A senior Lebanese security official delivered an extraordinary message to Israel this week.
Israel, he said, should help Lebanon, give it “oxygen” and avoid playing into Hezbollah’s hands. He also spoke of a genuine desire in Lebanon to move toward peace with Israel, while acknowledging an uncomfortable reality: The Lebanese Armed Forces are still incapable of disarming Hezbollah on their own and, in some areas, only the Israel Defense Forces can do the job.
Israel should listen to this message, but take it a step further. If the Lebanese government sees Hezbollah as an obstacle to restoring its sovereignty, while Israel sees the organization as the primary threat on its northern border, then the fundamental interests of the two countries may be closer than either side is accustomed to admitting.
Hezbollah is a Lebanese organization with a deep domestic constituency, particularly among the Shi’ite population. But it was also built, funded and armed for decades by Iran as part of a regional network whose interests have repeatedly conflicted with those of the Lebanese state.
For Israel, Hezbollah represents a direct security threat. For Lebanon, the problem is more fundamental: An armed organization maintained military capabilities exceeding those of the state, conducted its own foreign and security policy that at times conflicted directly with Lebanon’s national interests and could effectively determine when the country went to war.
The old equation of Israel versus Hezbollah with Lebanon caught in between may no longer accurately describe the situation. Both states increasingly face the same Iranian-backed organization, albeit for different reasons. But a common interest is not yet a common strategy. This is where the real test for Beirut begins.
We should recognize what has changed. Publicly demanding Hezbollah’s disarmament was once almost unthinkable for Lebanon’s political leaders. Today, restoring the state’s monopoly over weapons is part of the national debate, while Lebanese officials increasingly speak about the damage Hezbollah has inflicted on their country and even about the possibility of peace with Israel.
That shift matters. But states are ultimately judged not only by what their leaders say, but by what they are prepared to do.
Dismantling Hezbollah cannot mean merely pushing it away from Israel’s border or destroying much of its military capability. Over four decades, Hezbollah constructed a state within a state encompassing military, political, financial, social, media and civilian networks. Defeating such a system requires a holistic campaign and a division of labor between Israel and the Lebanese state.
Israel can and should deal with the military targets Lebanon is currently incapable of dismantling: tunnels, weapons depots, rocket infrastructure, command centers, Radwan Force positions and other strategic capabilities. The recent destruction of Hezbollah’s underground complex on the Ali al-Taher Ridge is an example. The Iranian-funded complex, built over two decades and containing more than two kilometers of tunnels and command and weapons storage facilities, was ultimately destroyed by the IDF despite Iranian warnings. The gap between Tehran’s rhetoric and its ability or willingness to protect Hezbollah’s strategic assets points to an opportunity that should not be wasted.
Israel cannot and should not rebuild the Lebanese state on Lebanon’s behalf. If Beirut expects Israel to perform military tasks it cannot yet perform itself, Lebanon must take responsibility for Hezbollah’s civilian centers of gravity: the financial, institutional, social and ideological networks through which the organization finances itself, shapes public perceptions and creates dependence on Hezbollah rather than on the state.
In terms of strategy, Jerusalem would target Hezbollah’s military, while Beirut would target its domestic infrastructure.
Al-Qard al-Hassan, Hezbollah’s financial institution, is not a rocket launcher. Jihad al-Bina, its reconstruction arm, is not a Radwan Force unit. Hezbollah’s welfare, health, education and family-support systems are not attack tunnels. Neither are its media and propaganda networks. Yet together, these institutions are essential components of Hezbollah’s power. They provide money and services; rebuild homes after wars; and reinforce the claim that the “resistance” can provide for Lebanese Shi’ites better than their own government.
The same applies to ideological infrastructure. Political or religious support for Hezbollah is not itself a target, but incitement, illicit financing and organizational activity supporting armed authority outside the state cannot be ignored. Beirut has tools Israel does not: law enforcement, fiscal regulation and public institutions capable of offering citizens an alternative to Hezbollah’s parallel state.
This may be precisely the moment to use those tools. Hezbollah’s ability to provide money, reconstruction, health care and assistance has long been a major source of strength within the Shi’ite community. That capability has been damaged. This does not mean Lebanese Shi’ites have suddenly turned against Hezbollah. But dependence, loyalty and fear are not the same thing, and a weakened ability to provide services creates an opening for the Lebanese state.
Beirut’s opportunity, then, is not to wage a campaign against Lebanon’s Shi’ites, but to compete for them. If Hezbollah cannot rebuild a family’s home, the state should. If a young Shi’ite seeks education, employment or a future, his relationship with his country should not have to run through an armed political organization. Dismantling Hezbollah’s state-within-a-state will not be complete when the last rocket is destroyed. It will be complete when Lebanese citizens no longer need Hezbollah to obtain what they should receive from their government.
The weakness of the Lebanese Armed Forces cannot become a blanket exemption from responsibility. If Beirut cannot yet dismantle Hezbollah’s military structure, it can still disrupt illicit financing and smuggling, enforce its laws and strengthen alternatives to Hezbollah’s institutions. Military weakness may explain why Lebanon cannot do everything. It cannot justify doing too little.
Israel also has responsibilities. If Beirut is genuinely willing to reclaim Lebanese sovereignty, Israel should give it room to act while making clear that it has no territorial ambitions in Lebanon. Israel’s objective is security, not land. Such a declaration would not require Israel to compromise its security, but it would weaken one of Hezbollah’s arguments for retaining its weapons. Yet room for Beirut cannot become immunity for Hezbollah: Israeli restraint must be accompanied by measurable Lebanese action. If Israel is asked to give Beirut “oxygen,” Beirut must demonstrate what it is doing with it.
This leads to an idea that may initially sound unrealistic: Perhaps Israel and Lebanon should stop pretending that the struggle against Hezbollah belongs to only one of them. This does not mean a military alliance, a joint command center or soldiers fighting side by side. But more open strategic coordination is no longer inconceivable if both governments recognize that Hezbollah undermines the interests of both.
In practice, the division of labor is clear. Israel would act against the military capabilities that threaten it and that Beirut cannot yet dismantle. Lebanon would act against the political, financial, civilian and ideological infrastructure that allows Hezbollah to regenerate. The United States and Arab countries committed to Lebanese sovereignty could reinforce the effort by strengthening Lebanese institutions, applying financial pressure on Hezbollah’s networks and investing in civilian alternatives.
We normally imagine the sequence in one direction: Hezbollah is disarmed, an agreement follows, peace becomes possible and only then can Israel and Lebanon cooperate. Perhaps the sequence can also work in reverse.
Trust does not always have to precede cooperation; sometimes cooperation creates trust. Two adversaries can identify a shared interest, act toward a defined objective and gradually build confidence through results. That could have an impact on issues beyond Hezbollah’s military capabilities. Much of the terror group’s legitimacy rests on the idea of “resistance” to Israel. Limited cooperation between Israel and Lebanon against a threat they increasingly recognize as common could begin to undermine that narrative.
Perhaps peace will not come because Israel and Lebanon first learn to trust one another. Perhaps they will learn to trust one another because they choose to confront, in different ways but toward the same objective, the force that has prevented them from living as normal neighboring states.
