While most Arab states have been absorbing hundreds of Iranian drone and missile attacks, Egypt has remained outside the regional confrontation, almost three weeks into the war.
Not only has not a single projectile been launched toward Egyptian territory, even the Houthi rebels, Iran’s proxy in Yemen, have refrained from disrupting shipping in the Red Sea bound for Egypt’s strategically vital Suez Canal. Egypt’s government takes pride in this and attributes it to a combination of quiet diplomacy and significant military power.
Even so, Cairo has been forced to respond to the attack on its allies in the Persian Gulf. These states form the backbone of Egypt’s economy.
The relationship is not limited to financial aid, loans and investments. Millions of Egyptians are employed in these countries and send foreign currency home to their families. If the Iranian missile launches and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz continue for an extended period, the Gulf states could suffer unprecedented economic damage that would directly affect Egypt’s economy.
Egypt’s economy is particularly vulnerable to crises. Even a minor economic shock could push the masses into the streets.
‘Cannot ignore it’
Burak Çelik, a Turkish Mideast expert, told Israel Hayom that Egypt is pursuing an extremely cautious balancing strategy amid the war.
“Cairo has no interest in being dragged directly into the confrontation, but it cannot ignore the strategic consequences of prolonged regional escalation,” Çelik said. “From its perspective, the main concern is not Iran itself, but the potential instability in the region and the risk of additional economic pressure at home.”
“At the same time, Cairo seems to be quietly aligning with the broader Sunni Arab consensus that favors containing Iranian influence while maintaining diplomatic flexibility. It is trying to remain strategically relevant without becoming a frontline actor in the confrontation. Egypt’s position appears less active and more like controlled strategic caution.”
Acting as a mediator
Egypt’s answer has been to attempt to position itself as a mediator, like its role during the war in Gaza, perhaps in the hope that such conduct will remove it from Iran’s list of targets.
“The strategy of mediation has proven effective, and many countries in the region have learned from the Qatari experience that it pays to be a channel of communication, even with Islamist actors,” explained Ariel Admoni of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.
Still, Admoni agreed that diplomacy has not truly protected the Gulf states. Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Oman were ultimately struck. According to him, “Saudi Arabia has also appeared in reports as having approved U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to strike. The reliability of the reports is less important than the fact that their very existence raises suspicion toward them in Tehran.”
Cairo’s decision to emphasize the diplomatic channel has created tension with its allies. Egyptian sources have reported dissatisfaction in Kuwait and the UAE with Egypt’s approach. According to those sources, such messages were conveyed to diplomatic officials in the Gulf, prompting Egypt to work to warm relations again.
The tension stems not only from official statements but also from commentary in Egyptian media outlets, which in some cases portray the Iranian regime in a relatively positive light. These commentators are widely perceived as informally echoing the Egyptian government’s position.
For example, retired Egyptian general Wael Rabie wrote in the newspaper Sawt al-Umma that “Israel and the U.S. gambled that assassinations of senior regime figures would stir the Iranian street and push it toward rebellion or revolution, but the exact opposite happened.
“The developments showed that the state and society in Iran moved toward cohesion around the regime and strengthened internal solidarity rather than division,” Rabie wrote.
Cairo orchestrated by Tehran
“Since the start of the war between the U.S. and Israel on one side and Iran on the other, everything we read, watch or hear from the heart of Cairo appears to be orchestrated from Tehran,” Egyptian commentator and writer Mohamed Saad Khiralla told Israel Hayom. “Military experts, media figures, journalists, writers, representatives of unions and parties, and above all, the religious institution Al-Azhar all seem to belong to slain Iranian leader Ali Khamenei.”
He argued that the reason is simple—Iran is fighting Israel, which creates blind loyalty toward the clerical leadership in Tehran.
As a result, leading writers and journalists in the Gulf states, who tend to echo the voices of their own rulers, have expressed disappointment with Egypt’s stance. According to Khiralla, some have even said they would not “give a single dollar to Egypt,” accusing it of living on loans and donations.
Khiralla added that another factor behind the tension is that, despite Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi’s repeated assurances that “Gulf security is part of Egypt’s security, when the moment of truth arrived, it turned out that Egypt’s army is closer to Iran’s mullahs than to the Gulf states.”
The Egyptian expatriate in Europe even called on major powers to halt military aid to Cairo. “It would be absurd if the Iranian regime collapses while the dictatorship in Egypt survives,” he said.
Another factor behind Cairo’s conduct appears to be concern within Egypt’s leadership about the possible collapse of the Iranian regime. First, there is concern that various Iranian factions could attempt to seize power and destabilize the region. Second, Cairo has little desire to see Israel gain additional regional strength. Third, there is a deep fear that a new revolution in Iran could ignite a wave of protests that might threaten Egypt’s own regime.
Originally published by Israel Hayom.
