If I were writing a geopolitical thriller, the main characters would be Washington, Beijing, Tehran, Paris and Brussels.
In one storyline, Washington appears increasingly focused on bringing the current conflict with Iran to a close, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, limiting further disruption to global markets, and shifting American attention away from the Iranian file and toward other priorities, including America at 250 and the approaching midterm elections.
In another, France—a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council—is publicly warning that it will veto the lifting of U.N. sanctions unless Tehran accepts restrictions not only on its nuclear program, but also on its ballistic-missile capabilities and proxy network.
At the same time, Europe is undergoing what may be its most significant reassessment of China in decades. Its leaders are debating how to respond to growing dependence on Chinese supply chains, industrial overcapacity and what many increasingly view as a systemic challenge, rather than a traditional trade dispute.
A thriller writer might connect these developments and imagine a coordinated strategy: Washington playing the role of diplomat, Europe playing the role of enforcer. Reality is almost certainly less coordinated than that.
Yet the coincidence is striking.
At the very moment that the United States appears willing to explore accommodation with Iran, Europe is drawing red lines. At the very moment that Washington and Beijing appear to be seeking a more stable relationship after a period of heightened tensions, Europe is moving toward a more assertive economic posture toward China.
For Israel—and increasingly, for the wider world—both stories matter.
Iran remains an existential threat to Israel. Beyond its nuclear ambitions, Tehran has spent decades building proxy networks, destabilizing neighboring states and threatening freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. The significance of Hormuz extends far beyond energy. Disruptions affect the movement of critical commodities, industrial inputs and global supply chains. More broadly, if coercion succeeds in one strategic chokepoint, it risks encouraging similar behavior elsewhere.
France’s position is not occurring in isolation. While Paris has been the most explicit, Europe more broadly is showing little appetite for rapid sanctions relief. Senior European officials have stated that discussions about lifting sanctions are premature, and European leaders continue to link any future normalization not only to nuclear issues but also to Iran’s regional activities, missile programs and broader security concerns.
At the very same moment that Europe is taking a firmer position toward Tehran, it is also becoming more assertive toward China.
At first glance, this may appear to be a story about Iran. Yet at the very same moment that Europe is taking a firmer position toward Tehran, it is also becoming more assertive toward China. From concerns about industrial overcapacity and trade imbalances to efforts to reduce dependence on Chinese supply chains and critical minerals, European leaders increasingly appear determined to push back against vulnerabilities that they believe could become future strategic liabilities.
The China story is no less consequential.
The future of global manufacturing, critical minerals, advanced technology supply chains, maritime trade and the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific will shape the international system for decades to come. Decisions being made today in Beijing, Washington, Brussels, Tokyo, New Delhi, Manila, Seoul, Canberra and elsewhere will influence the economic and security environment in which Israel operates.
What makes this moment noteworthy is not that some countries are becoming tougher on Iran or tougher on China.
It is that concerns about strategic dependence, supply-chain vulnerability, coercive leverage and freedom of navigation are increasingly appearing across both conversations.
The Strait of Hormuz and the South China Sea are very different theaters. Iran and China are very different actors. Yet both have become central to debates about the resilience of global trade, the security of critical supply chains, and the ability of states to use economic or geographic leverage for strategic purposes.
Whether by design or by circumstance, recent developments suggest that more governments are beginning to connect these issues.
Nor for Israel are these separate conversations.
China is Iran’s largest economic partner and a critical supplier of the industrial and dual-use components that have helped sustain Tehran’s ballistic-missile capabilities and broader strategic resilience. In other words, decisions in Beijing as well as Tehran inevitably shape Israel’s security environment.
As more governments are beginning to connect the questions of strategic dependence, coercive leverage and supply-chain resilience across both Iran and China, Israel has every reason to do the same.
