The targeting of the Arab Gulf states by the Islamic Republic of Iran, including Saudi Arabia, as part of Iran’s response to the immense firepower unleashed against them by the combined forces of the United States and Israel, has driven Saudi Arabia to seek new alliances.
Riyadh’s poor experience with the Biden administration had convinced the kingdom of the need to diversify its alliances and depend less on the United States. Its worries have increased in light of Israel’s stunning performances against Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis and Iran, resulting in their seeking to build a regional balance of power. Saudi Arabia began by fostering an alliance with Pakistan, which commenced in September, with the signing of the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA).
The U.S.-Israel war with Iran drove Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the president of Turkey, to seek a security pact that would include Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt. It essentially creates a Sunni-Muslim accord with a combined population of 500 million.
Partnering with Pakistan, the sole Muslim nuclear power, affords Erdoğan’s Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia—all non-nuclear countries—a nuclear umbrella. The first formal meeting of the foreign ministers from these four countries took place on March 19, in Riyadh, on the sidelines of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. This was reported to be the first time the four countries held a joint security cooperation discussion.
The ostensible intention of the SMDA would be to serve as a security platform that would enable greater cooperation in the defense industry and broader defense matters. In other words, it would seek to develop its own arms rather than depend on the United States.
The initiative emerged amid intense regional tensions, particularly the ongoing war between Iran and the U.S.-Israel coalition, and the threat of further escalation. The talks focused on combining regional influence, defense cooperation and industrial collaboration to address shared security challenges, without mirroring NATO’s structure. Erdoğan, as the saying goes, “wants to dance at several weddings at the same time.”
He wants a footing in NATO, in which he is the only Muslim participant, but wants, even more, to advance Muslim power and influence in the Middle East region and beyond.
Islamabad would use the envisioned pact as leverage against India and, at the same time, use the Saudi beneficence to support its economy. Similarly, Egypt seeks Saudi financial help to bolster its failing economy and fund Cairo’s efforts to build up its military forces to counter Israel, which it considers its chief enemy, despite the 1979 peace treaty.
At the March meeting attended by the four foreign ministers, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan posited, “In principle, we need to recognize this: Either we come together and learn to solve our own problems ourselves, or an external hegemon will come, and either impose solutions that serve its own interests or do nothing while preventing others from acting.” He was implying that the United States or Israel are those hegemons.
Erdoğan and Fidan do not lack antisemitic and anti-Israel ardor. Ankara has repeatedly described Israel as the primary instigator of the war with Iran. In a joint statement following the Riyadh meeting, they proclaimed allegations regarding “Israel’s expansionist policy in Lebanon.”
Ironically, these four partners have, historically, had little love lost among them. Although Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have had a relatively close relationship, Saudi Arabia and Turkey had a bitter relationship following the October 2018 murder of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul, Turkey. A critic of the Saudi royal family and of Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman (MBS), Khashoggi was killed by a Saudi assassin. Erdoğan accused MBS of initiating the murder. The Saudis, for their part, considered Erdoğan and his regime as Muslim Brotherhood promoters.
Cairo has a history of rivalry and conflict with Istanbul from the time Mohammad Ali took over Egypt and severed its ties with the former sovereign of the land, the Ottoman court. Saudi Arabia and Egypt fought each other in Yemen through proxies from 1962 to 1970. That conflict tied up 60,000 Egyptian troops during the crucial 1967 Six-Day War. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s takeover of the Egyptian presidency after deposing the Muslim Brotherhood President Mohammad Morsi in July 2013 paved the way for closer relations between Cairo and Riyadh.
In the Middle East, however, alliances can easily shift, as Britain’s Prime Minister Lord Palmerston observed back in 1848: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”
How would the Sunni-Muslim, NATO-like pact impact U.S. interests in the region?
To begin with, it would reduce U.S. leverage in shaping Gulf security policy. Secondly, it would increase competition in defense and intelligence markets. The United States sells billions of dollars’ worth of arms to Saudi Arabia and the other pact partners.
Henceforth, Turkey would seek to replace Washington as the provider of arms with a hefty financial investment in Ankara’s defense industries by the Saudis. And, the United States would have to recalibrate its alliances in the region and forge a strong defense alliance with Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Cyprus and Greece (Israel signed a trilateral plan for military cooperation in 2026, with Greece and Cyprus) and, perhaps, India.
In short, the realization of this pact between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt would challenge U.S. influence in the region; create a commercial rival; and may even come to include America’s adversaries, China and Russia.
For Israel, this Sunni-Muslim pact will be a direct threat to its freedom to retaliate against adversaries. Syria, in particular, would be an arena of conflict. And, protected by Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella, Egypt and Turkey would be more likely to clash militarily with Israel.
