assistance, military and economic combined. These numbers are not abstract; they represent a tangible anchor of Egypt’s military preparedness, and on which its survival is dependent. Cairo needs to understand that failing to take responsibility could cost it their own country. A cost-benefit analysis should be forced upon its leadership.
The international community, led by the United States, Israel and aligned Arab partners, can craft a nuanced pressure campaign in the following ways:
- Egypt’s legacy role as the “first peace partner” of Israel has long granted it prestige and leverage. But if Cairo refuses to engage constructively on Gaza, the center of Arab-Israeli diplomacy will continue shifting toward the Saudi Arabia–United Arab Emirates axis. The Abraham Accords already showcase this pivot. If Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Jerusalem consolidate their alignment, then Egypt risks being sidelined, politically and economically, in the very sphere it still holds primacy. This prospect of irrelevance, more than withheld aid, could be a decisive motivator.
- Willingness to redirect or hold back funds: There is recent precedent for this, as in January, former President Joe Biden redirected $95 million of military aid from Egypt to Lebanon over concerns about Egypt’s human-rights violations.
- Alignment with Gulf donors or international institutions to offer temporary sanctuary or development packages could cushion the domestic burden of hosting Gaza’s displaced in Egypt.
- Parallel American support for security operations in the Sinai would be vital—not as a blank check, but as reassurance that Egypt need not destabilize itself while being responsive.
Egypt’s current position—to remain aloof from any post-crisis Gaza integration—ought not to be the end of the conversation. Through precision diplomacy, calibrated incentives, coupled with the looming risk of diplomatic marginalization, the United States and its allies can make clear that flexibility is in Egypt’s best interests economically, security-wise and diplomatically.
If executed sensitively and with international support, such pressure can align Egyptian interests with regional peace—offering Gaza a pathway to recovery without destabilizing Cairo and without upsetting the wider Middle East equilibrium.
