As protests continue to erupt across Iran and reports of mass killings mount, internal documents obtained by JNS from inside Iran reveal that the Islamic Republic has been preparing a sweeping overhaul of the Iranian internet, designed to permanently entrench state control over information, communication and digital life. Far from a temporary security response, the documents show a long-term strategy, formally submitted to senior government authorities last August, to restructure Iran’s digital ecosystem in a way that allows the regime to block foreign platforms; criminalize circumvention tools; centralize data and artificial-intelligence capabilities; and force Iranians onto state-approved technology at every level.
The documents were obtained by JNS through a source in the Iranian tech community, who received the original copies from a government employee inside Iran. The files indicate that the regime was planning to shut off the entire country even before the current uprisings.
These revelations have surfaced amid one of the bloodiest periods in the history of the Islamic Republic. International reporting has documented widespread use of lethal force against demonstrators, mass arrests and systematic internet shutdowns. Some sources, including reporting cited by TIME magazine based on Iranian officials and medical contacts, have claimed that more than 30,000 protesters have already been killed. The Associated Press and other outlets described more than 20 days of nationwide blackouts and severe throttling of internet access aimed at preventing protesters from organizing or sharing evidence of abuses.
According to the documents, the regime and its aligned technocrats view reliance on foreign technology not merely as an economic vulnerability but as an existential threat to the survival of the Islamic Republic. One passage states that dependence on non-Iranian platforms and software constitutes “one of the most serious bottlenecks of national security, cyber governance and technological sovereignty.” Another warns that widely used tools such as messaging applications, VPNs and cloud services have become “instruments of pressure and intelligent containment in the hands of hostile powers.”
The response outlined in the documents is comprehensive and uncompromising. The plan, endorsed by a group of regime-aligned tech specialists and engineers, including Elham Farahani, Seyed Jafar Seidi, Mohammad Hadi Zahedi, Hamed Rezaei, Morteza Sultanabadian, Mohammadreza Alavi Manesh and Amirreza Zafari, describes a multiyear effort to eliminate what is repeatedly referred to as “non-native” or foreign technology across nearly every layer of modern digital life. This includes physical infrastructure such as fiber networks and data centers, telecommunications systems, operating systems, cloud platforms, office software, AI intelligence tools, messaging apps, email services, video conferencing platforms and social-media networks. The stated objective is what the authors describe as achieving “zero foreign dependency” in information and communications technology.
In one striking passage, the documents call for “a gradual but irreversible transition from reliance on foreign technological tools toward full domestic control within a defined and binding national framework.” Another emphasizes that this transformation must be placed beyond the reach of ordinary political change, arguing explicitly that because governments and parliaments change, management of cyberspace must be anchored in institutions aligned with the Supreme Leader and insulated from electoral shifts.
The documents show that this plan was formally submitted in August to Dr. Seyed Mohammad Amin Aghamiri, head of Iran’s National Cyberspace Center (NCC), the powerful body tasked with overseeing internet governance, filtering and enforcement. That timing is critical. What is unfolding now strongly suggests that a strategy conceived last summer is being actively implemented in real time. The widespread throttling of internet access, repeated nationwide shutdowns, growing pressure on users to migrate to state-controlled platforms and intensified criminalization of circumvention tools closely mirror the roadmap laid out in the documents, indicating the regime has moved decisively from planning to execution.
The papers make clear that the NCC is viewed as the central engine for this transformation. One translated section asserts that “outside the National Cyberspace Center, full realization of these objectives is not possible,” and calls for the establishment of a High Commission or specialized committee with sweeping authority over policymaking, regulation, funding and enforcement. This body would operate above ministries and coordinate across state institutions, regulators, innovation funds and security bodies, with independent funding streams and long-term oversight powers.
Perhaps most alarming is the degree of coercion envisioned. The documents explicitly call for mandatory use of domestic platforms and tools across government, military and sensitive civilian sectors, enforced through binding regulations and legal penalties. One passage demands “clear and deterrent punishments” for the use of foreign platforms and VPNs in areas deemed sensitive to national security. Another proposes direct legal liability for managers and officials who fail to comply, including dismissal from office and imprisonment in severe cases. In the regime’s own words, violations must be treated as “crimes against digital sovereignty.”
The scope of the plan extends far beyond state institutions. Messaging services such as Telegram and WhatsApp, email platforms like Gmail, video conferencing tools including Zoom and social-media networks such as Instagram, X (Twitter) and YouTube are all explicitly identified as targets for replacement or strict legal and technical control. Where immediate replacement is not feasible, the documents recommend “controlled intermediary gateways” and legally enforced content red lines.
Artificial intelligence is positioned as a cornerstone of the new system. The documents call for the creation of a national AI cloud, domestic GPU farms capable of powering large language models and centralized national data platforms to feed those systems. They advocate the development of tools for facial recognition, behavioral analysis, and automated digital decision making, alongside a nationwide effort to train hundreds of thousands of specialized ICT personnel to staff the system over the coming years.
China and Russia are repeatedly cited as models. The authors argue that technological self-sufficiency and digital sovereignty are not only possible but essential for regime survival. At the same time, they insist that Iran must develop its own ideological and civilizational approach to technology rooted in Islamic governance rather than merely copying foreign systems.
For Iranians who have endured repeated internet shutdowns during protests, the implications are stark. What were once emergency measures are being institutionalized. The documents indicate that blackouts, filtering, forced migration to state platforms and aggressive enforcement against circumvention tools are intended to become permanent features of Iran’s digital landscape, dramatically reducing the ability of future protest movements to organize, communicate or document abuses.
These revelations have intensified scrutiny of foreign companies accused of aiding the Islamic Republic’s digital repression, particularly China’s Huawei. While the documents themselves do not name the company, activists and journalists have increasingly linked Iran’s push for a controlled national network to Chinese technology and expertise. Media reports have alleged that elements of Iran’s internet shutdown and surveillance infrastructure rely on Huawei equipment, allegations the company has previously denied or declined to comment on.
However, “A,” an Iranian cybersecurity expert who reviewed the documents, told JNS that the involvement of Huawei is crucial to the implementation of the regime’s plan. “These documents focus on the strategic replacement and localization of IT infrastructure. This is critical because Huawei currently owns the lion’s share of Iran’s core telecom and cloud infrastructure … the transition to a ‘National Information Network’ (Intranet) as outlined in the ‘Regulating Cyberspace’ bill relies on the Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) and filtering capabilities that Huawei’s technology provides.”
Huawei has also faced legal and reputational challenges related to Iran before. U.S. prosecutors have alleged that the company provided surveillance technology enabling Iranian authorities to monitor protesters, claims cited in federal indictments. Against this backdrop, a growing number of Iranian activists and diaspora groups are now calling for a boycott of Huawei, arguing that consumer pressure is one of the few remaining tools to hold corporations accountable when governments fail to act.
Online campaigns urge people to stop purchasing Huawei devices and services, framing the boycott as an act of solidarity with Iranians facing repression. The implications of such a boycott extend well beyond a single company. The documents obtained by JNS suggest that the Islamic Republic is actively seeking to wall itself off from the global internet while retaining sophisticated tools of control over its population. If successful, Iran’s model could serve as a blueprint for other authoritarian regimes seeking to crush dissent while preserving the economic benefits of digitization.
At a moment when Iranians are risking their lives to demand basic freedoms, these documents provide a chilling window into the regime’s long-term intentions. The strategy laid out is not simply about technology. It is about power, control and the deliberate construction of a digital environment in which resistance becomes harder, visibility disappears, and the cost of speaking out grows ever higher.
