Every war reaches an endpoint.
In some cases, this moment comes when one side is victorious and the other surrenders, as in the case of Japan in 1945, or when its leadership is destroyed, such as with Nazi Germany. But in recent history, total victory is increasingly rare, and most wars end through negotiated ceasefires when one or both societies are exhausted.
In the war between Iran and Israel, occupation is not a realistic option. The alternatives are either surrender or regime change in Tehran, with a new leadership that could quickly end the conflict, as happened in 1917 when Russia’s revolutionary government immediately withdrew its military from World War I.
The factors likely to bring surrender or regime change in Tehran are a combination of internal exhaustion and external pressure to end the war, primarily from the United States and President Donald Trump. (The United Nations and numerous European would-be mediators have no credibility or leverage over Iran or Israel.)
From the first hours of the Israeli attack, Trump reminded the leaders in Tehran that the option for a practical nuclear agreement remained on the table, despite the missed opportunity during 60 days of sterile negotiations. According to media reports, after the first days of warfare, as the Israeli Air Force established full control over the skies, Iran’s leaders asked the Americans to mediate a ceasefire.
But they woke up too late, as the war and immense Israeli military achievements introduced new dimensions while highlighting pre-existing ones.
At this stage, as Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has repeatedly declared, the war will not end until all of Iran’s missile and nuclear facilities, as well as related materials, are removed or destroyed—specifically, the Fordow uranium enrichment complex, buried deep underground. Trump has more than hinted at the same requirements.
The alternative of a ceasefire, followed by negotiations, regarding Fordow is not credible, following Iran’s years of deceit related to its obligations under the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. All of the major facilities and materials in Tehran’s nuclear program were acquired and operated through deception under the facade of a “civilian” program. For more than 25 years, Iran used a wide range of excuses to prevent inspections and interfere with the safeguards that were required by the Treaty, but the so-called “international community,” particularly the European governments and the United Nations, continuously avoided confrontations and failed to uphold these requirements.
Similarly, Israel does not trust the International Atomic Energy Agency, based in Vienna, following many years in which the organization hid and delayed reports detailing Iran’s non-compliance. For this reason, a negotiated destruction of the Fordow complex following a ceasefire is unacceptable to Jerusalem and Washington, except perhaps following complete surrender or the collapse Iranian regime.
Another core requirement for any negotiations would be direct talks with Israel, in contrast to the vile antisemitic and apartheid-like practice of the Islamic regime. From the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the leadership has vilified the Jewish nation-state and refused direct contact with Israelis. (About 25 years ago, I participated in an arms control conference in Moscow, and, logically, was slotted on a panel with an Iranian representative. Presumably under orders, he never looked at me and demonstrably walked past when the other participants shook hands at the end.) This irrational taboo also contributed to the regime’s enormous miscalculation regarding Israeli red lines.
The example of the negotiations that ended the 1973 war is an important precedent. After a stalemate resulting from exhaustion on both sides, coupled with the fact that the Israeli military had surrounded the Egyptian Third Army near Cairo, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger orchestrated the ceasefire negotiations. Top generals from the two enemies met along the only road (Kilometer 101) in the Sinai Desert. This was the first official contact between the two countries, and as such, representatives from Cairo and Jerusalem had no choice but to talk directly. The generals signed a six-point disengagement framework that was implemented with U.S. guarantees, followed by further interim agreements, and finally, the negotiation of the 1979 peace treaty led by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, with some help from U.S. President Jimmy Carter.
A post-Islamic government in Iran would create the conditions for a similar scenario to play out between Jerusalem and Tehran. For the populations at both ends, watching their leaders sit down and discuss the necessary practical arrangements would constitute a major step toward dissolving the walls of hate that have fueled the conflict for so long now.