On Thursday, Oct. 22, Muath Salama al-Baeer, a young man with Down syndrome from the village of Jamla in western Daraa, was killed during an Israeli military operation. According to the IDF, soldiers identified a man approaching in a suspicious manner and opened fire after he failed to respond to arrest procedures. The incident is under review.
The following day, hundreds of Syrians took to the streets, from Daraa and Quneitra to Damascus, Homs, Idlib and Hasakah.
I know this region personally. Between 2016 and 2018, when I commanded “Operation Good Neighbor,” wounded Syrians from villages in Daraa and Quneitra were treated in Israeli hospitals, while families across the border received food, medicine and humanitarian supplies. The principle behind the operation was simple: The civilian population of southern Syria was not our enemy, and lasting border security depended partly on our relationship with the people on the other side.
That relationship is now eroding. But beyond the genuine local anger, a more significant political process is unfolding. Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa may be learning that the street can deliver what his army cannot.
A changing protest movement
Anti-Israel demonstrations are not new in al-Sharaa’s Syria. After the Knesset approved the death penalty for terrorists in March, protests spread across Syrian cities in solidarity with Palestinian prisoners. What distinguishes the current wave is its focus on Syrian sovereignty rather than primarily on solidarity with Palestinian prisoners, reflected in protests on two consecutive Fridays.
According to an Oct. 8 report by the Syrian Network for Human Rights, Israeli forces conducted at least 453 ground incursions into Syrian territory between Assad’s fall in December 2024 and Oct. 6, 2026. The organization also documented 69 deaths and 162 detentions resulting from Israeli military activity during that period.
Local activists in Quneitra had called for demonstrations even before al-Baeer’s death. His killing did not create the anger; it gave it a powerful emotional focus.
On Oct. 30, the protests resumed. In Damascus’s Jobar neighborhood, demonstrators rallied under the slogan “Our People in Daraa and Quneitra Are Not Alone.” A week earlier, protesters had gathered outside the United Nations building in Damascus, and Syria’s official news agency, SANA, gave the demonstrations extensive coverage.
There is no evidence that Damascus organized these demonstrations, and the anger is genuine. But in a country where the new government is working to consolidate control over public life, allowing protests against an external enemy to receive extensive official coverage is a political choice. Al-Sharaa does not need to manufacture public anger. He only needs to let it flow in a direction that serves him.
A unifying enemy
Since Assad’s downfall, al-Sharaa has struggled to build a shared national identity in a country still scarred by civil war, as the violence on the coast and in Sweida made clear. Opposition to Israel’s military presence offers a unifying cause far easier to rally around than either al-Sharaa’s political vision or his jihadist past.
Even Syrians who oppose the new government may reject Israeli military activity on Syrian soil. The president can present himself as the defender of national sovereignty without first resolving the country’s internal divisions.
The sequence is telling. On Oct. 13, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani accused Israel of arming and financing militias in Sweida. Five days later, the Foreign Ministry condemned Israeli incursions. By the end of that week, protesters filled the squares.
This does not prove coordination, but it reveals a converging narrative: Israel is portrayed not merely as a foreign military force, but as an actor undermining Syrian sovereignty and backing those who threaten national unity.
One protester in Daraa echoed this narrative. Syrians, he told AFP, stand united “against Israeli incursions and against anyone who is tempted to tamper … with national security.” Against the backdrop of Damascus’s accusations against armed factions in Sweida, his reference to national security takes on a second meaning, one that extends beyond opposition to Israel.
The Sweida fault line
Sweida was already on edge. On Oct. 19-20, according to the Saudi publication Al Majalla, Damascus received information about possible attacks by Druze factions on government positions, raising fears of a confrontation that could trigger Israeli intervention. American and regional diplomacy, along with mediation by Syrian Druze figures, reportedly prevented immediate escalation. Damascus has not confirmed that war was close, and key details rest on anonymous sources.
Two days later, The National reported that roughly 3,000 Syrian troops had been deployed along Sweida’s western front amid increased Israeli military activity and the strengthening of Druze militias loyal to Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri. The episode showed how quickly an internal clash in Sweida could become a military crisis involving Israel.
The roots of that volatility run deep. The sectarian violence of July 2025, including allegations of abuses against Druze civilians by government-affiliated forces, hardened the community’s distrust of Damascus. Not all Druze support al-Hijri, and opposing Damascus does not mean supporting Syria’s partition. But the longer the standoff lasts, the greater the danger that each side will see the other as an existential threat.
This is where the protests matter most. When Sweida is framed as a government confronting a minority fearful for its safety, the use of force is hard to justify. When the same confrontation is framed as defending national sovereignty against Israeli interference, restoring Damascus’s authority becomes a national imperative.
The protests may help prepare Syrian public opinion for future government action in Sweida. That is a political mechanism Israel cannot afford to ignore.
The protests serve Damascus abroad as well. To Israel and Washington, they signal that Israel’s presence in southern Syria is no longer merely a security issue, but a source of popular opposition. That raises the diplomatic cost of Israel’s freedom of action and may strengthen Syria’s hand in the stalled security talks.
A strategy with risks
Yet this strategy carries risks for al-Sharaa himself. Islamist movements and armed factions could adopt the rhetoric of resistance and take it far beyond what Damascus intends. The more deeply Israel becomes Syria’s unifying enemy, the greater the risk that independent armed groups will act on that message.
Al-Sharaa, who emerged from the jihadist movement himself, knows how armed organizations exploit humiliation, anger and the presence of foreign forces. Damascus may succeed in mobilizing the street, only to discover that it cannot decide when the mobilization ends.
Israel’s challenge
What should Israel do? It has legitimate security interests in southern Syria. Syria’s weak security institutions and the risk of renewed terrorist activity, including Iran-linked networks, require vigilance and freedom of action.
But there is a difference between necessary security operations and continuous friction with civilians. Every death of a civilian who posed no threat can become another source of hostility. A thorough and transparent investigation into the Jamla incident, fewer disruptions to civilian life and a clear distinction between hostile forces and the local population are not only moral obligations. They are Israeli security interests.
At the same time, Israel must make clear to Damascus that political opposition to its presence is one thing, and exploiting anti-Israel sentiment to impose a military solution in Sweida is another. Israel’s commitment to the Druze should remain firm, but it must not become an automatic trigger for intervention in every internal clash in the province.
Washington, which is betting on al-Sharaa to stabilize Syria, should measure that stability not only by Damascus’s territorial reach, but by its willingness to protect minorities, restrain armed factions and avoid another confrontation with Israel.
During “Operation Good Neighbor,” I learned that a secure border depends on more than military positions, barriers and firepower. It also depends on the people living across it, and on their sense that they have much to lose from another war.
Today, the very areas where Israel once saved lives are becoming centers of protest against it. This is not yet a new military front, but it is a strategic warning.
Israel’s challenge is not only to prevent al-Sharaa from turning the Syrian street into a political weapon. It is also to ensure that its own actions do not supply that weapon with ammunition.
