A recently leaked draft of an American proposal for de-escalation between Israel and Lebanon has shed light on the diplomatic frameworks being promoted in the U.S. State Department regarding Israel’s war against Hezbollah.
At the base of the proposal sits United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, which brought about a ceasefire following the Second Lebanon War in 2006.
The new proposal sees the implementation of UNSCR 1701 as an end in itself, rather than a means to an end.
“The whole aim of the proposal is implementing resolution 1701, in other words, 1701 is the common denominator of the proposal,” international law expert and former Israeli ambassador to Canada Alan Baker told JNS.
The proposal seeks a series of security guarantees from the Israeli and Lebanese governments, including a withdrawal of all Israeli troops from Lebanon within seven days of signing and removal of Hezbollah forces from southern Lebanon.
In addition, the proposal sets up several enforcement and oversight mechanisms including the formation of a new international body, headed by the United States, that will oversee the proper implementation of the proposal and mediate between the two sides.
Nevertheless, at the root of the proposal sits the old framework of UNSCR 1701, which was the basis for the status quo on Israel’s northern border from 2006 to Oct. 8, 2023.
Experts differ on the viability of 1701 as a basis for a future settlement between Israel and Lebanon.
“Given the experience [of the past year] and the abuse by Hezbollah and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), I believe it is very dangerous for Israel,” Daniel Ayalon, former Israeli deputy foreign minister and U.S. ambassador, told JNS.
Baker, on the other hand, believes that “1701 already exists and it just needs strengthening and encouragement. This arrangement is there to give a possibility for the resolution to be implemented properly in the way it was originally intended.”
UNSCR 1701 was originally implemented in August 2006 as the Lebanon war wound down. The resolution sought to remove Israeli military presence from southern Lebanon while guaranteeing the security of Israel’s northern communities by removing all armed groups in southern Lebanon except the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and an international peacekeeping force known as UNIFIL.
The resolution was never truly enforced, and as early as 2009 U.N. reports already mentioned “large-scale arms build-up” by Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.
While the current proposal does seek to put guardrails around UNSCR 1701, its enforcement mechanisms remain similar. Despite a new role for an international body, headed by the United States, UNIFIL and the LAF would still serve a central role in demilitarizing southern Lebanon.
During the current war, both groups have shown themselves to be anathema to Israel’s security interests.
UNIFIL has refused Israeli requests to vacate active combat zones in Southern Lebanon. Israeli forces have also uncovered multiple Hezbollah bunkers and tunnels near UNIFIL bases, calling into question the U.N. peacekeeping force’s competence and integrity.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has gone so far as to describe UNIFIL as “providing a human shield to Hezbollah terrorists.” The leaked draft agreement would see UNIFIL in a more limited position but still playing a role in demilitarizing southern Lebanon.
Ayalon further expanded on what he said was the corruption in the organization.
“The problem with UNIFIL is not the number of peacekeepers, but their conduct. They were not peacekeeping but looking the other way, and some of them were getting kickbacks. Right now, they need scrutiny and verification processes because there is bad corruption,” he said.
Baker explained that in his view the proposal is sufficient with regard to UNIFIL, within the bounds of what is diplomatically possible. “You can’t just get rid of UNIFIL, because it is set up by the U.N. Security Council and they will never get rid of it, so limiting UNIFIL is the best option,” he told JNS.
The actions of the LAF have also raised concerns regarding its capacity to impartially enforce the demilitarization of southern Lebanon.
“The LAF also will need to be heavily scrutinized; some people say almost 50% of the LAF is Shi’ite,” Ayalon explained. Lebanon’s Shi’ite Muslims traditionally have greater allegiance to Hezbollah, a Shi’ite organization.
A further carryover of the 1701 framework to the current proposal is its exclusion of Hezbollah from the negotiations.
Hezbollah is only mentioned once in the text of the draft. The proposal seeks to generally frame the conflict as a clash between Israel and Lebanon as two states rather than a counter-insurgency operation carried out by Israel against a non-state actor operating from the territory of Lebanon.
This framing contradicts the IDF’s current military doctrine, however it does increase the agency and responsibility of the Lebanese government.
However, while it is not anywhere explicitly stated, the acceptance of such a proposal would imply Hezbollah agreeing to withdraw beyond the Litani River, without the LAF or UNIFIL being required to employ force.
“The requirement is that the Lebanese government will rein in Hezbollah and the presumption is that Hezbollah will agree to this arrangement between themselves and the Lebanese government,” Baker explained.
“It’s assumed and is a prior requirement that Hezbollah agrees to the deal and is unofficially part of it,” he added.
The LAF and UNIFIL lack the military capability to force Hezbollah to withdraw beyond the Litani should the terror group refuse.
The draft does not have built-in mechanisms to allow for Israeli responses to imminent threats from Lebanon should UNIFIL and LAF enforcement efforts fail. However, a side-letter agreement between Israel and the United States does expand on Israel’s “hot pursuit,” capacity, which was not initially codified in UNSCR 1701.
Under the agreement, Israel would be allowed to respond “with the greatest urgency” to threats emanating from the border area. Israel would further be allowed to carry out strikes against developing threats throughout Lebanon, including storage or production of long-range missiles in northern Lebanon.
However, such action would require prior consultation with the United States. Israel would further retain the right to carry out surveillance operations in Lebanese airspace.
According to Ayalon, the wording of the side letter is sufficient in terms of security, but does not give sufficient diplomatic guarantees against “those who will condemn or seek resolutions against Israel claiming that we are acting outside the mandate of the agreement.”
According to Baker, this issue is the crux of the proposal.
“What has been added is Israel’s right to act if the requirements of 1701 are violated, in coordination and support with the United States and other elements involved in monitoring the implementation. This is very significant for Israel’s security,” he explained.
An ulterior framework that could potentially resolve some of the concerns over UNSCR 1701 is UNSCR 1559.
“The basis should be 1559, calling for the dismantling of all militias in Lebanon, giving the LAF the only authority to bear arms,” said Ayalon.
“The starting position should be Israel demanding the full dismantling of Hezbollah,” he added. Resolution 1559 seeks a more fundamental approach to restabilizing Lebanon as a sovereign state before seeking to address the terror groups overrunning the country.
The resolution, which was passed in 2004, called for free and fair presidential elections in Lebanon followed by the disarmament of all armed groups throughout the entire country (not just in southern Lebanon) by the LAF. The resolution also called on Syria to withdraw all troops from Lebanon and to cease its interventions in domestic Lebanese governance.
In 2024 these demands could be reformulated to apply to Iran instead of Syria.
Considering the volatility of the situation, concrete de-escalation proposals are not likely to go into effect in the near future.
With Iran on the verge of a third missile attack on Israel, the U.S. election around the corner and Israeli tanks plowing deeper into Lebanon, the situation is extremely dynamic. Nevertheless, the diplomatic conception surrounding this conflict is firmly rooted in the old framework of UNSCR 1701.
