One of the most puzzling features of the recent turmoil in southern Yemen is the scale of the Southern Transitional Council’s miscalculation.
Over nearly a decade, the STC painstakingly built military forces under its umbrella, cultivated a domestic political constituency, and established diplomatic relationships abroad. Yet in the span of a single month, much of that investment evaporated, as the STC moved from what appeared to be a high-water mark since its establishment in 2017 to an abrupt denouement.
The normative questions of whether southern separatism is a legitimate or desirable cause, and whether the STC was the most effective vehicle to advance it, are important but not the focus here.
In 2020, I argued that Israel should consider how it might engage with and potentially support the southern cause as articulated by the STC, while recognizing that southern secession was no panacea for the Houthi challenge (which even then appeared likely to eventually reach Israel). That discussion belonged to a different strategic moment. What matters now is a post-mortem analysis of what the STC believed it was doing, why, and what went wrong.
Several questions frame this assessment. What compelled the STC to rush toward a decisive bid for independence while discounting the possibility of a Saudi reaction that would dismantle everything it had built? What does the STC’s dissolution mean for Yemen’s future? While the fog of war still obscures many details, the initial contours may be instructive.
The immediate driver of the STC’s campaign to assert military control over the Hadramawt and Al-Mahra regions appears to have been a sense that time was running out.
Although the STC defined itself as a separatist movement, it had been formally integrated into Yemen’s internationally recognized government through the Presidential Leadership Council. As the government’s performance failed, that association increasingly tarnished the STC.
Participation in the state appeared to neither advance southern independence nor deliver basic services to the southern population. The STC risked being seen not as an alternative to the government’s failure but as part of it.
At the same time, Saudi-Houthi negotiations were gaining momentum, with discussions focused on roadmaps to wind down the multilayered conflict. From the STC’s perspective, this likely raised concerns that Riyadh would bargain away Yemeni interests, particularly those of the Emirati-backed southern separatists, to secure its own exit from the war.
Acting quickly to establish facts on the ground may have seemed the only way to constrain Saudi flexibility and preempt unfavorable concessions.
Washington’s signaling may also have reinforced this sense of opportunity. The current U.S. administration has demonstrated a willingness to challenge inherited assumptions about regional order, potentially making it more open to outcomes such as southern secession than previous administrations.
In parallel, the White House issued an executive order examining the possible designation of elements of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. For a UAE-backed actor like the STC, this may have appeared to offer political cover for displacing a Yemeni government staffed by figures tied to Islah, Yemen’s Muslim Brotherhood affiliate.
Taken together, these factors may have convinced the STC that a narrow window had opened. The likely assumption was that once control had been established on the ground, Saudi Arabia’s response would be limited. After all, Riyadh had largely disengaged from Yemen since the 2022 ceasefire with the Houthis and had been seeking a negotiated exit ever since. In the context of Saudi-Houthi talks, the kingdom increasingly cast itself as a mediator rather than a party to the conflict.
Catastrophically wrong
From the STC’s vantage point, the probability that Saudi Arabia would re-escalate its involvement to block an STC campaign may have reasonably appeared low.
This assumption proved catastrophically wrong. Saudi Arabia was unwilling to tolerate a rapid, UAE-backed attempt to reestablish an independent South Yemen.
While Riyadh likely recognizes the limits of its ability to shape Yemen, it retains overwhelming capacity to act as a spoiler through its superiority in airpower, naval presence and logistics, capabilities enabled by its size and geographic proximity.
More important, the STC’s move threatened what Saudi Arabia views as core national security interests: Riyadh was not prepared to sit on the sidelines as the STC overtook the government of Yemen, which remains Saudi Arabia’s principal channel of influence over a populous and heavily armed neighbor along its southern border.
From Riyadh’s perspective, Yemen’s partition at the expense of its internationally recognized government represented a long-term risk that would ultimately force Saudi Arabia to become more directly engaged in Yemen as it diminished the option of exerting influence through partners on the ground.
It is likely that the STC had been pressing the southern issue with the Saudis for some time and ultimately grew impatient with repeated deflections, concluding that the moment had become “now or never.” Even so, given the history of coordination between the two parties, the scale of the miscalculation is striking and underscores the volatility inherent in highly personalized decision-making.
The regional consequences remain uncertain, but several different trajectories are plausible, though they are not mutually exclusive.
• First, southern separatist momentum may temporarily dissipate, producing a superficial return to normal marked by continued Saudi stewardship of a weak Yemeni government; this follows a decade of experience indicating that Saudi Arabia has failed to build capacity or deliver basic services.
• Second, Yemen may yet be partitioned, but through a process shaped and managed by Saudi Arabia.
• Third, renewed fighting within the anti-Houthi camp could spread, broadly pitting governing forces committed to Yemeni unity against an insurgency in favor of separatism.
• Fourth, the collapse of the STC could pave the way for the consolidation of armed forces under a single command structure, potentially improving military effectiveness against the Houthis.
Containing the Houthi threat
From the standpoint of regional stability, the overriding aim should be an effective coalition capable of containing the Houthi threat. Whether that coalition operates within a unified Yemeni state or through an eventual partition is ultimately for Yemenis to decide.
What is clear, however, is why the dissolution of the STC is alarming. It risks disintegrating some of the most capable anti-Houthi military units in Yemen and extinguishing a project that, however imperfect, embodied aspirations for a comparatively moderate governance model in non-Houthi territory.
By dissolving the STC and sidelining Emirati influence, Saudi Arabia has effectively recommitted itself to Yemen in the interest of its national security. This may prove to be a miscalculation on Riyadh’s part, as continuing its previous course of disengagement is no longer a viable option.
The implications for the UAE are that it will need to adopt a more restrained foreign policy in areas where Riyadh’s priorities outweigh Abu Dhabi’s, or risk alienating its far larger neighbor and strategic partner.
Yet, tensions between the two Gulf states are unlikely to be a permanent feature of a “new Gulf” order, and instead reflect a temporary misalignment driven by developments on the ground, much as the region experienced during the rift between Qatar and its neighbors nearly a decade ago.
An eventual accommodation therefore, seems more likely than prolonged hostility, though the duration of this moment may depend on what Saudi Arabia demands of the Emiratis in Yemen and what Abu Dhabi is willing to concede.
One potential flashpoint is the Southern Transitional Council leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi. If he seeks refuge in the UAE while undermining Saudi designs for Yemen, Riyadh may press for his extradition, and that would sharply escalate the dispute.
For Israel
For Israel, Saudi-Emirati tensions add another layer of complexity to addressing the Houthi threat. Given its growing military stature in the region, inter alia its recognition of Somaliland and considerable influence in Washington, Israel should seek to help manage tensions among anti-Houthi forces by incentivizing cooperation among its members.
Greater involvement carries real risks, including the possibility of alienating one or more partners during mediation.
But staying on the sidelines also has costs. It limits Israel’s ability to shape events and may leave southern Yemen embroiled in internal rivalries rather than confronting the Houthis and the threat they pose to regional stability.
Originally published by the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.
