The pre-dawn arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu—Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s most formidable political rival—cemented March 19 as a pivotal and unforgettable day in Turkish political history.
Imamoglu, who was taken from his home and imprisoned as if he were a common criminal, faces a series of grave charges, including leading and being a member of a criminal organization, embezzlement, bribery, aggravated fraud, unlawful acquisition of personal data and rigging public tenders—along with accusations of aiding the Kurdish PKK.
As if that were not enough, on the night before his arrest, Istanbul University arbitrarily revoked his diploma, an essential requirement for eligibility to run for the presidency—despite having no legal authority to do so.
Taken together, these developments show that the mayor is the victim of an orchestrated political takedown.
Why was Imamoglu perceived as a threat by Erdogan? The answer begins with Imamoglu’s unexpected and decisive victory in the March 31, 2019, local elections, when he defeated Binali Yildirim, Erdogan’s close ally and a former prime minister. Born in 1970, Imamoglu began his career in the private sector, working as a developer in his family’s construction and real estate business before entering politics. In 2002, he became a board member of the multi-sport club Trabzonspor, further raising his public profile.
His ascent posed a significant challenge to Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), which first secured control of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality in 2004. From that day until 2019, the AKP used the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality’s infrastructure and budget not only to serve the city’s residents but also to fund and develop civil society organizations aligned with the party. The municipality’s 2025 budget is approximately 564 billion Turkish liras ($14.8 billion at current exchange rates). The AKP was understandably reluctant to give up such a valuable resource, with a budget comparable to that of a sovereign state.
Following allegations of irregularities in the 2019 elections, Erdogan pushed the High Election Board (YSK) to annul the results. In the rerun held on June 23, 2019, Imamoglu not only retained his lead but expanded it significantly, thus officially becoming mayor. His landmark victory shattered the prevailing perception that Erdogan was invincible.
Imamoglu’s success against Erdogan’s candidate caught the attention of the Turkish people. Both during the election campaign and throughout his tenure as mayor, he began to earn widespread appreciation with speeches and conduct that resonated with both conservative and secular segments of society. His wife’s uncovered head and the couple’s endorsement of republican values were a defining source of support among secular voters, while his ability to recite Quranic verses with fluent Arabic diction dispelled prejudices that he was an irreligious secularist. These images played a key role in generating sympathy for him in conservative circles.
Additionally, Imamoglu’s roots in Trabzon, a city in the Black Sea region in northeastern Turkey, emerged as another significant factor in shaping his appeal.
Unlike in many other countries, “regionalism” stands out as a significant phenomenon in shaping voting behavior in Turkey. In other words, many Turkish citizens support political candidates based on their place of origin. This sociological phenomenon is particularly pronounced in Turkey’s Black Sea region.
Until Imamoglu’s rise, Erdogan—who is originally from Rize, a city on the Black Sea coast, some 47 miles from Trabzon—enjoyed a monopoly over the region’s political loyalty. For years, voters hailing from the Black Sea region backed Erdogan based on this regional allegiance, which can be compared to the devotion of football fans to their team. However, Imamoglu’s roots in Trabzon neutralized Erdogan’s “Black Sea card.”
By 2023, looking through a political lens, developments in Turkey had begun to seriously shake Erdogan’s grip on power. The continuously deteriorating economy, the Turkish lira’s steep devaluation against the U.S. dollar, rising unemployment, and—on top of all this—the devastating earthquake of Feb. 6, 2023, seemed to many to be harbingers of Erdogan’s impending downfall. Undoubtedly, Erdogan’s politically motivated issuing of a “zoning amnesty” prior to the earthquake, effectively legitimizing thousands of illegal buildings, played a role in creating this perception. From a political science perspective, such chaos is considered a golden opportunity for any opposition movement.
Yet, the opposition bloc led by the Republican People’s Party (CHP) failed to capitalize on this opportunity. Instead of rallying around the charismatic leadership of Imamoglu or Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavas, the CHP reverted to form by nominating as its candidate for the 2023 presidential election former party leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu—who had repeatedly lost to Erdogan and failed to inspire public enthusiasm. It is noteworthy however that Imamoglu did not mount a bold challenge to Kilicdaroglu even as the latter worked within the party to restrict Imamoglu’s room for maneuver and threats to push him out of the party.
In retrospect, despite the economic crisis and the devastating earthquake seemingly strengthening the opposition, Turkey’s conservatives demonstrated their unwillingness to remove Erdogan, the flagbearer of Sunni Islam, and replace him with Kilicdaroglu, a politician of Alevi origin. This hesitation enabled Erdogan to secure reelection with 52% of the vote.
Following Kilicdaroglu’s failure, he was replaced as party leader by Ozgur Ozel, while Imamoglu and Yavas had begun to be seen as the natural presidential contenders of the opposition camp. At that point, Imamoglu again chose not to announce his presidential candidacy, instead deciding to seek reelection as Istanbul mayor in the upcoming municipal elections on March 31, 2024. Imamoglu’s strategy was clear: he wanted to use the Istanbul Municipality as a springboard to the presidency right up until the last possible moment. Indeed, Imamoglu once again became mayor by defeating Erdogan’s candidate, Murat Kurum. In other words, Erdogan had been defeated once more.
This success led to Imamoglu being characterized as Erdogan’s most serious rival. He became the target of relentless daily attacks by newspapers and television channels close to Erdogan. Undoubtedly, these assaults only served to further strengthen Imamoglu’s position within the opposition camp.
The verbal attacks extended beyond critiques of municipal administration, frequently targeting Imamoglu’s positions on broader geopolitical issues. A pivotal moment came on April 28, 2024, when Imamoglu unequivocally condemned Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023 attack on Israel, explicitly characterizing the group as a terrorist organization. This statement provoked a vehement response from Erdogan, who, in stark contrast, portrayed Hamas as freedom fighters on the domestic political stage. Facing a mounting backlash, Imamoglu strategically navigated the political landscape by issuing statements that criticized Israel in an attempt to strike a more politically tenable balance.
On March 19, Erdogan moved to eliminate Imamoglu from the political arena, just three years before the scheduled 2028 elections, or two years before the likely early elections in 2027. By doing so, he hoped to create the impression that the arrest had nothing to do with the elections. Erdogan’s strategy to sideline Imamoglu continues to unfold.
In response, many of Imamoglu’s supporters, who genuinely believed he could defeat Erdogan at the ballot box, began to fill city squares across Turkey. While his arrest appears to have been the trigger for these protests, the underlying motivation runs deeper: Protesters are now fundamentally focused on defending democracy’s core principle of the free and fair transfer of power via elections. In this context, hundreds of thousands of people nationwide have taken to the streets to express their profound dissatisfaction with what they perceive as an assault on democracy. Supporters of Imamoglu’s CHP clashed with police in multiple locations. Consequently, many demonstrators, and journalists as well, were taken into custody.
The tectonic shifts of political dissent are reshaping Turkey’s electoral landscape. Protests that were once confined to metropolitan strongholds like Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir or to coastal provinces have now reached into the historically impenetrable Black Sea regional terrain traditionally considered Erdogan’s unassailable political fortress. At the heart of this seismic shift lies Imamoglu’s deep ancestral connection to Trabzon, where his familial roots and personal narrative have catalyzed an unprecedented political awakening.
With all centers of power—the legislative, executive, judiciary, press, army and police forces—controlled by Erdogan, the prospects for the protesters appear bleak. Moreover, Erdogan’s intimidation of key business circles, particularly TUSIAD (the Turkish Industry and Business Association), through police pressure, effectively prevents protesters from initiating a general strike that could paralyze the economy or even shut down airports.
At the same time, the present international geopolitical landscape paradoxically reinforces Erdogan’s domestic standing. Both the European Union and the United States have shown marked diplomatic restraint regarding Turkey’s internal political dynamics. The complex fallout of tensions between U.S. President Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has exposed NATO’s fragility, casting a shadow over the alliance’s cohesion in the face of persistent Russian aggression.
This strategic vulnerability has dramatically elevated Turkey’s geopolitical significance, compelling the European Union to adopt an unprecedented posture of strategic silence. Unlike previous diplomatic approaches, European powers now prioritize geopolitical pragmatism over vocal criticism, tacitly tolerating Erdogan’s increasingly authoritarian trajectory to preserve a delicate regional security balance. This shift in policy is not limited to the European Union alone. The Trump administration has fundamentally recalibrated U.S. foreign policy, dramatically departing from the democratic idealism championed by its predecessor.
Pragmatic national interests now supersede diplomatic principles, with a laser-focused approach to geopolitical engagement. Within this strategic realignment, Turkey has emerged as a critical focal point. Washington is actively pursuing rapprochement with Ankara, methodically addressing bilateral tensions and exploring avenues to normalize relations. These efforts include potential resolution of contentious issues such as CAATSA sanctions and the suspended F-35 fighter jet sales — developments that signal a willingness to accommodate Erdogan’s regime.
This calculated diplomatic strategy has effectively neutralized any meaningful American response to Imamoglu’s political predicament. Washington’s silence was eventually broken by a tepid comment from Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who expressed concern about the developments following a meeting in Washington with Turkey’s foreign minister Hakan Fidan. The muted response to events in Turkey serves a broader geopolitical calculus, where strategic partnerships take precedence over democratic scrutiny. Consequently, Erdogan finds himself in an extraordinarily advantageous position, insulated by a complex web of international political considerations that align remarkably in his favor.
This dynamic also extends to Erdogan’s position in Syria. Following the agreement signed between the new Syrian government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, Erdogan feels significantly more confident about the Syrian arena and seeks to deepen his country’s influence in the region by establishing new military bases in Syria.
Erdogan’s strongman image in foreign policy clearly influences his actions at home. Buoyed by his position, the Turkish president may choose to suppress the protests with an iron fist. In the event of an unexpected escalation from the protesters, Erdogan will most likely deploy, in addition to police forces, the new “neighborhood watch” (Bekci) units, the Police Special Forces (POH), and even his own “Presidential Reinforcement Units” (Takviye Hazır Kuvvetleri).
The arrest of Ekrem Imamoglu marks a critical juncture in Turkish democratic history, underscoring the deepening tensions between political power and democratic principles. What began as a local political rivalry has evolved into a broader contest over the fundamental rights of political opposition and the integrity of electoral processes. İmamoglu’s journey from a rising municipal leader to a potential political threat to Erdogan demonstrates the complex dynamics of Turkish politics, where regional loyalties, religious identities and urban-rural divides continue to play significant roles in shaping political narratives.
Despite the current challenging circumstances, the widespread protests following Imamoglu’s arrest suggest that democratic resistance remains alive in Turkey. The willingness of hundreds of thousands of citizens to take to the streets, risking police intervention, indicates a deep-seated desire for genuine democratic representation and fair political competition. While Erdogan’s control over state institutions appears comprehensive, the emergence of leaders like Imamoglu and the persistent public demand for democratic change indicate that the political landscape in Turkey remains dynamic and unpredictable, with the potential for significant transformations in the future.
Just as Erdogan once earned the title of “victim” in the eyes of the people after being imprisoned for four months in 1999— a development that ultimately propelled him up the political ladder—Imamoglu may also stage a similar comeback. Turkish political history suggests this is possible. Whether this happens, only history will reveal.
However, if Imamoglu fails to make a “comeback” to the political stage before the next general elections, Turkey will have entered an authoritarian one-man era, the likes of which it has never experienced. Erdogan’s prophetic words from the founding speech of the AKP will come true: “From now on, nothing in Turkey will be the same as before.”
Originally published by the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.