In September of 2022, when I visited Saudi Arabia and met with several of their top government ministers, they told a group of 25 Americans that they would like to immediately recognize Israel, but that the Arab Street was not yet ready for this step.
Since that visit, however, I have watched a steady stream of Saudi public statements that have been sharply critical of Israel—statements that often seemed unnecessary and inconsistent with the private assurances we had received. Their rhetoric made me question whether they truly intended to shift attitudes on the “Arab Street,” or whether their private comments were simply meant to reassure American visitors.
Today, Saudi Arabia’s actions make that question even more urgent. The kingdom is taking a series of foreign‑policy steps that move it away from its previous claims of moderation and toward alignment with certain Islamist‑leaning states such as Qatar and Turkey. As reported by Jewish Insider on Dec. 31,
“Saudi Arabia is recalibrating its regional posture in ways that are challenging long-held assumptions about Riyadh’s role as a moderating force in the Middle East, as recent moves across Yemen, Sudan and the Horn of Africa expose the country’s widening rift with the United Arab Emirates and a growing alignment with Qatar and Turkey—two countries with openly hostile positions toward Israel.
“The realignment has been most stark on the issue of Yemen, where Saudi Arabia led an airstrike on an Emirati shipment of vehicles on Tuesday, which Riyadh claimed was intended for the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), which has consolidated power in the country’s south as Saudi-backed efforts to stabilize the war-torn nation have stalled. Hours after the strike, the Emirati government announced it would withdraw its remaining troops from the country.
“The Saudis’ decision to embrace Islamist-aligned factions in Sudan, where the UAE is aligned with rival forces, has caused additional fissures with the Emiratis, putting the two U.S. allies and Gulf power players at odds.”
This pattern extends beyond Yemen and Sudan. Saudi Arabia has also taken positions that diverge sharply from those of the more moderate Gulf States on issues, such as Somaliland.
Somaliland is a functioning democracy with elections, police and relative stability, while Somalia remains plagued by the al‑Shabaab Al-Qaeda linked insurgency and a weak federal government. Yet Riyadh condemned Israel for its recognition of Somaliland’s independence on Dec. 26—a move supported economically and militarily by the United Arab Emirates. These choices collectively undermine Saudi Arabia’s former claims to be a moderating force in the region or a credible potential partner for Israel.
My trip in 2022 was led by the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD), which at the time believed that Saudi Arabia’s moderation was genuine and was working to encourage the kingdom to join the Abraham Accords. But FDD’s experts have since revised their assessment. Hussain Abdul‑Hussain, a research fellow at FDD, recently stated that Saudi Arabia is:
“abandoning its past policy and distancing itself from the UAE and the moderate capitals and getting closer to Islamist Qatar and Turkey. … How far on the scale of Islamism the Saudis decide to go remains to be seen.
There have been two alliances competing in the region: A radical Islamist one led by Turkey and Qatar and allied with Iran and Pakistan, and a moderate one led by Israel and the UAE and allied with India, Greece and Cyprus.”
Nevana Mahmoud, a political commentator based in the United Kingdom, has said:
“I see the Saudis saying, “We cannot defeat the Islamists, but we can influence them, using them for strategic influence. They think they can influence the Islamists rather than be fooled by them. Before Islamists were infiltrating Saudi, now Saudi thinks they are powerful enough to influence and tame them to serve strategic interests. I see that as wishful thinking.
I see Riyadh of “playing the game” on the normalization with Israel issue, while “always having an excuse not to.”
“The excuses will never end.”
If Mahmoud is right, Saudi Arabia is not merely hedging; it is making a calculated bet that it can harness Islamist movements for its own purposes. History offers many examples of regimes that believed they could “manage” or “tame” radical actors, only to find themselves constrained or destabilized by the very forces they empowered. Riyadh appears confident that it can avoid that fate. That confidence may prove misplaced.
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia continues to secure major strategic gains from the United States. Their recent approval to purchase F‑35 fighter jets, despite the implications for Israel’s legally mandated Qualitative Military Edge, is only the latest example. Another is U.S. approval for Saudi Arabia to acquire the most advanced Nvidia graphics‑processing chips for its new $5 billion global AI hub. These are extraordinary concessions for a country that is simultaneously drawing closer to anti‑Israel and anti‑Western governments.
Saudi Arabia’s earlier efforts to counter the Muslim Brotherhood and broader Islamist movements are fading into history. As Abdul‑Hussain of FDD put it, the nation “is getting closer to all Islamist, anti-Israel, anti-West governments, whether it’s Iran and Pakistan or Qatar and Turkey.” Western governments, and especially those who continue to view Riyadh as a reliable moderate ally or a near‑term candidate for normalization with Israel, need to recognize this shift.
Saudi Arabia’s words have long been reassuring. Its actions now tell a different story. The West must stop treating Riyadh as a trusted partner based on promises and begin evaluating it based on its increasingly clear alignment with Islamist and anti‑Western blocs.
