“I’m not going to start wars, I’m going to stop wars,” proclaimed President-elect Donald Trump in his Nov. 6 victory speech.
Bolstering America’s deterrence posture is the most critical prerequisite for stopping/minimizing wars and terrorism. This posture is reflected by the size and structure of the U.S. defense budget, avoiding appeasement of rogue entities and dwelling on reality (as frustrating as it is) rather than fantasy.
The U.S. deterrence posture has been undermined by the State Department, which was evicted from the center stage of foreign policy formulations during President Trump’s first term. Trump opposes Foggy Bottom’s multilateral/cosmopolitan state of mind, which prefers a coordinated policy with the United Nations, international organizations and Europe rather than unilateral, independent U.S. national security and foreign policy.
The State Department has also subordinated Middle East reality to its own, alternate reality, which has led to its systematic failure in the Middle East (e.g., stabbing the Shah in the back in 1978-79 and facilitating the ayatollahs’ rise to power; embracing Saddam Hussein until his 1990 invasion of Kuwait; cuddling Arafat and ushering him to the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993; betraying pro-U.S. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and courting the anti-U.S. Muslim Brotherhood in 2009; treating the 2010 “Arab Tsunami” as if it were an “Arab Spring” and Facebook Revolution; the 2011 military offensive on Muammar Gaddafi, which transformed Libya into a major hotspot of anti-U.S. Islamic terrorism; pressuring Israel to conclude a series of accords with—and refrain from demolishing—Hamas, which bolstered its terrorism and led to the atrocities of Oct. 7, 2023).
U.S. deterrence has been severely undermined by the State Department’s policy toward Iran’s regime, which since 1979 has been transformed from “the American Policeman of the Gulf” to a venomous anti-U.S. octopus whose tentacles stretch from the Persian Gulf through the Middle East and Africa into Latin America and the United States itself.
The ayatollahs have become the global epicenter of anti-U.S. wars, terrorism and drug trafficking, threatening the U.S. homeland and the survival of all pro-U.S. Arab regimes, especially the Arab oil producers. The ayatollahs aspire to control 48% of global oil reserves, as well as key global trade routes, which would deal a major blow to Western economy.
U.S. deterrence has also been severely undermined by the delusion that the diplomatic option, supplemented with mega-billion dollar gestures, could induce the ayatollahs to abandon their fanatical, 1,400-year-old vision, conduct good faith negotiations and accept peaceful coexistence. The architects of the diplomatic option have ignored the fact that rogue regimes bite the hands that feed them, as documented by the ayatollahs themselves, who took over the U.S. Embassy—a few months after receiving U.S. support in toppling the Shah—held 50 American hostages for 444 days and emerged as a leading threat to the United States, globally and domestically.
Just like the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, Hamas and the PLO/Palestinian Authority, Iran’s ayatollahs are driven by a fanatical vision which transcends monetary considerations. Moreover, this vision has been codified by their constitution, education system and mosque sermons.
This fanatical vision mandates the elimination of enemies, such as the “apostate” Sunni regimes, the “infidel” West, the “Great American Satan” and the “illegitimate” Zionist entity, which they view as America’s vanguard in the Middle East.
The ayatollahs consider negotiation a means to advance their anti-U.S. vision, not a means to advance reconciliation with the United States.
The Ayatollahs should not be negotiation partners but a target for regime change. The potential cost of regime change would be dwarfed by the cost of facing a nuclear Iran.
At the same time, a series of peace accords ended the state of war between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and South Sudan, because—unlike the ayatollahs, Hamas, the PLO/P.A. and Hezbollah—the national vision/aspiration of each of these Arab countries does not mandate the elimination of Israel. In fact, Saudi Arabia’s “Vision 2030” plan considers Israel to be a partner, militarily, technologically and agriculturally.
Trump’s first term featured “maximum pressure” economic sanctions, which crippled the ayatollahs’ economy and constrained their capability to bolster terrorism and wars. However, as demonstrated by the 2021 suspension and softening of the sanctions, economic sanctions are reversible. They can mitigate or delay war and terror, but do not eliminate the threat.
On the other hand, regime change eliminates the threat and is irreversible. Furthermore, it would significantly bolster America’s strategic stature (including in Latin America, America’s soft underbelly) by removing the ayatollahs’ machete from the throats of all pro-U.S. Arab regimes, eliminate the chief supporter of global Islamic terrorism and induce Saudi Arabia and Oman (and possibly Kuwait, Indonesia and additional Muslim countries) to join the Abraham Accords.
The Abraham Accords were conceived by ignoring the State Department’s preoccupation with the Palestinian issue and focusing on the national interests of the individual Arab countries, as was done with Israel’s prior peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan. Contrary to the State Department’s conventional wisdom—which produced a litany of peace proposals but no peace—the Abraham Accords came to fruition, because they bypassed the Palestinian issue, denying the Palestinians veto power over the peace process. The Abraham Accords confirm that the State Department has been wrong to assume that the Palestinian issue is the crux of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the crown jewel of the Arabs and a root cause of Middle East turmoil.
While the State Department has been obsessed with Palestinian statehood, all pro-U.S. Arab countries have limited their support for such a state to talk, while their walk has been indifferent to negative. Arab leaders pay more attention to the Palestinian rogue walk than to the Palestinian moderate talk. Therefore, they consider the Palestinians to be a role model for intra-Arab subversion, terrorism and treachery, due to Palestinian terrorism against their hosts in Egypt (1950s), Syria (1960s), Jordan (1968-70), Lebanon (1970-82) and Kuwait (1990).
In addition, they are aware of the Palestinian collaboration with Nazi Germany, the Soviet Bloc, Ayatollah Khomeini, international terror organizations, Muslim Brotherhood terrorists, North Korea, Venezuela, Cuba, Russia and China. Therefore, they have concluded that a Palestinian state west of the Jordan River would add fuel to the Middle East fire, toppling the pro-U.S. Hashemite regime east of the River, transforming Jordan into an arena of anti-U.S. Islamic terrorism, triggering rogue ripple effects in the Arabian Peninsula (as well as in the United States), threatening every oil-producing Arab regime and Egypt. This would be a bonanza for the ayatollahs, Russia and China and a blow to the U.S. economy and to U.S. homeland security.
On the other hand, Israel has emerged as a unique force and dollar multiplier for the United States, and a leading innovation center for the U.S. commercial and defense high-tech sectors (e.g., 250 U.S. high tech giants operate research and development centers in Israel). Israel is the “Triple-A store” of the U.S. defense and aerospace industries (increasing U.S. export), and the leading battle-testing laboratory for America’s defense industries (saving many years of research and development), armed forces (enhancing battle tactics), intelligence community and counter-terrorism agencies.
Israel has been the largest U.S. aircraft carrier (as stated by Gen. Alexander Haig, a former NATO supreme commander, and Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, a former Chief of Naval Operations), which does not require Americans on board, deployed in a critical area between the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, sparing the United States the need to manufacture and deploy (to the Middle East) a few more real aircraft carriers along with a few ground divisions, which would cost the U.S. taxpayer $15 billion to $20 billion annually.
Originally published by The Ettinger Report.
