In the shadow of ongoing conflicts, the latest Arab Opinion Index for 2025 paints a stark picture of simmering resentment across the Middle East and North Africa. Conducted by the Qatar-funded Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, this massive survey of over 40,000 respondents in 15 countries reveals overwhelming anti-Israel sentiment, intensified by the Gaza war. A whopping 87% oppose their governments recognizing Israel, 80% view the Palestinian cause as a shared Arab struggle and 44% see Israel as the top threat to the Arab world, surpassing even the United States at 21%. But before policymakers in Washington or Tel Aviv hit the panic button, let’s dissect these numbers. As experts noted to JNS, public opinion in autocratic regimes is often more smoke than fire, manipulated by agendas and divorced from realpolitik.
Is this survey truly the voice of the “Arab street,” or a curated narrative? Daniel J. Samet, the American Enterprise Institute’s Jeane Kirkpatrick Fellow, warned against overhyping such polls.
“Analysts give too much weight to the so-called Arab street,” he told JNS. “The Arab countries that have signed the Abraham Accords did so despite widespread anti-Israel sentiment at home. Strategic interests, not public opinion, will determine whether more states pursue normalization.”
Indeed, the Accords with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan held firm despite similar opposition in past surveys (85-88% since 2014). Drops in support post-normalization, like Morocco’s from 20% to 6%, haven’t reversed deals; governments prioritize security pacts and economic gains over street protests.
The survey’s findings on Israel are unequivocal and alarming at first glance. Across regions, from the Mashreq (Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria) to the Gulf (Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia), Israel tops the threat list for individual countries at 28%, with regional spikes like 53% in the Mashreq and 38% in the Nile Valley (Egypt, Sudan). When asked about threats to the broader “Arab nation,” that figure jumps to 44%, a slight uptick from 38% in 2022-23, reflecting a decade-long trend where Israel consistently leads (37-52% since 2011). Iranian influence, by contrast, registers at just 6-8%, though it hits 14% in the Gulf.
The Gaza war looms large, with 87% reporting psychological stress from Israel’s actions in Gaza and Lebanon, and 70% actively following the news via satellite TV or the internet.
Solidarity with the Palestinians runs deep: 83% say South Africa’s International Court of Justice case against Israel lifted their spirits, and 80% affirm the Palestinian issue as pan-Arab, up from 76% recently and stable around 70-84% since 2011.
Opposition to normalization is fierce at 87%, with only 6% in favor, and half of those conditioning it on a Palestinian state. Their reasons for rejection are predominantly political: 31.5% call Israel a “settler-colonial state occupying Palestine,” 13.3% decry its expansionism and 9.1% highlight oppression of Palestinians. Cultural or religious motives barely register at 2.3%.
These attitudes bleed into views of the United States. Perceptions have soured over the decade, with preferences for American education, medicine, or products dropping 15-20%. Negative sentiments dominate: 77% agree U.S. policies threaten Arab stability (the highest among any power), 66% see America imposing its will globally and 62% accuse it of controlling Arab nations. To mend fences, 44% suggest shifting policy; 17% want halted support for Israel, 14% call for protecting Palestinians. Yet, as the survey noted, this reflects a “statistically significant shift,” eroding even non-political appeal like U.S. healthcare or tech.
Hussain Abdul-Hussain, a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, goes further, questioning the survey’s integrity.
Funded entirely by the Doha-based Arab Center under Azmi Bishara, a pan-Arab nationalist and fugitive, it’s designed to “prove the existence of a unified ‘Arab Street’ that thinks like a unified nation, and that hates America because it takes the side of Israel,” he said.
In autocracies, he argued, “you cannot accurately gauge public opinion” as pro-normalization voices are silenced, exiled, or threatened.
“If peace supporters could ever campaign for normalization without fear for their lives, these numbers would have been much different,” Abdul-Hussain told JNS.
The Gaza fallout, he said, is mostly performative: “Watch Al-Jazeera, get angry, and riot in the West,” often by Islamists with anti-Western agendas far beyond Palestine.
This skepticism matters for future policy. The survey’s anti-normalization tide could pressure fragile regimes, especially amid Gaza’s humanitarian crisis, where 62% of Gazans couldn’t access medicine, 51% lacked water, and 89% faced service shortages, all thanks to Hamas.
Yet, as Samet implied, strategic calculus trumps polls. Gulf states, eyeing Iran as a 14% threat, continue backchannel ties with Israel.
For Israel, Abdul-Hussain’s take is blunt: If these numbers hold, “Israel should be worried right now.” But real reactions, beyond Hezbollah, have been muted, with no mass Arab uprisings. Proxy wars persist, but the “Arab street” hasn’t toppled Accords or sparked intifadas.
The United States, facing 56% negative views, shouldn’t chase popularity either.
Abdul-Hussain dismisses anti-Americanism as universal: “Hating America is not particular to Arab nations... Human nature usually sides with underdogs,” he said.
And in terms of appeasing via concessions, Abdul-Hussain suggested this is a fool’s errand.
“Let them be angry, and let them realign with Russia and China,” he advised. Arab economies offer “little to the world” beyond population; tantrums would self-sabotage. China interned Uyghurs with scant Muslim backlash, proof that interests, not polls, rule, he said. Abdul-Hussain suggested that Washington should stick to mutual benefits: countering Iran and bolstering trade, without ditching Israel.
In the end, the 2025 Arab Opinion Index underscores a region fractured by war and ideology, where anti-Israel fervor runs high but policy bends to power. Both Abdul-Hussain and Samet agree that the “Arab street” remains a convenient myth, fueling endless conflict rather than resolution.
