Recent proclamations by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan underscore how dramatically Turkey has changed over the past two decades—from a strategic partner of Israel into a growing regional challenge. “Zionist ideology is based on genocide, occupation and expansion,” the Turkish president recently declared, stressing the need to “fight Zionism.”
No Israeli should dismiss such rhetoric. Turkey’s increasingly anti-Israel trajectory has become even more pronounced amid the current regional war. This trend is reflected not only in the position of the ruling party, but also in Turkish public opinion: In a recent Pew survey, 97% of Turkish respondents expressed unfavorable views of Israel.
This poses a serious challenge. Turkey is an important Middle Eastern power with a large population, modern military, advanced defense industries, and broad regional ambitions.
Ankara’s hostility is not confined to rhetoric. For some time, it has been one of Hamas’s most important patrons, in part because of Erdoğan’s ideological affinity with the Muslim Brotherhood. Turkey has also turned a blind eye to Hamas operatives on its soil, who have used its territory as a hub for money laundering, as well as for directing terrorist activity in Judea and Samaria. Added to this are Turkey’s prominent role in delegitimization campaigns against Israel, as well as its influence in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean.
Israel and Turkey are now engaged in an open rivalry over regional and global influence. Some in Israel already describe the country as “the next Iran,” implying that it is on its way to becoming a strategic—and perhaps, even an existential threat—especially against the backdrop of the weakening of the Shi’ite axis.
This analogy is flawed. Worse, it could damage Israel’s ability to formulate a sound regional strategy in the years ahead. Turkey, even under Erdoğan, remains a pragmatic actor in foreign policy and differs fundamentally from Iran’s revolutionary, ideological and religious regime. Turkey seeks influence, prestige, room for maneuver and economic advantage. These ambitions are not benign; they reflect state interests that must take into account multiple centers of power within Turkey itself.
Unlike Iran, Turkey is also subject to significant Western influence through its strategic relationship with the United States, its membership in NATO, its ties to the European Union and its dependence on Western markets. In 2025, for example, more than 40% of Turkish exports went to the European Union. Erdoğan himself has agreed on several occasions to reset relations with Israel, in part because of American and European pressure.
In 2025, he also described Turkey as “an inseparable part of Europe,” a useful reminder that Ankara still sees itself as tied to the West, not wholly outside it.
Turkey and Israel also maintain direct diplomatic and security ties, even if at a low level. The two countries know how to manage crises quietly and prevent them from spinning out of control, as demonstrated by the operational deconfliction between their air forces over Syria. It should also be noted that Turkey’s current regime, while authoritarian, still operates within a system of electoral politics, active media and extensive ties to the outside world.
Turkey’s approach to Israel is adversarial, though it relies mainly on rhetoric, diplomatic pressure, economic tools and calibrated uses of force—not on an Iran-style proxy-war doctrine. Iran has spent decades building a broad proxy network based on Shi’ite communities and allies, whose principal purpose is to fight Israel. Turkey provides political support to Hamas and turns a blind eye to certain activities by the movement on its territory. However, because it seeks to preserve its Western ties and avoid direct confrontation with Israel, it has generally avoided overt military support for Hamas or other terrorist organizations.
Above all, Turkey has a clear interest in avoiding a direct military confrontation with Israel, which it views as a regional military power with significant ties in the West, first and foremost with the United States. Israel has considerable leverage over Turkey. At the same time, ties with Israel offer Turkey important benefits, economically and, no less significantly, in terms of influence over the Palestinian and Syrian arenas.
Jerusalem should not ignore the growing challenge, but it should view it as it is, without exaggerating it and without downplaying it. Turkey is a large Muslim country with regional ambitions and a deeply anti-Israel outlook. But it is not Iran, and it will not become Iran. Military confrontation is not inevitable.
The right Israeli strategy is disciplined competition: maintaining deterrence; preserving quiet security channels; coordinating closely with Washington and European capitals; strengthening regional partnerships; and using the areas where Israeli and Turkish interests still overlap to keep relations below the threshold of direct confrontation. Normal relations may remain possible, even if they are unlikely to return to the golden age of the late 1990s.
While Ankara is not Abu Dhabi, it’s also not Tehran. Dealing with it requires a strategy that recognizes the seriousness of the Turkish challenge while overcoming the failures of the Iranian analogy.
