On Yom Ha’atzmaut, Armenia’s Foreign Ministry sent an unexpectedly positive message to Israel. “We extend our congratulations to the Government & people of Israel on Yom Ha’atzmaut,” the official post stated. “Armenia stands ready to expand Armenia-Israel ties & explore new opportunities for cooperation.”
Israel’s Foreign Ministry responded with “Thank you, dear friends.”
But Armenia’s post was savaged by Armenians, especially those from the vocal Armenian expatriate community.
“Are you guys f**king insane?” Ana Kasparian, the Jew-hating co-host of “The Young Turks” talk show, wrote back.
Only a few years earlier, relations between Armenia and Israel hit a low point when, in June 2024, less than a year after Hamas’s brutal attack in southern Israel and while 116 hostages still languished inside Gaza’s terror tunnels, Armenia rewarded Hamas by following Spain, Ireland and Norway to become the 145th country to recognize a Palestinian state.
The Hamas terrorist group applauded the move, stating that it “considers it an additional and important step towards solidifying the international recognition of our people’s rights and their aspirations to end the Nazi Zionist (Israeli) occupation of their land and establish their fully sovereign independent state with Jerusalem as its capital.”
The difference in just a few short years is noteworthy. There had been no change in the government of Armenia. Neither had Israel elected a new government that the Armenians found more palatable.
Both Armenia’s recognition of Palestine and its later readiness “to expand” ties and “explore new opportunities for cooperation” came under the leadership of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.
The change was due not to new officials but to Armenia’s geopolitical posture. By this year’s Israeli Independence Day, Pashinyan was in the middle of a critical re-election campaign, the outcome of which would determine the direction Armenian foreign policy would take. Unlike pro-Russia opponents, he sought to realign Armenia’s fortunes with the United States and the West, rather than remain a vassal of Russia and a major trading partner with its southern neighbor, Iran.
The second development that likely changed Armenia’s calculus was the weakening of Iran. Israeli and U.S. cooperation against the Islamic regime, both during the 12-day war in June 2025 and joint U.S.-Israeli strikes earlier this year, freed Armenia from needing to serve as Iran’s counterbalance to Israel-friendly Azerbaijan.
Pashinyan also broke with convention before his re-election on June 7 by making overtures to normalize Armenia’s relations with its two biggest adversaries: Azerbaijan to the east and Turkey to the West.
Despite claims by his detractors that Pashinyan was unpopular and likely to lose the election—and despite Russia’s disinformation campaign to sway the election—Pashinyan staged an impressive victory earlier this month.
On June 14, Armenia’s Central Election Commission certified the results of the vote, with Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party winning 49.7%—not a majority but significantly more than his two nearest rival parties, Strong Armenia and the Armenia Alliance. The result gives Pashinyan’s party 64 of 105 seats in the National Assembly, while Strong Armenia will hold 29, and the Armenia Alliance will hold 12 seats.
Once again, Pashinyan’s political instinct won out over the naysayers who predicted his demise. Despite the decline in his mandate compared with his two previous elections, the result will allow Pashinyan to continue his realignment with the United States and Europe, a trajectory that should also include better relations with Israel.
The Trump administration has also been keen on building its relationship with Yerevan.
Even though Armenia could benefit from real gains as a result of closer ties with Israel, it will be a hard sell to the Armenian people. Israel maintains a strong strategic partnership with Azerbaijan. The Jewish state was the second-largest provider of weapons to Azerbaijan in the run-up to the two wars fought between Armenian forces and Azerbaijan for the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 and 2023, both times resulting in territorial losses for Armenia and culminating in Baku taking complete control of Nagorno-Karabakh.
“What exactly is Armenia congratulating Israel for? The ethnic cleansing of Palestinian Armenians during the nakba? Its denial of the Armenian Genocide? Its threats against Jerusalem’s Armenian Quarter? Its support for Azerbaijan’s ethnic cleansing of Artsakh’s entire Armenian population just two years ago? F**king pathetic,” Alex Galitsky, policy director for the lobbying group Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA), replied to Armenia’s Yom Ha’atzmaut wishes, after reposting Kasparian’s comment.
Armenians were not alone in their criticism. Rebukes for Israel’s support of Azerbaijan also came from Israeli-American influencer Emily Schrader and American foreign-policy analyst Michael Rubin.
Other factors that account for the lackluster relationship between Israel and Armenia include a low number of Armenian-Jewish immigrants compared to immigrants from Georgia and Azerbaijan. Today, Armenia’s Jewish community is also the smallest of the three, estimated by the World Jewish Congress at approximately 500, while 1,500 live in Georgia and 7,200 in Azerbaijan.
More importantly, Israel’s trade with both Georgia and Azerbaijan dwarfs its trade with Armenia. Israel imports more than 40% of its oil from Azerbaijan via Georgia and Turkey, making Baku a critical ally. Total trade between Israel and Azerbaijan annually approaches or exceeds $1 billion, while trade with Armenia totals about $25 million.
But as Pashinyan’s unlikely electoral victory signaled, Armenia may be open to putting old wounds behind it, including those against Israel, and to becoming a catalyst for a united South Caucasus that would benefit the whole region.
Pashinyan bet that a significant portion of Armenians were tired of ongoing wars and aspired to a future aligned with Western democratic values and economic growth, even if that meant making peace with it two historic enemies.
A major step towards this end was his meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev at the White House in August, where they initialed a peace agreement. At this meeting, U.S. President Donald Trump announced the co-development of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP).
The Trump administration has also been keen on building its relationship with Armenia. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio traveled to Yerevan on May 26, where he and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan signed a strategic partnership agreement, as well as agreements on critical minerals and cooperation on the development of TRIPP.
Once completed, TRIPP will be a 27-mile route through southern Armenia, connecting Azerbaijan’s mainland and its isolated enclave of Nakhichevan. The route would eliminate the need to transfer goods through Iran and would be more direct than a route through Turkey. For the United States and Europe, TRIPP would improve the West’s access to critical minerals and natural resources in the South Caucasus and Central Asia without requiring a route through either Iran or Russia.
For Israel, a project like TRIPP to redevelop what was formerly known as the Zangezur Corridor could bolster its trade with Azerbaijan and Armenia, even though the route still cannot bypass Turkey.
Israel should view Pashinyan’s election victory as an opportunity. His pro-Western stance means that Israel could now pursue closer ties with Yerevan while ensuring it preserves its strategic partnership with Baku. While it will take time for the distrust that the Armenian people feel toward Israel to dissipate, both states are likely to reap rewards.
The Trump administration, which has shown interest in building alliances between Israel and the U.S.’s other international partners—as it did when it facilitated Kazakhstan becoming the latest country to join the Abraham Accords in November—should be inclined to incentivize the building of rapport between the two states. The relationship will support continued peace in the South Caucasus while stripping away another important ally to Russia and Iran.
