Following the broad success of “Operation Rising Lion,” Jerusalem and Washington are now engaged in discreet but deliberate talks aimed at creating a formal mechanism for coordinated enforcement of a new Iran policy. The proposed framework, which would mark a significant shift in the way the two allies approach nuclear deterrence, is designed to prevent the Islamic Republic from reconstituting its uranium enrichment program and to ensure that any future violations are met with a swift, coordinated military response. According to officials familiar with the discussions, this new doctrine would institutionalize what has until now been ad hoc cooperation, elevating it to a standing system of intelligence triggers, political authorization and operational coordination. Israeli officials have said this joint-action mechanism would serve as a “mandate for future operation” against Iran.
After years of covert sabotage and diplomatic pressure, the June 2025 operation marked the first overt use of military force against the heart of Iran’s nuclear program. Led by Israel and supported by the United States, the broad campaign decimated Iran’s atomic scientists and heavily targeted major sites related to the nuclear program. The most critical blow came with the U.S.-executed strike on the heavily fortified Fordow facility, long believed to house Iran’s most advanced, and heavily protected, centrifuge cascades. The bombing raid was carried out in close coordination with Israel.
While Israeli and American officials agree the campaign inflicted massive damage, there is ongoing debate among Western analysts over the depth of the setback. Public assessments by Jerusalem, Washington and European intelligence agencies all point to a severely degraded program, though estimates vary on how long it might take Iran to rebuild, ranging from several months to multiple years.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hailed the strikes as a decisive turning point and was insistent that the operation had succeeded in its stated goal of removing the Iranian nuclear threat. “We sent Iran’s nuclear program down the drain,” he said in a televised message after the strikes. He warned that if Iran attempts to rebuild, “we will act with the same determination, the same power, to cut off any such attempt.” U.S. President Donald Trump echoed that framing, describing the strikes as a “spectacular military success” and emphasizing that the Iranian nuclear program had been “completely and totally obliterated.” Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell gave a more measured assessment, saying the strikes had “potentially set back Iran’s nuclear program by one to two years,” while sources within the Defense Intelligence Agency cautioned that Iran “could restart its nuclear program in a matter of months,” depending on its internal capabilities.
“I think beyond a doubt, there is massive damage inflicted on the Iranian nuclear program. This operation has been planned for decades, and currently, there’s no reason to assume that it did not go through successfully,” Capt. (res.) Alexander Grinberg, an Iran expert at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS), told JNS. Grinberg further explained that restarting the nuclear program involves multiple novel difficulties for the Iranian regime.
“The regime needs to focus on holding control of the people in the short term, the economy in Iran is going from terrible to even more terrible, and spending money on rebuilding the nuclear program is impossible right now,” said Grinberg. He also explained that issues surrounding recruitment and secrecy would expand the timeline for reconstituting a program even further. “It must be understood that any plan to rebuild a nuclear program in Iran must include much better concealment methods. They have to find new scientists, and not many people will want that job now. They have to rebuild the destroyed centers and rebuild the destroyed technologies. But, in addition to all that, this has to be done in a completely secretive way so the U.S. and Israeli intelligence don’t know it’s happening,” said Grinberg. “Otherwise, there’s no reason to rebuild the program because they know they’ll just get hit again. Any assessment about how much time it will take them to rebuild has to include the need to move forward in secrecy or in new facilities that are so deep that bunker busters can’t reach them,” he added.
In the days after the strikes, Iran responded aggressively, with leadership figures vowing to rebuild its nuclear infrastructure. “We will rebuild the nuclear program stronger than before, and with deeper resolve,” said Mohammad Eslami, vice president and head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization. Officials announced an end to cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and barred inspectors from key facilities. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi confirmed that “Iran has halted implementation of transparency measures under the Additional Protocol. We are no longer able to monitor key nuclear sites.” Other Iranian officials have raised the possibility of withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). “There is no point in remaining in the NPT while our peaceful efforts are under attack, ” Iranian Parliament Member Hossein Naghavi-Hosseini said in a speech to the parliament last week. Meanwhile, commercial satellite imagery has already revealed signs of reconstruction efforts, most notably at the Fordow facility. Images captured by Maxar Technologies show excavation equipment, including bulldozers and mobile cranes, working near tunnel entrances, as well as a newly constructed access road, clear indicators that Iran is assessing strike damage and initiating repairs.
The Iranian posture following the success of “Operation Rising Lion” indicates that the saga of the Iranian nuclear program is not over. While the June strikes delivered a crippling blow to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, Israeli and U.S. officials emphasize that vigilance remains essential to prevent reconstitution over the long term. Intelligence across Western agencies concurs that Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity has been shattered, and that restarting industrial-scale operations would involve substantial time, effort and international diplomatic risk. While there is no indication of a short-term threat, Israeli defense sources warn that, in the absence of sustained pressure and surveillance, Iran could gradually reestablish a more dispersed and concealed nuclear infrastructure. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz expressed these concerns, saying, “We must prepare both intelligence‑wise and operationally ... to prevent Iran from rebuilding its capabilities.” Netanyahu added to this, saying, “We must remain vigilant against Iran’s attempts to renew its pursuit of nuclear weapons aimed at our destruction.”
This potential threat is the foundation of the proposed joint-action mechanism currently being proposed by Jerusalem. The framework under discussion includes predefined intelligence triggers, joint threat assessments, and an agreed-upon process for authorizing strikes if Iran resumes enrichment activity or reconstruction at key facilities. Israeli sources describe the model as an enforcement mechanism, designed not only to monitor Iranian violations but to enable a rapid, coordinated military response. While the June strikes were coordinated at the operational level, Israeli planners are now seeking a standing agreement that would eliminate the need for crisis-time deliberation. “Our challenge is to step up our abilities so that we can respond quickly and decisively should the need arise,” Katz said in a recent statement on the Iranian threat. The working assumption is that if Iran moves to reconstitute its program, pre-approved military options must already be in place.
The proposed model is said to draw on existing U.S.-Israel coordination mechanisms developed for southern Lebanon. That structure, created in the context of the Hezbollah threat, includes real-time intelligence sharing, deconfliction protocols and pre-cleared strike authorizations in response to specific violations. Israeli defense officials see this as a functional precedent, one that could be adapted to the Iranian nuclear file with added layers of strategic planning and joint oversight. “The goal is to receive a mandate similar to the situation in Lebanon, meaning that if suspicious activity is detected at nuclear sites, or if there’s evidence of uranium being removed from the areas that were hit by U.S. and Israeli warplanes, there would already be prior U.S. approval to act against it,” a representative of the Prime Ministers Office told The Jerusalem Post last week.
American officials have continued to engage with Israel following the June strikes, but have not committed to any formal structure for authorizing future military action. The United States has expressed a preference for maintaining flexibility in its response posture, avoiding any arrangement that would obligate automatic military support or pre-authorized action. While intelligence sharing remains robust and operational cooperation during the June campaign was extensive, there is no indication that the White House has endorsed a joint enforcement mechanism or strike mandate. The current U.S. approach appears to favor case-by-case evaluation of Iranian behavior, with a focus on maintaining discretion and avoiding pre-commitment. “We are committed to continued intelligence collaboration, but any decision on action must be made based on the facts at hand,” White House spokesperson Karoline Levitt said when asked about the matter. Trump has indicated that he is open to the idea of future strikes on Iran should the need arise; however, no binding framework or political authorization structure has been publicly confirmed or privately finalized.
A core obstacle remains the longstanding gap between Israeli and American red lines for military action. While Israel views nuclear infrastructure itself as an intolerable threat warranting preemption, the United States has historically required clearer signs of weaponization before using force. Under Trump, that gap has narrowed—his administration paired diplomatic outreach with direct participation in the June strikes. Still, the absence of a shared threshold poses a challenge. A central purpose of the proposed mechanism is to codify red lines and response protocols in a way that can endure beyond the current leadership and ensure long-term coordination across future administrations. “The problem is not short-term. The problem is if there is a different administration that comes that doesn’t have a strongly defined policy like Trump does,” said Grinberg. “For this case, it is very valuable to have something that is written down and signed. A predefined mechanism that Israel can work off of,” he added. “ It’s less about an understanding between Trump and [Netanyahu] and more about having a broad mechanism for future U.S.-Israeli understanding,” he added.
