Russia’s ability to retain its naval and aerial foothold in Syria remains uncertain following the overthrow of Moscow’s client and ally Bashar al-Assad. Meanwhile, Turkey is dramatically increasing its influence and entrenchment in Syria, with potentially negative implications for Israel.
Observers in Israel have provided contrasting assessments on whether Russia, which spent years providing support for Assad’s regime against Sunni rebels, will be able to remain in Syria.
Russia’s Khmeimim Airbase in western Syria has served as one of Moscow’s key bases in the Middle East, reportedly housing Su-34, Su-35, and MiG-29 fighter jets, among others, as well as advanced radar arrays.
Some reports have claimed in recent weeks that Russia has severely downgraded its activities at the Khmeimim base following the overthrow of Assad by Sunni rebels led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, commanded by former Al-Qaeda member Ahmad al-Sharaa.
Khmeimim is one of two critical Russian facilities in Syria, the other being in Tartus; Syrian media reported on Jan. 21 that the country’s new leaders had canceled a 49-year treaty granting Russia a naval presence there.
The Tartus facility and the Khmeimim Air Base are critical to Moscow’s regional ambitions. Russian President Vladimir Putin intervened militarily in 2015 in Syria’s civil war to bolster Assad, and the bases represent Russia’s strategic foothold in the region. Despite Assad’s removal, Putin has continued to downplay the strategic setback, reportedly insisting that Moscow had achieved its objectives in Syria.
On Feb. 6, Syria’s new defense minister, Murhaf Abu Qasra, told The Washington Post that Syria’s new government is open to allowing Russia to keep its strategic military bases in the country.
“If we get benefits for Syria out of this, yes,” said Abu Qasra. He added that Russia’s stance toward Syria’s new government had “improved significantly” in the wake of Assad’s fall, and that his administration wanted Moscow to “address past mistakes.”
Russia has routinely bombed Idlib province, where Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was based before taking over the rest of Syria in December 2024.
Professor Eyal Zisser, vice rector of Tel Aviv University and chair of Contemporary History of the Middle East, told JNS on Feb. 17 that “Sharaa of course wanted economic assistance and support, which are crucial for ensuring his regime’s survival. For that, he courted the Gulf states, primarily Saudi Arabia and also Qatar, and mostly needed the West and the United States to lift sanctions. The Americans, for now, have not really helped him; They are still weighing their policy.”
In this vulnerable position, Sharaa is not seeking to quarrel with the Russians, “unlike the Iranians and Hezbollah whom he despises,” he said. At the same time, Sharaa “did not forgive or forget what the Russians did in Syria,” he added.
Sharaa has adopted a pragmatic stance to avoid turning Russia into an enemy, said Zisser, and is willing, for now, to allow Russia to keep its bases as part of a new agreement. Sharaa has also asked Russia to extradite Assad, who fled to Moscow.
Nevertheless, Zisser assessed that Russia’s long-term presence in Syria is likely not tenable. “I do not think in the long run that the Russians would want or be able to remain in Syria, which has turned into a hostile environment for them,” he said.
Turkey, for its part, could assist Russia and act as an intermediary on its behalf vis-à-vis Sharaa, but Ankara itself “is not happy that the Russians are staying, and would prefer for its own reasons that they leave, and that Syria remains under Turkish influence,” added Zisser.
Indeed, Israel needs to be concerned about Turkish, not Russian entrenchment in Syria going forward, according to Zisser. “The Russians did not really help Israel when they were in Syria, and they can’t do much now. The near-term problem for Israel in Syria is Turkey. If we were concerned about Russian flights and aircraft, now we have Turkish flights and aircraft [in Syria], and this can create friction,” he said.
Professor Kobi Michael, a senior research fellow at the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy and at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, believes however that Russia will not be quick to give up its foothold in Syria.
“Russia’s interest in Syria is really crucial, and in exchange for that interest they would be willing to invest quite a bit of effort and maybe bend,” he told JNS on Feb. 18.
The new Syrian regime also has an interest in cooperating with Russia, said Michael, since it is still under intense scrutiny from the international community, especially the United States. “It needs, so to speak, to think about all the security guarantees it can generate for itself, and it can dictate certain conditions to the Russians from a position of strength,” said Michael.
Sharaa could extract economic carrots from Russia, and more importantly, military supplies, “because the new Syrian army does not have a functioning force, and the Americans or Europeans would not sell them weapons,” he said, adding, “I’m not sure the Chinese would agree to sell them much.” As a result, the new Syrian regime could demand military supplies from the Russians in exchange for letting them stay.
Turkey, too, looks set to equip the new Syrian military, but its capabilities still fall short of Russia’s in this respect, said Michael.
Russia “definitely” wants to keep its foothold in Tartus—its only foothold in the Mediterranean. Tartus has major significance for Russia’s ability to project power, explained Michael, noting that Moscow still sees itself as a world power.
“They know Tartus well and it is convenient for them geographically,” he added.
With regard to Israel, Michael said that continued Russian presence in Syria was not necessarily counter to Jerusalem’s interests.
Such presence “could be good for Israel under certain circumstances,” he said, as it could act as a counterweight to the Turkish influence in Syria. “Too large a Turkish influence in Syria is not good for us,” he cautioned. “If Turkey entrenches itself very deeply, it can disturb us and create problematic friction areas.”
Asked to address the large quantities of Russian weapons found by Israeli forces in Hezbollah facilities in Southern Lebanon, Michael said: “This Russian weaponry reached Hezbollah via Iran.”
Moscow, he continued, “certainly” knew about these shipments. “However, I would not describe Russia as an integral part of the Iranian axis. Iran and Russia were a type of partnership. I don’t think we will [now] see Russia supply weapons to Hezbollah, because this would undermine Russia’s efforts to remain in Syria.”