In recent weeks, accusations have surfaced in various forums about the State of Israel’s treatment of the Haredi community. These claims suggest that major institutions like government bodies, research institutes and nonprofit organizations are collaborating in a war against Haredi society. Their alleged goal is to incite hatred, lower the Haredi birthrate and ultimately destroy the possibility of sustaining a Haredi lifestyle in the Land of Israel.
Some have used particularly harsh language about this, insinuating that the policies proposed by these institutions echo the evil intentions of some of the Jewish people’s greatest enemies, who openly stated that they were motivated by apprehension “lest they multiply.”
These are serious accusations, but they turn the reason for the intense focus on Haredi society on its head. It is not some hidden hatred of Haredi life that concerns government ministries, economic experts and research institutes. The motivation is much simpler: The future of the State of Israel largely depends on the relationship that develops between Haredi society and the state, as well as between Haredim and their fellow citizens.
According to an official projection from Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, among others, within a generation, Haredi society will account for approximately one-fifth of the country’s population, and perhaps even more.
There is broad agreement that the State of Israel can and should be home to a large, prosperous Haredi society that is secure in its identity. No one should have to apologize for the number of children they have, their faith or their desire to give Torah study a central place in their lives. But as a group grows, so does the impact of its institutions and way of life on the entire country. Thus, its responsibility for the country’s future grows as well.
Over nearly two decades, Israel has developed a policy of gradual integration of Haredim through encouragement and accommodation: employment centers, separate and tailored educational tracks, vocational training, employer incentives, scholarships and financial incentives. The premise was that if barriers were removed and appropriate frameworks found, integration would proceed gradually without compromising the Haredi way of life.
While these policies yielded labor market and educational improvements, the overall metrics in employment, education and military service remained problematic and did not change at the pace required.
A review published by the Ministry of Finance’s Chief Economist Department in July 2026 found that participation in higher education among Haredi men was indeed rising, but “at a slower pace than that recorded among young Arabs.” As a result, “The gaps between population groups in rates of integration into higher education remained significant.”
The Israel Democracy Institute, Knesset Research and Information Center, State Comptroller and many other official sources have reached similar conclusions. Put simply, the state’s professional bodies recognize that the moderate approach produced gains, but not change at the pace or on the scale required.
When a policy pursued for many years, backed by substantial resources, fails to produce change at the necessary pace, professionals have a duty to reexamine its underlying assumptions.
For example, the existence of a welfare state relies on trust and mutual responsibility: Those who can contribute finance the system, and the system assists those who cannot support themselves.
Nitza Kasir, the former deputy chair of the Haredi Institute for Policy Research, has written that “the welfare state rests on the ethos that every person is responsible for striving to be economically self-sufficient through personal effort. This is the unwritten ‘social contract’ on which the welfare state is founded.”
She later stated, “The Haredi public is not a full partner in the ‘social contract’ among all Israeli citizens, raising concern that the fabric of partnership on which the welfare state rests may unravel.”
The future of the State of Israel depends on the relationship between Haredi society and the state.
Kasir recognizes that the Haredi community has a right to choose a different way of life, but this does not eliminate the question of who bears the cost of that way of life or what happens when that community’s share of the population grows rapidly.
Choosing to work minimal or no hours leads to significantly lower tax revenues and increased reliance on social services. Kasir explains that this could jeopardize the welfare state’s ability to provide essential services to all citizens.
Another key dimension is security, which is a quintessential public good. Everyone benefits from it. In Israel, however, not everyone bears the burden to the same degree, because Haredim overwhelmingly do not serve in the IDF or undertake national service.
A study by Gilad Cohen Kovacs and Gilad Malach of the Israel Democracy Institute estimated that the net amount of funding allocated to Haredi society in the sphere of military security alone is approximately NIS 14.9 billion per year (approximately $4.91 billion). This includes both the gap in tax-based financing of the defense budget and the economic costs borne by those who serve, their families and their employers.
The assumptions underlying the estimate may be debated and examined, and alternative methods of calculation may be proposed. However, the suggestion that these figures are fabricated is not a fact-based response. It also does not refute the assertion that a group not significantly involved in financing or providing security is benefiting from a public good whose costs fall disproportionately on others. As Israel’s security burden and its costs continue to soar, the need to redress that imbalance only increases.
Not everyone must contribute to Israel’s national security in the same way or to the same extent. A society cannot endure, however, when a growing group receives a broad array of rights, exemptions and subsidies while the obligations involved in sustaining the state fall mainly on other groups.
This refutes the claim that discussion of tax credits, allowances or services for large families constitutes a “war on the Haredi birthrate.”
Reviewing tax credits is not a quota limiting the number of children a family may have, and reducing subsidies is not a law restricting family size. It is true that economic policy affects incentives and may therefore also affect family decisions. But it is a long way from there to the claim that this is an attempt to “eradicate any possibility of Haredi life in the Land of Israel.”
It is legitimate to ask whether the state is obligated to design its tax and welfare systems so that they systematically reduce the economic cost of choosing to have a large family, work part-time and forgo training for the labor market, even when that cost is shifted onto other citizens. Religious freedom and family autonomy are fundamental rights. To have other citizens finance the consequences of those choices without limit is not.
Israel’s social contract does not require anyone to relinquish their faith, dress, community or Torah study. It requires the state to respect Haredi distinctiveness, but it also requires Haredi society to see itself as a partner in responsibility for the country as a whole, rather than solely for its own community.
The Haredi community, to which I proudly belong, is an integral part of Israel, and its success is in the interest of all Israeli citizens. Precisely for that reason, we must not settle for slogans of “hatred” and “persecution” whenever a demand is made for fairer participation. As Haredi society grows, its future can no longer be separated from the future of Israel’s economy, security, welfare system and democracy.
“Lest they multiply” is not the policy being proposed. No one is asking the Haredi community to shrink or disappear. On the contrary, may its numbers grow; may it flourish and prosper. But as its numbers grow, so must its sense of responsibility; responsibility for supporting its families, educating its children, safeguarding the citizens of the state, and sustaining a fair and sustainable social contract among all parts of Israeli society.
