“Our position on the aggression against Iran, Lebanon and Palestine, and the violation of holy sites, is a principled stance rooted in confronting the Israeli enemy and exerting efforts to resist it, and we emphasize our readiness at the military level in accordance with developments.” This was proclaimed on March 19 by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, the leader of the extremist Shi’ite regime that bears his family name and rules northwestern Yemen. It was a public declaration noteworthy precisely for what it did not include: a commitment to take part in the Iranian regime’s existential campaign for its very survival.
For a month now, Iran has been waging a broad regional campaign aimed at exhausting Israel and the United States, and preventing them from achieving what it perceives as a clear and overt attempt to overthrow the regime. In this campaign, all means are considered legitimate: indiscriminate fire at population centers; attacks on energy infrastructure in the Persian Gulf; fire on allies such as Qatar and Oman, as well as NATO countries such as Turkey and Cyprus; and aggressive pressure on its regional proxies to join the campaign.
On March 28, the terror group based in Yemen launched multiple rounds of missiles at the Jewish state.
Hezbollah answered the call, yet the Houthis—radical, antisemitic and eager for battle, with the slogan “Death to America, Death to Israel, a Curse upon the Jews” literally emblazoned on their flag—had until now refrained from assisting Shi’ite Iran in the defining battle over its existence. Why?
Some of the best minds in Israel and the United States are grappling with this question, and there is no clear answer.
The best possibility from Israel’s standpoint were that the Houthis are deterred from direct participation after having exhausted a substantial portion of their capabilities in recent years, and after a series of aggressive Israeli strikes against them, which targeted command-and-control objectives and damaged national infrastructure. In the background was also perhaps the calculation that using force would not significantly advance the Iranian effort, but would exact a heavy price from the Houthis, who are trying to rebuild their strength for the next round.
The decision may also reflect Houthi operational independence and their insistence on not acting under Iranian dictates. The Houthis cooperate strategically with Iran, but unlike Hezbollah, they do not regard themselves as subordinate to Tehran, militarily or religiously.
Moreover, the Houthi leader has ambitions of his own. In al-Houthi’s regional vision, he sees himself occupying a central leadership position within the axis system, one not necessarily subservient to Iran. The decision not to act until now may be a signal to Iran and the entire region that the Houthis do not dance to anyone’s tune, even if that actor is a partner in the struggle.
It may also express a sober Houthi assessment that Iran’s weakening is inevitable, obliging them to conserve their strength for the day they may inherit the crown of leadership of the Shi’ite axis.
And it is also possible that the Houthis have been waiting in the wings for the right moment to enter the stage, whether because the campaign drags on, the stability of the Iranian regime erodes or developments in the Palestinian arena make intervention worthwhile. As a reminder, the Houthis tied their fate to the campaign in Gaza, and they may wish to preserve one of the few tools of deterrence they have left against a return to fighting in the Strip. Being drawn into Iran’s war might divert Houthi attention from what they believe truly matters: leading the regional struggle to defend “Palestine.”
There is also another possibility that keeps Israeli intelligence awake at night. It may be that the Houthis have waited for the right moment to surprise Israel with a strategic operation: a large-scale barrage of missiles or drones, or, more troubling still, a broad ground or maritime raid.
The Houthi leader has declared in the past the Yemeni people’s willingness “to move in the hundreds of thousands toward Palestine and wage the battle of holy jihad against the Zionist enemy.”
This is reinforced by past reports of Houthi training for a ground or naval raid on Israel, strengthening the assessment in Israel that this possibility cannot be ruled out, despite the great distance and the many operational constraints.
As a central lesson of the failures on Oct. 7, 2023, the Israel Defense Forces has been preparing for this scenario, initiating a series of intelligence and operational efforts. Should the Houthis choose such a course of action, one may reasonably assume—and hope—that they would face an IDF vastly improved over the one that confronted Hamas on that Black Saturday.
Ultimately, the Houthis’ decision to join the fighting seems to have reflected, above all, their own resistance instinct and inability to remain on the sidelines while such a defining campaign for the Shi’ite axis was underway. In this sense, the prolongation of the war—and perhaps also indications that it might soon end—may have persuaded them that they did not want to be remembered as having stayed out of it.
In the background stood Iran’s desire to bring the chaos to a close across all arenas, and the Houthis may have seen an opportunity to shape developments not only in Lebanon and Gaza, but possibly in Yemen as well. They may also have identified a temporary window of opportunity in the fact that Israeli and American attention was focused primarily on Iran and Lebanon, thereby reducing the likelihood of the kind of large-scale strikes against them that might have been expected under other circumstances.
Either way, the Houthis are here to stay, and they are likely to remain a major challenge to regional and global stability regardless of how the campaign against Iran and Hezbollah develops. Their religious extremism, regional imperialism, relative resilience in the face of external pressure and burning hatred of Israel and Jews will continue to shape Houthi policy, making them one of the most complex and deceptive actors Israel has had to contend with in recent years.
