No army in modern history has been asked to do more under greater strain than the Israel Defense Forces over the last two years. The IDF has fought on multiple fronts—Gaza, Lebanon, the West Bank, Yemen and Iran—with courage and skill. Yet beneath the headlines of tactical victories lies a harder truth: Israel’s most revered institution is fraying.
One reason Israel had resisted ground operations in the Gaza Strip in the past was the fear of casualties. The cost of the war in life has been far lower than expected, but still staggering. More than 1,150 Israeli security personnel—including soldiers, police officers, Shin Bet agents and civilian security officers—have been killed in combat or from related causes such as accidents, illness or suicide. Nearly half were under 21.
Some 20,000 soldiers have been wounded, more than 1,500 seriously, including 99 amputees who received prosthetics. The totals would be higher without Israeli medical advances that helped hundreds of soldiers survive serious injuries. Still, the country now counts more than 6,500 newly bereaved families, including 885 children. Each casualty is a reminder that the promise of “Never Again” was not enough to prevent Oct. 7.
The IDF’s failure to prevent the Hamas invasion was compounded by its unconscionable neglect in equipping its troops. The rapid mobilization of 300,000 reservists no doubt presented challenges; nevertheless, the military denied there was a problem even as soldiers publicly detailed their shortages of vital gear like bulletproof vests, tactical equipment and winter clothes. A former member of my son’s unit raised money and delivered supplies to them early in the war. He was not the only one. Millions of dollars’ worth of supplies have been donated and delivered by Americans.
Technically, the responsibility falls on the IDF chief of staff and the Israeli defense minister, though these positions have changed several times in recent years. The one constant—the man ultimately responsible for the military, the budget, and defending the nation—has been Benjamin Netanyahu. He has evaded responsibility.
The heroism of Israel’s reservists remains undiminished. In the war’s first days, more than 100% of those called reported for duty—men well beyond the age limit begged to serve. But that unity has frayed. Repeated deployments, unclear objectives and eroding trust in commanders have worn down even the most devoted patriots.
When the IDF called up 60,000 reserves for the Gaza City operation, the turnout was much different. The IDF did not release figures, but there were larger numbers unwilling to serve due to severe mental-health issues, burnout and the impact on their personal lives. The burden extends to their families. Half of reservists’ spouses say their marriages have suffered; one-third of couples have considered separation or divorce. Children bear the silent burden of fathers gone too long. Not surprisingly, the longer the service, the worse family situations became.
Mental health has become a crisis for the IDF. Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) has spiked, and Israel doesn’t have enough therapists to meet the demand for help. Because of the lack of government resources, many have turned to civilian programs that were established since the war began.
The Defense Ministry said out of 20,000 wounded soldiers, more than half were suffering from mental-health conditions. Thousands of soldiers stopped serving in combat roles due to psychological distress. Some former soldiers are wracked with guilt for what they failed to do to protect Israelis on Oct. 7; others for things they saw or did in Gaza. In a monologue that went viral on X, Israeli comedian Udi Kagan revealed his own struggle with PTSD and observed, “There is no household in Israel without this thing … this thing that grows in darkness, in shame, in silence.”
In 2023, 17 soldiers committed suicide. The number increased to 21 in 2024—the largest single-year total since 2011. Twelve were reservists, seven were on compulsory duty, and two were career soldiers.
The stress on soldiers is no doubt related to how their proud moral code—tohar haneshek, or the “purity of arms”—has been tested. The code says that soldiers “will use force of arms only for the purpose of subduing the enemy to the necessary extent and will limit his use of force so as to prevent unnecessary harm to human life and limb, dignity and property.” In Gaza’s dense urban terrain, Hamas used civilians as human shields, daring Israel to maintain its ethics while defending itself. The accusations that followed—of genocide, disproportionate force, or attacks on schools and hospitals—were predictable and false. Still, if only a handful of soldiers violated the IDF’s code, their actions stain the reputation of all.
Meanwhile, false claims led the U.N.-backed International Criminal Court in The Hague to issue arrest warrants for Netanyahu and his former defense minister, Yoav Gallant. The United States rejected the ICC warrants; however, several European countries said they would enforce them. The threat was taken so seriously that Netanyahu took a circuitous route to fly to New York for his speech to the General Assembly, fearing his plane might have to make an emergency landing in one of those countries. Mark Carney, Canada’s prime minister, just said that he would arrest Netanyahu if he visits. Other Israelis who served in the IDF have been threatened with arrest while visiting countries that back the ICC.
Haredi draft issue
Few issues have divided Israelis more than the continued exemption of the ultra-Orthodox from military service. Thousands of Haredim remain in yeshivahs while others fight and die. Although this issue dates back to the state’s founding, it’s become far more acute as the number of exemptions has ballooned from the 400 originally agreed to by David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s founding father and first prime minister, to tens of thousands.
The Israeli Supreme Court has repeatedly ordered the government to come up with a plan for drafting Haredi men, but their representatives in the Knesset have thwarted the effort by threatening to bring down the government. Secular Israelis have been further outraged by rabbis’ statements urging yeshivah students to ignore conscription orders and by protests against the arrest of draft dodgers. Despite threats to the current government, draft notices were sent to thousands of Haredim. Only a fraction reported; the army accepted an even smaller number. While some have served with distinction, the public overwhelmingly believes that the community has shirked its duty to the state.
Meanwhile, the myth of Israel’s self-reliance has collapsed. The IDF ran short of vital supplies, including Iron Dome interceptors, necessitating emergency U.S. shipments. Israel’s ability to sustain its operations over the last two years hinged on massive, consistent weapon shipments from both the Biden and Trump administrations totaling $21.7 billion, according to Quincy Institute senior research fellow William Hartung. Most of Israel’s success in the war has been through air power, and as Hartung noted, “its entire inventory of combat-capable aircraft comes from the U.S.”
This dependence came at a cost: It made Israel vulnerable to coercion from the United States. The Biden administration used the leverage to influence Israeli behavior by withholding or slow-walking certain weapons systems and forbidding the use of others. Trump used arms more as carrots by reversing Biden’s policies.
Increasingly, Democrats in Congress have called for suspending or cutting aid to Israel, putting Israel’s security at risk. Recognizing its overdependence on foreign weapons, Israel has begun to ramp up production of munitions and discuss relying on more domestically produced arms. Still, it cannot replicate the manufacture of the most sophisticated weapons in its arsenal, such as the F-35 stealth fighter jets.
Israel always took pride in saying that it could defend itself and that American troops were never asked to defend it. Yet in the last two years, Israel has been forced to rely on the United States, European and Middle Eastern states to fend off Iranian drone and missile attacks. A “secret” American base in the Negev provided sophisticated early-warning radar for missile detection, and U.S. soldiers operating THAAD anti-missile systems were deployed in Israel. This reliance extended to offensive capabilities: Israel ultimately did not have to prove whether it could destroy Iran’s underground nuclear facilities because Washington handled the operation.
Because of its dependency on the United States, Israel was subject to pressure that limited its options. Biden pressured Israel not to attack Iran and forced Netanyahu not to target nuclear or energy facilities when it did. He micromanaged IDF movements in Gaza. Trump told Israel not to bomb Beirut or its infrastructure, even as he let the IDF continue to conduct military operations in Southern Lebanon. More significantly, Trump forced Israel to accept ceasefires before destroying Iran’s nuclear stockpile and ballistic missiles, Hezbollah in Lebanon and now Hamas in Gaza.
Israel has no good alternatives, as 99% of “major conventional weapons” transferred to Israel are supplied by the United States and Germany, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. According to The New York Times, at least two dozen countries have restricted arms sales to Israel because of its conduct in Gaza; six countries have banned weapons transfers to Israel altogether.
The U.S.-Israel relationship has never been one-sided, and American troops and others will benefit from the lessons learned during the wars of the last two years. Technologies developed in Israel, such as the Arrow missile and the soon-to-be-deployed Iron Beam laser-defense system, will be used by other armies. The way Israel has fought in the urban environment against a foe using human shields will be modeled by others. Medical advances in battlefield medicine will be adopted worldwide.
After the fighting, the IDF must undertake a critical introspection to implement sweeping reforms. It must evaluate soldier conduct under the code of ethics and minimize dependence on foreign weapons by improving internal supply. Simultaneously, it must address the significant burdens on its personnel by boosting mental-health services and easing the strain on reservists, while urgently moving to integrate the Haredi community to avert a major national schism. It must also reckon with the implications of being a vassal of the United States.
Part I: Gaza and the illusion of victory
Part II: Israel bloodied Hezbollah, but only Lebanon can defeat it
Part III: Houthis keep the rockets coming
Part IV: Unexpected consequences in Syria
Part VI: The tragedy of the hostages
Next: Part VIII: Israel as Sparta
