Since joining NATO in 1952, Turkey has relied on the alliance’s nuclear umbrella and has hosted several dozen U.S. nuclear bombs at the Incirlik Airbase. At the same time, Turkey itself does not possess nuclear weapons, in line with its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it signed in 1969.
In recent years, however, senior officials have periodically raised, in public, Turkey’s “right” to develop and obtain nuclear weapons. In a speech in September 2019, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan argued it was unfair that his country was not allowed to develop nuclear weapons while other states possessed them or were working to acquire them.
In July 2025, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan voiced dissatisfaction with the nuclear treaty, which he said suffers from “structural injustice” by preserving the strategic supremacy of the five permanent U.N. Security Council members, all of which hold nuclear weapons.
In his view, only one aspect of the treaty is implemented in practice—preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, while progress on nuclear disarmament and assistance to other countries developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is not being upheld.
These statements have been voiced against the backdrop of Turkey’s concerns over its neighbor and long-time rival Iran’s race toward nuclear weapons. They also come alongside Israel’s existing capabilities, according to reports.
Ankara has not stood idly by. In 2018, it began building the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, financed and operated by the Russian state nuclear corporation Rosatom. Under the deal with Russia, estimated at $24 billion, the Akkuyu plant is expected to include four reactors and is planned to supply roughly 10% of Turkey’s annual electricity consumption.
It is important to note that this is a civilian nuclear program intended to generate electricity, not a military program that would require higher levels of uranium enrichment. Still, the practical implication is that an infrastructure base is being built that could, under certain conditions in the future, help pave a path toward a military track.
Warming ties with Pakistan
Turkey’s warming ties with Pakistan, the only nuclear-armed Islamic country, also appear intended to diversify Ankara’s support pillars in this arena. That rapprochement has been reflected, among other things, in the significant assistance Turkey provided Islamabad in its confrontation with India. Closer relations with Pakistan could help Turkey acquire knowledge and capabilities that, over time, would enable it to build nuclear power plants independently.
Nuclear ambitions are closely tied to Turkey’s self-perception as a regional power with aspirations to revive an Ottoman-style sphere of influence. Turkey is pouring enormous resources into its defense industries, and it is difficult to imagine it voluntarily giving up on the development of nuclear weapons that could one day add a significant layer to its power projection and deterrence.
Domestically, not everyone is enthusiastic about the nuclear energy projects being advanced by the government. Opposition lawmakers have raised serious concerns about the risks involved in operating nuclear power plants, including ecological damage and environmental challenges, as well as unease over deepening Turkish dependence on Russia.
Still, it should be assumed that as long as Erdoğan remains in power, and likely under his successors as well, Turkey will continue its efforts to develop nuclear capabilities.
Israel would be wise to include the scenario of Turkish progress toward nuclear capabilities in its strategic planning and regional risk assessment, even if it unfolds gradually over a long period. Even if such a process is not expected to materialize quickly, the very existence of an accumulated pathway of knowledge, infrastructure and international ties could alter the regional deterrence balance and shape Ankara’s behavior in regional flashpoints.
Originally published by Israel Hayom.
