Days after an investigation by the British newspaper The Telegraph revealed that Chinese components in K3 Scout unmanned sea drones operated by Britain’s Royal Navy and used by British special forces since March had sent data to China, an Israeli media report on Tuesday found that the Israel Defense Forces is still using Chinese-made vehicles at its headquarters in Tel Aviv.
A former Israeli official told JNS that American guidelines on the use of Chinese equipment provide a good model for U.S. partners.
According to the Aug. 18 report by Walla, IDF officers are prohibited from possessing Chinese-made cellphones, and the Israeli military cannot purchase Chinese-made communications equipment. The IDF has also phased out the practice of leasing Chinese-made vehicles for its officers, which reportedly come equipped with cameras, microphones and their own cellular communications.
The IDF had instructed officers not to discuss classified matters while in the vehicles and barred the vehicles from entering top-secret facilities before fully phasing them out, the report said. However, Chinese electric vehicles—MG ZS models—purchased some five years ago are still being used to patrol within and around the IDF’s headquarters (the Kirya) in Tel Aviv.
The IDF said in a statement that it operates according to mandatory regulations and protocols regarding equipment purchases, including vehicles and digital components, according to the report.
A former Israeli official told JNS on Tuesday that the United States has developed a rigorous framework for screening Chinese technology out of sensitive networks, and that the British case illustrates rules applicable across domains for America’s allies.
“I can say that the Americans know this field in depth, studied it thoroughly and built clear rules, I assume with a fairly wide margin of caution,” the official said.
Separately, a Western observer told JNS that Chinese-made commercial drones and vehicles present a more ambiguous risk calculation than blanket bans suggest, arguing that policy should be calibrated according to context rather than applied uniformly.
“I think we have to assume there is a risk of data collection, and therefore it’s appropriate that companies working in security matters, not just the IDF but anyone entering bases, should be wary of using a Chinese-made vehicle,” the observer said, although he warned that blanket suspicions of China go too far.
The observer said the drone market poses a distinct structural problem because of one manufacturer’s dominance.
“In the drone sector there’s a real difficulty, because something close to 70% of the market is controlled by DJI. That creates a situation where if you don’t want something Chinese, you can buy an alternative, but it just costs you more, sometimes a lot more. You end up forced into using a more expensive and less capable product,” the observer said.
The observer argued that the actual operational risk depends heavily on the mission.
“As long as you’re talking about routine security activity, say for a company commander, the assumption that someone is watching in real time is a very extreme assumption. So for that kind of use, I would adopt a more permissive policy,” the observer said, drawing a sharper line for sensitive operations.
“If you’re talking about special operations or intelligence-related activities, then I think Israel needs to pay both premiums. One is a higher price, and the second is a less advanced, lower-quality product.”
Starting in 2019, and more forcefully in 2020, the United States applied heavy pressure on Britain to remove Huawei from its fifth-generation (5G) networks, arguing that the equipment could allow Chinese intelligence to penetrate sensitive communications networks.
Huawei was placed on the U.S. Commerce Department’s Entity List in May 2019, restricting its access to American technology. Washington also cited concerns that China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law compels Chinese companies to cooperate with state intelligence services and warned that allowing Huawei into critical British infrastructure could damage the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance among the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
Britain initially resisted a full ban, restricting Huawei only to non-sensitive areas of its network, before shifting course after American sanctions were tightened in May 2020 under the Foreign Direct Product Rule.
Britain’s National Cyber Security Centre determined that the risk had increased significantly because the sanctions undermined Huawei’s ability to use trusted and monitored components.
In July 2020, Britain decided to remove Huawei entirely from its 5G networks by 2027 and barred the purchase of new Huawei equipment starting at the end of 2020.
The Telegraph reported on Aug. 9 that cameras installed on Royal Navy surveillance sea drones contained Chinese-made components that transmitted data to an IP address in China.
Britain’s Ministry of Defense severed internet connectivity from the cameras after discovering the transmissions. The roughly £12 million ($16 million) drone fleet had reportedly recorded preparations for British operations in the Persian Gulf aimed at securing freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.
However, Britain’s Ministry of Defense said in a statement that a thorough investigation found no evidence that ministry data or systems had been accessed, compromised or transmitted externally.
