Israel’s policymakers and security agencies must finally undertake the serious strategic review they have long avoided, weighing the dangers of ties with Doha against any perceived benefits
Israel’s “Swords of Iron” war has thrust Qatar into the spotlight. For two decades, Doha has leveraged Middle East crises to earn international credit as a mediator and problem-solver. This time, however, the conflict has damaged its image worldwide.
Over more than 20 years, Qatar formulated what one might call a “pincer doctrine”: one arm extending a welcoming embrace to the Western world, the other working to undermine it. The friendly arm relies on diplomacy, vast sums of money, strategic acquisitions, mediation for hostage releases and crisis resolution, bribes to politicians and operating public-relations firms to do its bidding. The destructive arm comprises Al Jazeera and a global propaganda network, gaining influence in universities, the promotion of radical Islam via the Muslim Brotherhood’s teachings, financing terror and fomenting revolutions in the Islamic world.
This doctrine has proved a winning strategy that answers the principality’s security needs and transforms an otherwise minuscule “teardrop” on the globe into a major influencer on world opinion.
Yet this doctrine is threatened by the war, which has exposed its destructive arm so conspicuously that Qatar itself is at risk. Doha failed to deliver what was expected of it: the swift return of all hostages and an end to the fighting. Hamas—its “wayward child”—defied Qatari directives and refused to follow the rules Qatar has tried to impose. Now, Doha faces a genuine dilemma.
Qatar stood at a similar crossroads in May 2017, when Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt imposed an economic boycott and even threatened military measures against it. Their stated reasons included terror financing, inciting radical Islamist groups and Doha’s ties with Iran.
These concerns did not deter the Israeli government only a year later from adopting a controversial decision devoid of any diplomatic logic to allow the Qataris to bring suitcases full of cash into Gaza. By doing so, Jerusalem effectively legitimized Doha and undermined the boycott by the Gulf states—a boycott spurred by a shared interest with Israel in curbing terror and containing Iran. The flimsy rationale offered at the time was that the Palestinian Authority had halted its funding to Gaza, so Qatar would stand in, theoretically buying calm from Hamas and freeing the Palestinian Authority to channel the money it saved to bolster its control in the territories under its control.
Documents seized in Gaza during the war show how deeply Hamas was worried by the 2017 crisis. Its primary fear was that the United States would compel Qatar to cut ties with Hamas. Had that happened, Hamas would have been severed from Doha’s propaganda network, which the group sees as an essential mechanism for advancing its agenda and those of the Muslim Brotherhood, and radical Islam worldwide, and, of course, it would no longer have been able to suckle from the Qatari cash cow (a phrase the emir of Qatar himself coined in a meeting with Ismail Haniyeh, the chairman of the Hamas political bureau slain last year by Israel).
Qatar, however, proved remarkably resilient, refused to yield to pressure and even established new safeguards against future threats. First, it reinforced its alliance with Iran and Turkey. Second, instead of distancing itself from Hamas, Doha actually intensified its cooperation, believing that nurturing Hamas served Qatar’s own regional and international interests.
Documents captured in Gaza—corroborated by Shin Bet interrogations—confirm beyond doubt that Qatar has been a central pillar of support for Hamas. Doha has been a principal financial pillar not only for Gaza’s reconstruction but also for the movement as a whole, including its military arm. Qatar bankrolled Hamas’s special forces and training in Lebanon and was seen by the group as central to promoting its interests. At the same times, as an ostensible mediator it manipulated Israel and promoted Hamas’s agenda worldwide.
Qatar has also operated in tandem with Shi’ite elements. It funds the Houthis and Hezbollah, including their purchase of drones and gliders, just as Shiite Iran backs Hamas and other Sunni groups, including the mujahideen organization in Gaza that murdered the Bibas family.
Despite the setbacks suffered as a result of Israel’s war with Hamas in Gaza, Qatar’s leaders have not sunk into despair. Instead, they have immersed themselves in shaping the Middle East in the years ahead and to craft their image on the global stage. It appears that no development will steer them away from the strategic goals they have set. Already, they are advancing in several arenas:
• Qatar is deepening its influence in the Trump administration, leveraging years of ties with key figures such as Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, designated U.S. ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee and numerous people in the Republican Party. Qatar also made a major financial investment in Newsmax, a pro-Trump cable-news network.
• A similar apparatus is at work in Europe, where, for years, Qatar has strategically used its vast wealth to boost its standing through academic, educational, health care and humanitarian organizations operating globally at a cost of billions of dollars, cooperating with U.N. institutions like the U.N. International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). These organizations have served as conduits through which Qatar has funneled hundreds of millions of dollars to the United Nations. In return, Sheikha Moza, the mother of the current emir, and her oil-rich principality have garnered honors in U.N. corridors and among Western heads of state. Millions more have been routed through Sheikha Moza’s foundations to prestigious universities in the United States and elsewhere in the West, granting Qatar significant sway in those institutions.
• Qatar has pushed the Americans to negotiate with Hamas, bypassing Israel. This amounts in practice to U.S. recognition of Hamas—an aim both Hamas and Qatar have pursued for years. In a conspicuous move, Adam Boehler met with Hamas leadership. This should come as no surprise: A document seized in Gaza mentions that more than a decade ago, it was the Americans who urged Qatar to open its doors to Hamas’s leaders.
• Qatar will likely feature in every scenario for Gaza’s reconstruction. Doha views reconstruction as a strategic imperative, so it is deeply involved behind the scenes in coordinating with the Americans. Notably, during an earlier rebuilding, Qatari-constructed neighborhoods in Gaza were equipped from the start with tunnels connecting them to Hamas military headquarters.
• Qatar can be expected to play a major role in Syria as well, potentially collaborating with Turkey (its ally) and perhaps even with Iran to define shared interests in overseeing Syria. Substantial Qatari involvement in rebuilding Syria alongside Turkey is quite plausible. Qatar’s footprint in both Gaza and Syria is unlikely to bode well for Israel.
• Qatar will remain active in mediation efforts elsewhere. Recently, it helped free an American hostage in Afghanistan and has participated in talks between Congo and Rwanda.
At some stage, Qatar may offer the Americans and their allies its assistance in U.S.-Iran negotiations over the nuclear file—another opportunity to elevate itself on the world stage. Qatar has already begun a campaign demanding that Israel place its nuclear facilities under international oversight.
Still, the Qataris are wary of Trump. According to the seized Hamas documents, as early as 2017 they believed Trump would force Qatar to normalize relations with Israel—a move that would strike a severe blow to Hamas. Consequently, the Qataris will do everything possible to avoid alienating the American president and will employ every possible tactic to snare him into their web.
Given Qatar’s tremendous wealth and role as a mediator, it is unrealistic to expect the global community to abandon it altogether. At the same time, Doha may well leak sensitive documents and information about leaders who have received bribes if anyone tries to tarnish Qatar’s image. It is not far-fetched that Qatar was behind the now-discredited papers released against Netanyahu at the war’s outset and may likewise be involved in recent leaks about his aides. Meanwhile, one can assume that Qatar will keep a lower profile in its terror-related activities, in line with the Muslim Brotherhood’s doctrine, until global outrage subsides.
Turning to the “Qatargate” affair currently making headlines, the outcome is still unclear. From Doha’s standpoint, it will attempt to keep recruiting influential Israeli political and business figures and even take over assets in Israel if possible. On the other hand, it is as yet unclear where the Shin Bet investigations will lead. Plainly, however, a fundamental investigation into Qatar’s involvement in Israel is overdue.
Advancing the Abraham Accords, normalizing relations with Saudi Arabia, rescuing the hostages and dismantling Hamas all hinge on one overarching objective: removing Qatar from the equation of influence in the Middle East and globally. Trump is the one figure who might threaten Doha in a way that could dramatically shift regional dynamics and curb the growing danger posed to Western interests by the Muslim Brotherhood’s brand of radical Islam.
For now, Doha remains central to the hostage negotiations, so Israel must wait patiently before taking any cardinal decisions. Still, it would be prudent for the country’s policymakers and security agencies to undertake the serious strategic review they have thus far avoided, weighing the implications of relations with Qatar and the attendant security risks against any gains.
From Hamas’s point of view, Qatar is a strategic asset; for Qatar, Hamas is likewise essential. Those calling for the dismantling of Hamas—a contentious goal in itself—should be equally mindful of Qatar’s role and act accordingly, without delay.