“Here is France’s position—it is clear: Yes, to peace. Yes, to Israel’s security. Yes, to a Palestinian state without Hamas.”
— President Emmanuel Macron of France
This April 11 tweet from the French president masks a policy—or more broadly, a growing problem in Europe itself. The countries currently leading the move to recognize a Palestinian state—France, Spain, Ireland and Norway—are not doing so as part of a rational political process, but because of domestic political pressure with tumultuous demonstrations, a public arena dominated by Muslim voices and militant campuses.
Unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state has become an act of domestic appeasement—and just for that reason, it constitutes a dangerous strategic misstep.
It is born out of reactivity, not responsibility. It is motivated by the need to appear moral, but ignores the destructive consequences for Israel’s security, regional stability and the future of the Palestinians themselves.
In France, where about 6.8 million Muslims live (about 10% of the population), the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has become a major domestic issue. After Hamas’s Oct. 7 attacks, Macron initially expressed support for Israel, but he quickly shifted gears. The declaration of support for a Palestinian state, amid the fighting, was aimed no less at a domestic audience than at external ears.
In the background to this declaration was a spike of 400% in antisemitic incidents; banned demonstrations that were held nonetheless in the streets of Paris; and an unprecedented boost for the radical La France Insoumise (LFI) party led by Jean-Luc Mélenchon, which garnered 62% support among Muslims compared to only 8% of the public as a whole. Macron understood that if he did not signal to the street that he was listening, the political center would lose its grip.
In Spain, too, where some 2.5 million Muslims live, the discourse has become a domestic one. The Sánchez government, comprised of the socialists and their partners from the radical left (Sumar), announced its official recognition of “Palestine” in April 2024. That declaration did not stem only from ideological commitment; it was also a direct response to growing public pressure.
In more than 50 cities, mass demonstrations were held under the rubric “Stop the genocide.” Strikes were announced at universities, and academic associations demanded that ties with Israeli institutions be cut. Spain’s deputy prime minister, Yolanda Díaz, even proclaimed “From the river to the sea”—sparking international condemnation but boosting her status among the Muslim population. Here, too, recognizing Palestine was primarily a domestic political maneuver.
Although Germany may not have officially joined this trend, domestic pressures are mounting there as well. Germany’s Muslim population comes to about 5.5 million residents. In the aftermath of Oct. 7, raging protests were held in large cities, antisemitic incidents burgeoned by 320% and Jewish institutions were attacked.
This agitation, too, prompted a political response, albeit more hesitant. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz spoke of the need for a Palestinian state, denounced scenarios of expulsion from Gaza, and, at the same time, increased aid to Gaza. New parties such as BSW (the Reason and Justice party) and DAVA (the Democratic Alliance for Diversity and Awakening) are attracting Muslim support, reminding Germans of the price they paid in 2016 when the Social Democratic Party recognized the Armenian genocide and lost about a hundred thousand voters of Turkish background.
Europe misunderstands the language
The Western attempt to differentiate between the “jihadist terrorist” and the PLO’s “nationalist fighter” reflects a fundamental failure to understand the conflict. However, there is no difference between the hudna doctrine of Hamas and the phased plan of the Fatah Party. Both stem from the same underlying strategy: an ongoing, carefully calibrated, gradual struggle whose goal is not a peace accord but the destruction of the Zionist enemy.
At the core of Hamas’s outlook is the concept of the hudna, a temporary truce when facing a powerful enemy that allows one to reorganize and prepare for the next stage of the struggle. Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin spoke about this back in the 1990s. Senior Hamas officials like Khaled Mashal and the now-deceased Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar reiterated the notion countless times.
A hudna is never the end of the conflict, only a tactical hiatus on the way to the next jihad—a hiatus intended to mislead Israel and buy time.
The reality on the ground proves this well. Even if Hamas temporarily disarms, is exiled or is “distanced from the arena,” its ethos will continue to thrive, in the mosques, the textbooks, the local police force and in the discourse of the street. The struggle will not end; it will just pass through a phase.
Fatah and the PLO, touted by Europe as a moderate partner, hold almost the same concept. The 1974 resolution of the Palestinian National Council spoke of a “phased plan” that said if at any political juncture a foothold is gained in any territory, it will serve as a means to continue the struggle until Israel is eradicated.
PLO chief Yasser Arafat did not hide this aspiration. In 1994, he likened the Oslo Accords to the “Treaty of Hudaybiyyah,” a strategic timeout that the Prophet Muhammad took when facing a stronger enemy, fully intending to violate it in the future. Former Palestinian official Faisal Husseini called the accords a “Trojan horse” and explicitly acknowledged that the aim was not to exist alongside Israel but in place of it.
In the 15 years that followed the Oslo Accords, more than 1,500 Israelis were murdered in terror attacks—only 270 were killed by Palestinians in the years that preceded the accords. Not only did the Palestinian Authority fail to condemn these attacks, but it also glorified them. Hundreds of millions of shekels have been doled out as “salaries” for the terrorists; even amid U.S. pressure in 2025 to stop the payments to families of terrorists and “martyrs,” the P.A. did not put an end to the practice but simply relocated it to the president’s office. The payments continue in a different guise, and P.A. leader Mahmoud Abbas himself has made clear: “Even if we have only a penny left, we’ll keep providing it to the families of the martyrs.”
The P.A.’s education system, largely funded by the European Union, continues to reinforce messages that include the delegitimization of Israel, glorification of martyrs and demonization of Jews.
A March 2025 report by IMPACT-se points to such disturbing features as maps with no Israel on them, paeans to dying for Palestine, math exercises where martyrs are the unit of calculation, and depictions of Jews as liars and enemies of Islam.
In the public arena as well, not only does the P.A. fail to promote a moderate discourse; it sometimes directly encourages terror attacks. In January 2023, after a massacre in a synagogue in Jerusalem, Abbas, under pressure from the United States to condemn it, refused to do so for fear that it would harm him politically. On Oct. 7 itself, Fatah channels showed videos in which operatives of the movement boasted of participating, saying: “Fatah members took part in the massacre—we killed them and stepped on their heads,” “We slaughtered every Israeli,” “Smite the sons of monkeys and pigs.”
It was only after five days, under enormous pressure from Washington, that a vague announcement emerged about “opposing harm to civilians on both sides,” without any mention of Hamas or the massacre, and without a word about children being kidnapped or slaughtered.
At present, the Palestinian political reality does not meet the conditions for building a moderate or peace-loving state. Public opinion polls consistently find widespread support for radical movements and armed struggle.
For example, in a survey published a few months after Hamas’s attack on Oct. 7, 2023:
- 72% of Palestinians supported the attack.
- 70% said violent struggle is the most effective way to achieve national goals.
- Only 34% supported the two-state solution.
- If general elections had been held, Hamas would have won by a substantial margin both in Gaza and the West Bank.
The Palestinian public is not only disappointed in its leadership, but it is also redefining the concepts of “steadfastness” and “resolve.” The figures who inspire trust are mainly those identified with armed struggle, such as Marwan Barghouti, who is serving five life sentences for murder, while pragmatic figures such as Salam Fayyad are considered weak or even “collaborators.”
It should be noted, however, that alongside the radical majority, a minority exists that is quiet, civic and moderate. There are educators, students, entrepreneurs, academics and businesspeople who believe in a different approach based on institution-building, dialogue and improving the society from within. They are not the majority, and they do not have political power—but they are there, and are contending with pressures from Hamas and sometimes from the PA.
This is not, for now, a functioning opposition—but a potential nucleus from which the leadership, the society and hope could be built.
Even if we ignore for a moment the public discourse and the radical ideology, the practical question remains: Does there exist, at present, a Palestinian entity capable of maintaining a state? The answer, by every political, institutional and economic criterion, is negative.
Since 2007, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank have been governed by rival entities: Hamas, ruling Gaza as an independent and armed Islamist body, and the P.A., ruling parts of the area commonly called the “West Bank” with limited powers and fragile stability. Attempts to reconcile these two groups—the Cairo agreements, temporary unity governments, announcements of a settlement—have all failed again and again.
There is no single authority, policy or legal system—and certainly no joint security control on the ground, single governmental address or realistic chance of unification.
The budgets of both the P.A. and Hamas are based mainly on external aid—from the European Union, Arab states and sometimes also private organizations. There is no effective taxation, no independent central bank, and no orderly economic policy. With most of the public budget reliant on contributions, in the absence of aid, both entities would collapse. A state that is established in such a condition will be a completely dependent entity, not an independent, sovereign one.
Even if we assume the existence of governmental structures, the content of the institutions themselves is deeply defective. The legal system is not independent, but subject to political pressures and the security forces; the government institutions suffer from corruption, a bloated bureaucracy, political appointments and lack of transparency; the education system does not aim for reconciliation but promotes conflict and an ultranationalist narrative; and the media and the religious establishments do not serve the public but, rather, the ruling parties.
The P.A. in the West Bank, and even more so in Gaza, relies almost completely on Israel for basic infrastructural needs: water, electricity and fuel. In the West Bank, Israel provides about 40% of the water consumption and almost all the electricity. In Gaza, before the war, about 50% of the electricity and 10% of the water came from Israel.
The gaps between the discourse on sovereignty and the total lack of basic infrastructural independence stand in sharp relief. Even if a state is recognized, it will not function as a state. It will be both a terror state and an institutionally failed state that will soon become a plaything of external or internal forces.
If Europe wants to help build a Palestinian state, it must recognize that currently, a unilateral declaration will not promote a state; rather, it will thwart a solution. The current situation provides no basis for a sovereign state, and any hasty recognition will only exacerbate the chaos. Europe, which purportedly will lead the effort, must work in cooperation with the United States and moderate Arab states to create the conditions on the ground for the gradual building of state infrastructure.
The lessons from Lebanon are clear: A state cannot rise while armed terror organizations operate alongside it. Therefore, a fundamental requirement is the total disarmament of all the Palestinian organizations, both in Gaza and the West Bank.
This measure, which will likely require a role for a dedicated international-local force, must be implemented under close supervision, in coordination with Israel and within an agreed framework for sovereign demilitarization. Accordingly, weapons must remain only in the hands of municipal actors whose task is to preserve civic order.
Another requirement concerns people. For two decades, it has been impossible for a new Palestinian leadership to grow. A whole generation of professionals, academics, entrepreneurs and educators has been excluded from the political framework. An ossified government and a corrupt political structure have blocked any dynamic of renewal.
True leadership will not grow from the offices of the P.A., but from a deep civilian stratum: professionals, entrepreneurs, academics, young people and women who espouse a pragmatic and feasible worldview. Such a leadership will not deal initially with the conflict with Israel, but with the internal building of a civil society: a stable labor market, education, media and health services.
Future coexistence will not emerge from declarations but from technological, occupational and environmental collaborations. There already are such initiatives, but they remain marginal and restricted to the civic sphere because of the restrictive political framework. The potential is much greater.
That potential could be advanced by working for infrastructural and economic independence. One of the main defects of the existing Palestinian structure is the almost total dependence on Israel for water, electricity, fuel and basic infrastructure. For real sovereignty to develop, gradual infrastructural independence must be built. European investments should be conditioned on regulation, coordination and oversight with Israel, including the development of water sources, power stations, and expanded domestic production in both the West Bank and Gaza.
Europe can, and must, fund and help guide such a process. The aim should not be to disconnect from Israel, but to develop a real capacity for economic-administrative independence.
In the practical sphere, a sound government and a local economy are essential. At present, there are no Palestinian institutions capable of functioning on a sovereign level. There is no effective budgetary oversight, no economic independence and no professional administration. The rehabilitation must begin at the municipal level. Municipalities, local councils, economic zones—these can all become laboratories of good governance, responsible management and local development.
Last is the sphere of awareness. So long as the Palestinian educational, religious and media systems propagate a discourse of hate, supremacy and victimhood, no civic awareness can develop. The schools must undergo a deep reform: in content, values and instruction. The mosques must be under supervision. The media must be open to new voices.
A society cannot be built when its language is one of perpetual conflict. Only if a systemic change occurs in the public discourse can a future political transformation be contemplated.
As noted, no process can succeed without the ongoing support of the moderate Arab states. Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and the United Arab Emirates can provide a framework that includes political backing, economic guidance and strategic connections to the Arab world.
European involvement will be needed, not only to counteract pressures and guarantee disarmament, but also to confer legitimacy on the new, emergent leadership.
Only after all that is achieved will it be the right time to begin thinking about a political settlement. Not at the beginning, but after a moral, administrative and public infrastructure has been created that can sustain itself. The possibilities include sovereign autonomy under supervision, a regional federation or a form of confederation. What is important is that decisions are not reached to allay political pressure but as part of genuine readiness for change, opposition to terror, demilitarization and a desire for peaceful and good-neighborly relations.
The declarations by European governments about recognizing a Palestinian state are not the result of a diplomatic breakthrough, but a political response to growing domestic political pressure. The problem is that this pressure, which stems from Muslim communities, the street, college campuses and the Internet, does not demand a rational solution but an emotional gesture. And Europe, time after time, gives in to it.
At present, Europe suffers not only from a misconceived foreign policy but from severe domestic blindness. Instead of courageously dealing with a process of domestic radicalization—in the guise of sealed-off neighborhoods, radical mosques, antisemitism under a guise of moral causes and the rise of pro-Hamas parties—Europe chooses to export the problem. And it does so with proclamations like “a Palestinian state now,” which may sound nice but reflects a loss of domestic control.
This is no longer just a question for Israel or the Palestinians. It is a European question: Can liberal democracy survive when it gives up on understanding reality, on political morality, on setting clear boundaries?
If Europe wants to contribute to a solution, it must begin by strengthening the moderate forces among the Palestinians and within Europe itself. It must not submit to a discourse of force, but regain a discourse of responsibility.