A new flagship strategic research report from The Olam uses AI-driven scenario modeling to project the economic consequences of Saudi-Israeli normalization across three time horizons: 2029, 2034 and 2046. The headline finding: a normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel, if achieved, would catalyze between $650 billion and $1.3 trillion in cumulative new Middle East economic activity by 2046. Eight economic sectors. Three horizons. One trillion dollars.
The numbers are large. They are also conditional on a political agreement that has not been reached—and may not be reached on the timeline the modeling assumes.
For the American Jewish policy and business community, which has watched the Abraham Accords transform regional architecture since 2020, the report offers something genuinely useful and something it deliberately does not offer. It offers a structural read on the scale of the prize if the deal materializes. It does not offer a date for when, or certainty about whether, the deal materializes.
That distinction matters more than the dollar figures.
The Olam report’s methodology is anchored to a working precedent. Israel-UAE bilateral trade grew roughly fifteen-fold in four years under the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement that entered into force on April 1, 2023—from approximately $200 million in 2020 to more than $3 billion in 2024. This is the most consequential commercial precedent in Israel’s history of relations with the Arab world.
Saudi Arabia is structurally larger than the United Arab Emirates in every relevant dimension. Its GDP is roughly 2.3 times that of the UAE, and its population is more than three times as large.
The Public Investment Fund at $925 billion in assets under management is approximately two-and-a-half times the size of Mubadala Investment Company, a major Abu Dhabi state-owned sovereign wealth fund that manages a global portfolio of more than $380 billion in assets.. Applied to the UAE commercial trajectory, the Saudi base case does not require optimistic assumptions. It requires multiplying observable outcomes by observable scale.
The numbers cascade across eight sectors. By 2029, three years post-signing, Saudi-Israeli bilateral trade would reach between $2.5 and $5 billion annually. By 2034, between $8 and $25 billion. By 2046, between $25 and $100 billion at the base-to-bull range—comparable to Israel’s current bilateral trade with the United States. Cumulative accords-bloc economic activity reaches between $650 billion and $1.3 trillion by 2046.
The AI infrastructure partnership is the single largest economic line in the modeling.
Saudi Arabia is building tier-one sovereign AI infrastructure at unprecedented speed under Vision 2030. Humain, chaired by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and that launched in May 2025, has announced $23 billion in committed partnerships across the AI stack and targets between 3 and 6 gigawatts of AI compute capacity. That capacity represents between $90 and $300 billion in total infrastructure investment. AWS has committed $5.3 billion in operational Saudi infrastructure. By 2030, Saudi Arabia will host the largest non-U.S. hyperscaler footprint outside China.
The Israeli innovation ecosystem brings complementary input. Israeli high-tech contributes between 17% and 20% of national GDP and over half of total exports. Civilian R&D spending of 6.35% of GDP is the highest in the world. Israeli cybersecurity exports exceed $13 billion annually. NVIDIA’s Israeli operation is its largest outside the United States. The Israeli silicon design ecosystem is the second-largest globally.
Under normalization, Israeli-linked share of Saudi AI infrastructure spending is estimated at 5% to 15%—translating to between $40 and $100 billion cumulative by 2034 and between $200 and $500 billion by 2046. By 2046, the combined AI compute capacity of the Abraham Accords economic bloc could reach between 15 and 25 gigawatts operational, positioning the bloc as a credible third AI compute concentration, alongside the United States and China.
The complementarity is structural. Whether it gets built—and on what timeline—is the open question.
The corridor that needs the deal to function
The second-largest economic line in the modeling is the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), announced at the G20 Summit in September 2023 and signed by India, the United States, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the European Union, Italy, France and Germany.
IMEC connects India’s western ports through Gulf hubs and Saudi territory to Haifa, and then onward by sea to European ports. At full maturity, the corridor cuts India-to-Europe transit time by 40% versus the Suez route and reduces logistics costs by 30%. By 2046, the corridor would move between $300 and $600 billion in annual goods value through Haifa.
The corridor’s rail spine ends at Haifa. Without Saudi-Israeli normalization, the Saudi-to-Jordan-to-Israel link cannot be built, and the corridor does not function. Saudi participation today is theoretical. Israeli participation is structural.
This is what makes the deal structurally significant rather than merely transactional. It is not just a commercial agreement between two countries. It is the unlock for a global logistics architecture that India, the United States and the European Union have already endorsed.
For Washington, the strategic case is overdetermined.
Saudi-Israeli normalization is the cornerstone of the American counter-architecture to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. It produces an integrated commercial bloc—Israel, UAE, Saudi Arabia, India, Europe—explicitly aligned with U.S. strategic interests. The integration of Israeli innovation with U.S. hyperscalers gives the American supply-chain leverage that the alternative—Saudi AI built on Chinese infrastructure—would erode.
Credit historically belongs to the architects who made the Abraham Accords possible. The first Trump administration—Jared Kushner, Avi Berkowitz, Jason Greenblatt and David Friedman—delivered the original four-country breakthrough (UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco) in 2020. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivered the Israeli side and held coalitions through ratification across multiple subsequent governments. The second Trump administration has resumed the expansion: the May 2025 Gulf trip, the Kazakhstan signing of late 2025, the May 2026 six-country framework, Stargate UAE and the $1.4 trillion UAE commitment.
The completion of the Saudi-Israeli line would be the architecture’s capstone. If achieved, it would be comparable in scope and structural importance to NAFTA in 1994, the U.S.-China WTO accession framework of 2001 or the post-1945 Bretton Woods architecture in their respective eras.
Predicted results for the Jewish business community
For the American Jewish business community and the broader Jewish diaspora, the implications would be substantial.
Since 2020, the Israel-UAE corridor has produced a Jewish business class operating fluently in three Gulf capitals. Dubai’s Jewish community has grown from a few hundred residents pre-Abraham Accords to several thousand by 2025. Chabad-Lubavitch centers operate in three emirates. Synagogues operate openly. Kashrut routing serves the wider Gulf food import market.
A Saudi-Israeli economic relationship would extend that infrastructure to the largest Arab economy in the world. Saudi sovereign capital flowing into Israeli VC funds would reach between $5 billion and $15 billion annually by 2034. American Jewish family offices and Jewish-founded U.S. venture firms—Bessemer Venture Partners, Battery Ventures, Insight Partners, Sequoia, Andreessen Horowitz, General Catalyst—would develop formal Saudi corridors.
Joint capital markets across Tel Aviv, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi would become standard. Branded kosher hospitality at scale in Riyadh, Jeddah, NEOM and AlUla. The combined accords bloc’s kosher economy could make between $5 billion and $10 billion annually.
For an American Jewish community aware of the modern history—the expulsions of the 1940s and 1950s that emptied Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Morocco, Tunisia and Libya of their Jewish communities—the structural fact is consequential. A Saudi-Israeli economic corridor would represent the largest expansion of Jewish commercial life in the Arab world in modern history.
The regional environment shapes the diplomatic timeline. Saudi public commitments on broader regional security remain unresolved. Coalition politics in Israel introduce additional variables. Iran-related security calculations affect Saudi calculations on timing and substance. Trump’s six-country framework announced in May places Saudi Arabia at the top of the queue for accords expansion, even though a framework is not a treaty and a pledge is not a closing.
The Olam report does not predict that the deal will happen in 2027, 2029 or any specific year. It models what would follow if it does. That distinction is what makes the report useful to policy readers, investors and business operators—and what distinguishes it from advocacy.
For the American Jewish business community and policy community, the operative question is positioning rather than scheduling. If Saudi Arabia ultimately enters into the accords, the consequences would be large and structurally enduring. If Saudi Arabia does not join within the timeline that the Olam modeling assumes, the underlying analytical case for the AI partnership, the IMEC corridor and the broader Jewish commercial geography remains worth understanding.
The Abraham Accords have already proven that the architecture works. They have already produced a working Jewish commercial presence in the Arab world at a scale not seen in over a century. Whether that infrastructure ultimately extends to Saudi Arabia—and on what timeline and what terms—is the question that the next several years will answer.
The economic prize is large. The political path is complex. Both facts are equally true.
The full 31-page Olam strategic research report is available at: olam.business.
