Over the past month, a steady stream of optimistic reports suggested that normalization between Israel and the recently installed al-Sharaa government in Damascus was within reach.
Ahmed al-Sharaa, a former ISIS and Al-Qaeda commander who seized power during a December uprising against the Assad regime, was an unlikely candidate to lead Syria toward peace with Israel. Yet, Western diplomats insisted the winds had changed.
“We have dramatically changed the paradigm there. I’m very upbeat about the potential for an Abraham Accord with Syria …, and that may even precede Saudi Arabia,” Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Yechiel Leiter said in an interview published on the PragerU media platform on May 22.
Despite troubling signs, including the massacre of more than 1,500 Alawite civilians in March, Western diplomats appeared convinced by al-Sharaa’s transformation from jihadist militant to suited statesman.
“The current government of Syria, in my opinion, has conducted itself as best it can as a nascent government with very few resources,” U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack told the Associated Press.
Israel’s two-pronged approach
Israel’s stance toward al-Sharaa has been more cautious and mixed. In March, Defense Minister Israel Katz called him “a jihadist terrorist from the Al-Qaeda school, committing atrocities against the Alawite civilian population.”
In contrast, Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar suggested that Syria could join the expanding circle of normalization.
On the ground, Israel pursued a dual-track policy. Taking advantage of Syria’s power vacuum, Israel expanded its buffer zone to include the Syrian Hermon and established a de facto protectorate over territory stretching from Damascus to the Golan border. It also carried out preemptive strikes on former Syrian army installations to prevent them from falling into the hands of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, al-Sharaa’s terrorist organization.
At the same time, Israel pursued diplomacy, dispatching senior officials to meet with Syrian representatives. Israeli officials met with Syrian diplomats in a recent state visit to Azerbaijan, and National Security Adviser Tzachi Hanegbi reportedly met with al-Sharaa in Abu Dhabi in early July. Israel also gave its backing to American- and Gulf-led efforts to reintegrate Syria into the Western sphere.
American optimism and Israeli cautious support culminated on June 30 when President Donald Trump signed an executive order revoking sanctions on Syria. U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent added that the move would serve as an “opportunity to reestablish ties to global commerce and build international confidence.”
Violence in Jabal al-Druze
Barely two weeks later, the al-Sharaa government launched a coordinated assault on the Druze-majority region of Jabal al-Druze, particularly targeting the provincial capital of Suweida city. The conflict began as sectarian clashes between Druze and Bedouin clans.
While Hayat Tahrir al-Sham claimed its forces intervened to restore order, eyewitnesses and reports suggest otherwise. Government-aligned Bedouin militias were encouraged by Damascus, and HTS fighters directly participated in attacks against Druze civilians.
“The regime approached the leaders and sheikhs of the Bedouin tribes and offered them some money to send soldiers and to fight. The mobilization was paid for and supported,” Jonathan Hessen, a senior fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS), told JNS.
The offensive involved heavy weaponry, summary executions including of women and children, looting, arson and the desecration of religious sites. Over 600 people were killed, and tens of thousands were displaced.
Israel warned both Damascus and Washington that the attacks posed an unacceptable threat to its security. When those warnings were ignored, Israel launched a sweeping aerial campaign against southern Syrian forces and strategic targets in Damascus, including the military HQ and areas near the presidential palace.
U.S. and Syrian officials quickly condemned the strikes. “Israel’s intervention … comes at a very bad time and creates another very confusing chapter in efforts to stabilize the region,” said Barrack.
In Israel, public opinion rallied behind the Druze, an Israeli minority widely viewed as loyal and integral to national society. The operation was further cast as a critical consolidation of Israel’s emerging role as a regional hegemon in the aftermath of the successful “Operation Rising Lion” against Iran.
The Sunni power struggle over Syria
Professor Hillel Frisch, an expert on the Arab world at JISS, explained that the Israeli strategy in Syria is colored by the emerging clash between two Sunni-led camps: one backed by Turkey and Qatar, and the other supported by Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other Gulf states.
The collapse of the Shia crescent in the wake of Israel’s multifront war after Oct. 7, 2023, has left a vacuum in the Middle East, one that is being quickly filled by a new struggle for dominance between these two camps, who align in their religious denomination and their close relations with the West, but vehemently oppose each other’s geopolitical aspirations.
On an ideological front, the two groups are also at odds due to their differing perspectives on radical jihadist Sunni groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. The Turks have reinvigorated their neo-Ottoman ambitions under the banner of Muslim Brotherhood ideals, and Qatar is a major funder of multiple pro-jihadist initiatives, most notably the Al Jazeera media network.
Amid this emerging conflict, the fall of Syria to the control of a Turkish-backed HTS presented a major threat to Gulf interests.
The overtures toward the Gulf and Israel by al-Sharaa were therefore interpreted as a welcome sign that, instead of Syria becoming a Turkish-dominated outpost, it might instead become a key battleground between the two camps, up for sale to the highest bidder.
“The Saudis are trying to apply pressure to make al-Sharaa more independent from Turkey and Qatar. There is a clear rivalry, which is great for the Syrians because the Saudis and the Qataris are competing in providing aid,” Frisch said.
Strategic uncertainty and sectarian fracture
According to Frisch, “The most likely scenario is the continuation of chaos and sectarian violence in Syria.” If Syria did stabilize, it would most likely happen under “Turkish and Qatari support, which would control Syria under fundamentalist Islamist ideology and transform it into something similar to a Taliban state constantly threatening Israel on its northern border.”
Frisch assessed the third option of “al-Sharaa emerging as a true reformer and modernizing Syria into a stable U.S.- and Gulf-aligned state” as the least likely.
The Druze are not a recognized religion under Islam. In that context, Israel’s recent actions in backing the Druze have decidedly turned public opinion in Saudi Arabia against Israel.
“The Saudi press has turned very against Israel. The Saudis realize that Israel is part of the pushback against Turkish and Qatari control. On the other hand, they support the Bedouin confederation,” Frisch said.
Frisch further explained that long-term damage to Gulf normalization efforts can be mitigated if Israel is clear in its policy of attempting to limit Turkish influence in Syria.
Strategic calculus: Normalization vs. national security
Most officials and analysts agree that Israel’s recent actions were harmful for short-term normalization with any of the Arab states, be it Syria, Lebanon or Saudi Arabia.
However, the Sunni conflict over Syria exposes that while a quick stabilization of Syria might push it into the Gulf camp and toward a fast-paced diplomatic resolution with Israel, it is more likely to push it into an invaluable vassal and proxy for an emerging Turkish threat.
The danger of such a development is a critical motivating factor in understanding the nuances of Israeli action in Syria over recent weeks. Israeli actions signal a cautious approach of not rushing forward with significant steps that could overly strengthen al-Sharaa’s government and thereby release him to revert to HTS’s jihadist roots.
Frisch explained that Israel’s anti-Turkish policy is being achieved through the demilitarization of Syria and with a particular focus on the region between Damascus and the Israeli border to prevent Turkey from using these resources.
“The intervention in the massacre of the Druze in southern Syria serves as a humanitarian explanation for an already established policy of preventing military buildup in that area,” Frisch said.
Hessen stressed, “Israel is still engaged in a multifront war and needs to retain clear red lines to prevent Iranian re-entrenchment in northern Syria, but also more broadly to limit Islamist or jihadist elements.
“This does not mean that Israel wants to have perpetual violence and instability in Syria. It does mean that Israel will act decisively when there are emerging threats, and when red lines are crossed,” Hessen added.
Frisch further explained that the potential of replacing Iranian-backed Hezbollah with a Turkish-backed HTS on Israel’s northern border while a war is still being fought on multiple fronts is an unacceptable risk.
“Israel’s major national security interest is to avoid the replacement of an Iranian-led Shia axis with a potentially even more threatening Sunni axis led by Turkey and financed by Qatar,” Frisch said.
“Normalization is very nice, but it’s much less important than national security interests in Gaza and Syria. It is a lesser concern,” he added.
