Over the past several years, Israel has been singularly focused on a litany of crises dominating the political arena of the Middle East. From Lebanon to Iran, to Gaza, Israeli news cycles have been dominated by a nonstop wave of stories about immediate threats facing the Jewish state.
However, in parallel to the dramatic confrontations developing on or around Israel’s borders, a separate geopolitical race has been unfolding with critical long-term implications for Israel’s security.
An increasingly open competition has been waged among Middle Eastern powers to carve out spheres of influence in the African continent. This competition directly affects Israel in a litany of spheres, including trade, diplomatic relations and direct security threats. The primary players in this “race for Africa” are Iran, Turkey and the Gulf states.
Israel’s interests in Africa
Israel has historically sought close relations with African countries. In the ’60s, close ties with Africa were a cornerstone of Israeli foreign policy, with David Ben-Gurion and Golda Meir being particular advocates for strengthening ties. However, in the aftermath of the Yom-Kippur war, relations fell off, leading to a rollercoaster of diplomatic relations ever since the early ’70s.
Asher Lubotzky, a historian and geopolitical analyst of Africa and the Middle East, explained in a recent report for the Institute for National Strategy and Security (INSS) at Tel Aviv University that the current diplomatic map is marked with broad disparities across the continent in terms of relations with Jerusalem.
“The prevalent religiosity in each country, the local histories of Israel’s image, and each government’s international orientation and security challenges all shape Israel’s current position,” Lubotzky noted.
In much of Muslim-majority North Africa, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, Israel faces entrenched political and popular hostility. Nine African states maintain no diplomatic relations with Israel, and even countries once considered relatively moderate, such as Senegal and Nigeria, saw significant public protest against Israel as a result of the war against Hamas in Gaza.
Israel’s position is considerably stronger in Christian-majority states in East, Central, and parts of West Africa, where expanding evangelical and Pentecostal movements have bolstered public sympathy for Israel. Countries facing Islamist insurgencies, such as Kenya and South Sudan, and Christian communities in southern Nigeria, view Israel as a strategic partner. The cohort of pro-Israeli African states constitutes a critical conduit for Israeli outreach into the developing world and serves as a foundation for Israeli diplomatic interests.
However, Israel’s strategic interests in Africa extend beyond diplomacy.
“Israel’s southern frontier, the Red Sea, was very important during the war. Across the Red Sea, there is Africa—Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, etc. And this region is extremely strategic for Israel,” Lubotzky told i24NEWS in a recent interview.
The Red Sea saw consistent combat engagements throughout the war as the U.S., Israel and a broad coalition of allied nations sought to stamp out the naval and missile threat posed by the Houthis terror group based in Yemen. The survival of the Houthi regime throughout the war indicates that the Red Sea is destined to remain a zone of critical security interests for Israel in the near future.
In addition to diplomatic, trade and maritime interests, the proliferation of Middle Eastern terror groups throughout the continent is increasingly entrenching the influence of African geopolitics on Israeli security interests. Over the past decade, Africa has become a key arena for Hamas.
According to reports from Israel’s Kan public broadcaster, Hamas has begun stockpiling weapons in African countries for later smuggling into Gaza or other operational zones.
According to a recent report by the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, smuggling routes for the transport of “enormous quantities of standard weapons into the [Gaza] Strip … from military depots in Libya and Sudan” are already set up.
Iran
The proliferation of Hamas in Africa is a direct result of the expansion of Iranian influence throughout the continent. Tehran is pursuing a multipronged strategy of defense cooperation, energy partnerships and economic outreach, designed to exploit rising anti-Western sentiment, circumvent sanctions and expand its reach through new political and military partnerships.
In May 2025, Tehran signed a security cooperation memorandum with Niger, creating a joint committee for intelligence and operational coordination. Iran has also strengthened ties with Burkina Faso, which calls cooperation with Tehran a “top priority,” and has explored military training and equipment transfers. In parallel, Tehran announced plans to establish drone centers across Africa, beginning in Uganda.
Beyond overt security deals, Iran operates covertly through Hezbollah and the IRGC-Quds Force. It has organized attack cells across the Central African Republic, Chad, Gambia, Ghana, Niger and Sudan, targeting Western and Israeli interests. Between 2019 and 2022, coordinated intelligence operations thwarted several plots aimed at Israeli and American tourists in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana and Senegal.
Iran is also expanding its footprint in the Horn of Africa. Tehran has fueled instability through weapons smuggling into Sudan and has sought a deal to establish naval bases on the country’s Red Sea coast. Its support for the Houthis in Yemen has further destabilized the maritime corridor, placing Iran directly across the Red Sea from Saudi Arabia and heightening concerns about long-term Iranian access to shipping lanes.
Tehran is simultaneously using nuclear expertise and energy diplomacy to build long-term alliances. African states facing chronic energy shortages, such as South Africa, Niger, and Burkina Faso, have expressed interest in nuclear development, which Iran is eager to support. In 2024, Iran and Burkina Faso signed an MoU on nuclear research and training. Niger’s vast uranium reserves have become central to its relationship with Iran. In 2024, Iran acquired 300 tons of refined uranium from Niger in exchange for drones and surface-to-air missiles.
Turkey
While Iran has achieved impressive expansion of its influence across the African continent, its geopolitical position has certainly not been unchallenged. Turkey has emerged as one of the most active external military players in Africa, anchoring its expansion along key maritime corridors, particularly the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.
Raphael Parens, a fellow in the Philadelphia-based Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Eurasia Program, explained in a recent report for the institute that “Ankara sees Africa as a core part of its global political and economic engagement, following in the footsteps of its Ottoman forefathers.”
Ankara operates its largest overseas military base in Mogadishu, Somalia, which also hosts the world’s largest Turkish embassy. Camp TURKSOM serves as a hub for training Somali security forces, with Turkey aiming to prepare up to 10,000 troops, approximately one-third of Somalia’s armed forces. In 2024, Ankara signed a memorandum of understanding to equip, rebuild and train Somalia’s navy, securing in return a 30% share of revenue from Somalia’s Exclusive Economic Zone in the Indian Ocean.
Turkey’s Red Sea ambitions extend further. Agreements with Sudan have allowed Ankara to establish a military presence on Suakin Island, a historic Ottoman port positioned directly on regional maritime lanes. Turkey has also pursued negotiations for a future base in Djibouti, home to several competing international military installations.
Ankara’s security footprint is reinforced through SADAT, Turkey’s Wagner-style private military contractor. SADAT entered African theaters beginning in Libya and has since expanded operations to the Sahel and Somalia, providing training, security services and operational support, including the deployment of Syrian fighters.
Turkey’s parallel rise as an arms supplier has deepened its security role across Africa. Ankara has become the fourth-largest arms exporter to the continent, with cost-efficient platforms driving demand. Turkish defense firms are exporting armored vehicles, helicopters, light aircraft, drones and small arms across several African markets.
The Gulf states
While the spread of Turkish and Iranian influence clearly undermines Israeli regional interests, the expansion of Saudi and Emirati engagement may serve as a balancing feature to this geopolitical competition. The United Arab Emirates has emerged as the dominant African actor.
“The Emirates are the biggest external investor in Africa, more than the Chinese and the U.S. combined. For them, it’s very much geopolitical. They have a broad vision and plan for the region, and they perceive a clear competition against various regional opponents that they want to be active in,” Yoel Guzansky, a senior researcher and head of the Gulf Program at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), told JNS.
Since 2019, Emirati firms have signed investment agreements exceeding $110 billion, primarily in ports, logistics hubs and renewable energy systems, dwarfing the $2 billion invested by Iran and $10 billion invested by Turkey.
Guzansky noted that “the Red Sea is particularly critical for the Emirates. This has to do with making the UAE a hub both economically and geo-strategically. Controlling the routes along the Red Sea is a big part of that project.”
The UAE, after losing its lease in Djibouti, has built a network of facilities across the region, including ports and airfields in Somalia, a major base at Assab in Eritrea, and outposts in Yemen, including on Perim Island. Emirati installations, generally limited in scale but strategically located, support military operations against the Houthis and efforts to block Iranian weapons smuggling through the Red Sea.
Saudi Arabia’s approach has centered on large-scale infrastructure investment in East Africa and the Sahel, designed to enhance food security and regional trade capacity while reinforcing its strategic depth along the Red Sea. Riyadh has committed to raising African investments to roughly $25 billion, including major port development projects such as its operation in Assab, Eritrea, and in Djibouti. Religious humanitarian organizations linked to the Saudi state, including the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre, also operate across the continent, extending Riyadh’s soft-power reach.
Not all Gulf involvement has been beneficial to Israel. Qatar has pursued a softer form of influence compared to the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Doha has expanded mediation roles in Sudan, the DRC, South Sudan and Chad, leveraging its diplomatic positioning as a global moderator. In the last year, it has announced ambitions to invest up to $103 billion across six African states in mining, agriculture, infrastructure and energy.
Al Jazeera’s extensive African coverage has further amplified Qatar’s diplomatic image on the continent. Guzansky observed that while the Qatari plans are ambitious, they are relatively fresh and far from being actualized.
“The Qatari involvement is brand new. There have been several declarations of intent, but they are yet to be an actual player on the ground like the Emirates,” he explained.
Israel’s future
The accelerating competition between Iran, Turkey and the Gulf states across Africa is rapidly reshaping the strategic environment surrounding Israel’s southern and western periphery. From the dense clustering of foreign military installations along the Red Sea to the entrenchment of Hamas and Hezbollah logistics networks across North and East Africa, the continent has become an increasingly direct theater for forces that affect Israel’s maritime security, arms smuggling prevention and diplomatic standing in the developing world.
While the UAE and Saudi Arabia are expanding their presence in ways that may partially counterbalance Turkish and Iranian ambitions, Tehran’s covert terror infrastructure and Ankara’s growing network of training bases pose more immediate challenges to Israeli interests.
Shiri Fein-Grossman, CEO of the Israel-Africa Institute, warned in a recent interview with i24NEWS that Israel can no longer afford to treat African affairs as peripheral. “We have to think more like a regional power, or maybe a global power like some of our neighbors,” she said.
