The prospect of major military escalation between the Iranian regime and the United States raises an essential question about shifting security alliances in the Middle East. The region’s future hangs in the balance.
Is a greater Middle East security alliance, encompassing Israel, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and beyond, a realistic prospect? It is, if the U.S. administration determines that Hamas- and Palestine Liberation Organization-supporting Turkey will not replace Israel as its preferred regional partner.
This open question about U.S. Middle East policy stands as a central obstacle to converting the Abraham Accords into a genuine regional security architecture.
In 2020, when the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan entered the Abraham Accords through treaties or de facto normalization, they did not condition their participation on Palestinian statehood.
The UAE traded recognition for a suspended application of Israeli law to large parts of Judea and Samaria, and enhanced UAE access to American F-35 warplanes and drone technology. Bahrain followed within days, prioritizing security integration under the U.S. Fifth Fleet umbrella over Arab League orthodoxy. Morocco normalized relations in exchange for American recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara.
Even Sudan, the historic host of the three infamous “no’s” of 1967, in exchange for its removal from the U.S. terror-sponsoring state list and economic relief, agreed to begin the normalization process. Today, Sudan is governed by an extremist regime, but it remains a potential partner depending on internal developments.
Notably, the 2020 Abraham Accords regional approach to peacemaking and normalization reversed the preconditions of the 2002 Saudi-sponsored “Palestine first” Arab Peace Initiative. That reversal explains the survival of the Abraham Accords structure despite the Iranian regime-backed Hamas-Israel Gaza war.
No signatory to the Abraham Accords has withdrawn, even as Arab opinion polling shows 70%-80% public disapproval in Accord countries. Governments held their positions because the underlying interests, driven by a U.S.-led regional anti-Iranian regime coalition and the modernization of their economies, were free of the decades-long Palestinian veto.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has worked tirelessly to convert that logic into a new security-driven regional alliance. As early as July 2024, addressing both houses of the U.S. Congress, he floated an “Abraham Security Alliance,” a NATO-style framework open to states that “have made peace with Israel and those that will.”
In February 2026, following the assassination of the Iranian regime’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the degradation of its nuclear and missile infrastructure, Netanyahu unveiled what strategists call the “Hexagon Alliance”—Israel’s technological and security core, linked to India’s manufacturing weight, Greek and Cypriot Mediterranean corridors, Emirati economic channels and Somaliland’s Red Sea oversight.
Lebanon has since agreed to direct negotiations with Israel—an historic development—producing a U.S.-brokered framework agreement on June 26, 2026, restoring Lebanese sovereignty from years of Iran-backed Hezbollah control, from Southern Lebanon to Beirut.
Syria’s al-Sharaa government has held direct dialogue with Jerusalem while declining to join the Accords formally.
Bahrain and the UAE, having maintained long-time under-the-radar relations with Israel, have both absorbed Iranian drone and missile fire, a reminder that Tehran treats normalization as a declaration of war.
Nonetheless, Washington’s nominal embrace of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has slowed the construction of this promising security architecture. There appears to be a strategic shift inside the administration—beyond personal rapport between U.S. President Donald Trump and Erdoğan, there is a growing view that Turkey can assume roles Israel has traditionally played, engaging Arab states wary of Iran without the political cost of another Israeli-led campaign.
Ankara is exploiting this opening. Turkey is banking on overreliance by Gulf states on Washington and Jerusalem during the ongoing war with the Iranian regime. Turkey appears to be positioning itself as the Islamic world’s next leader, replacing the Iranian regime’s role as regional hegemon, set on influencing Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and the Gulf.
And it’s also happening on Israel’s borders. Notably, Erdoğan has continued to assert Turkey’s military presence in Egypt and Syria. Despite Israel’s refusal to allow Turkish military participation in the International Stabilization Force in neighboring Gaza post Oct. 7, Turkish special forces are training with the Egyptian military on Egyptian soil nearby.
This is particularly remarkable in view of years of tense diplomatic relations between Egypt and Turkey. No less concerning is the docking, for the first time, by the Turkish Navy at the Syrian port of Latakia, a long-time Russian installation. Turkey’s upgraded military presence, in both Egypt and Syria, creates a potential ring of fire surrounding Israel.
In addition, Turkey’s growing security, diplomatic and economic influence in Islamist Somalia has also become more pronounced in the past decade. According to reports, Turkish intelligence is working with the Somalis to recruit operatives in neighboring Somaliland, strategically positioned along the Red Sea, with a goal of weakening growing security ties between Israel and Somaliland.
Despite Turkey’s upgraded military presence in the Mideast and East Africa, Erdoğan has not operationalized his threats on Israel. He has avoided military confrontation and has refrained from disrupting Israeli operations in Syria, despite housing and training Hamas on Turkish soil, according to Israeli news reports.
Despite Turkey’s malign regional behavior, the U.S. administration is still considering Turkey as a politically “lower-cost” regional security manager.
The stakes surrounding this strategic tension rose on July 9, during a conversation between Netanyahu and Trump. The Israeli prime minister pointed out “the gravity of President Erdoğan’s and his associates’ statements questioning the legitimacy of the State of Israel.”
Israel is simultaneously fighting to block the sale of U.S. F-35s and F-110 engines to Turkey for its KAAN fighter. Netanyahu warned both the president and Congress that these moves would erode Israel’s military edge.
Turkey’s other moves are less ambiguous. Ankara maintains Russian S-400 anti-aircraft systems, a major sore point for Congress, and occupies northern Cyprus. In June 2026, Cyprus-based Turkish F-16s intercepted and radio-jammed aircraft carrying the defense ministers of Greece, France and the Netherlands, an exceptionally hostile act against three of its NATO allies.
Erdoğan’s malign behavior is clear for all to see. Turkey hosts Hamas leadership, partners with Muslim Brotherhood-aligned Qatar, and is arming factions inside Syria’s new government to build a corridor toward Israel’s northern frontier. Israeli air power struck Turkish-controlled sites at T-4 and Palmyra in April 2025 to deny Ankara a forward military foothold in Syria.
The Eastern Mediterranean is a parallel front. Turkey vehemently opposes the deepening security and energy cooperation among Israel, Greece and Cyprus. The trilateral alliance, formalized in Jerusalem on Dec. 22, 2025, links electricity grids through the planned Great Sea Interconnector (linking Israel, Cyprus and Greece). It also further advances joint air defense development and explicitly integrates into the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), designed to route Asia-Europe trade through Haifa.
Turkey’s alternative approach is to re-route IMEC through the Iraq Development Road and post-Assad Syria to Turkish ports. This would constitute a parallel corridor bypassing Israel.
Israel now assesses that Ankara will fill the vacuum left by a weakened Iranian regime. Turkey will likely be positioned as Israel’s principal long-term strategic competitor—the second largest military in NATO, a fast-growing defense industry, including advanced submarines. In addition, Turkey has begun planning nuclear-powered submarines.
Anti-Israel sentiment in Turkey extends well beyond Erdoğan and his government’s pugnacious Israel-hate rhetoric into the opposition and the public at large.
Despite this complex puzzle, the logic of the Abraham Accords still holds. Middle Eastern states will likely advance normalization in exchange for security and prosperity without waiting for the Palestinian issue to be resolved. What remains uncertain is whether Washington will build a regional security alliance with Israel, or with Turkey.
Trump and Netanyahu have proven to be strong partners, and the president sees Israel as the regional strong horse. An apparent personal rapport between Trump and Erdoğan is not a substitute for a stable, dependable regional alliance.
Erdoğan’s Muslim Brotherhood identity can boomerang on America and its Middle Eastern allies without warning, threatening Eastern Mediterranean stability. Turkey can quickly become the Sunni replacement of the declining Shi’ite Iranian Islamic Republic.
If the Abraham Security Alliance is to mean anything beyond aspirational rhetoric, the U.S. must expand the Abraham Accord alliances that Trump pioneered in his first term.
Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Somaliland, Greece, Cyprus and others are realistic candidates. However, the expanded security alliance will depend on a strong U.S., Israel and Gulf Arab foundation that would be shaken by Turkey’s neo-Ottoman imperial ambitions and their current destabilizing influence in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean.
Originally published by the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs.
