In the calculus of national security, the destiny of nations is determined not by the names of politicians, but by the nature of threats, the enduring character of national interests and the ability of governments to recognize strategic dangers.
From this perspective, the Islamic Republic of Iran and its machinery of terrorism represent for Israel neither a passing political dispute nor merely a consequence of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s policies, but an enduring structural threat to the country’s national security.
Whether Netanyahu remains in power or opposition leader Gadi Eisenkot assumes the leadership of Israel’s next government, one fundamental reality will remain unchanged: The Islamic Republic constitutes one of Israel’s foremost national security threats—a threat whose consequences have been equally profound and devastating for the national interests of the Iranian people.
A clear distinction must therefore be drawn between Iran as a historic nation and the Islamic regime that governs it.
Iran and Israel do not necessarily share identical interests on every regional question, just as no two nations enjoy such absolute convergence. Nevertheless, confronting the Islamic Republic’s expansionist policies and its Islamic terrorist proxy networks, missile threats, biological weapons and nuclear program constitutes a critical point on which Israel’s national security considerations converge with certain aspirations and national interests of the Iranian people.
For Israel, confronting the Islamic Republic regime is a matter of national survival and prevention of the emergence of future threats.
For the Iranian people, the issue concerns preserving their country’s historical existence, freedom, national sovereignty and bringing an end to a political structure that places its own survival above the public interest.
Under such circumstances, the collapse of the Islamic Republic’s governing structure and its replacement by a government accountable to the Iranian nation could, from my perspective, create the conditions for eliminating one of the most significant sources of instability in the Middle East.
The differences between Netanyahu and Eisenkot must be examined within this strategic framework. They may disagree over crisis management, the timing of military force, relations with Washington, the role of diplomacy and the costs of war. But disagreement over the means of confronting a threat does not necessarily imply disagreement over the nature of the threat itself.
Netanyahu has openly advocated the overthrow of the Islamic Republic. Eisenkot, too, has emphasized the necessity of bringing this regime to an end, although he does not regard its downfall through foreign military intervention as realistic and considers the Iranian people the decisive force in achieving such a transformation.
Their strategic convergence in identifying the threat must therefore not be mistaken for an identical approach to confronting it.
Within this strategic equation, the Mossad occupies a distinct and enduring position. Israel’s intelligence and special operations agency, unlike governments and electoral coalitions, is a permanent institution within the country’s national security establishment.
Naturally, a change of prime minister may alter priorities, operational direction and the limits of executive authority. Yet it would be strategically unreasonable to assume that a mere change in political leadership could erase the threat posed by the Islamic Republic from Mossad’s calculations.
Genuine national security is not defined by the changing names of political leaders; it is achieved through the elimination of enduring sources of danger.
From a strategic standpoint, the outlaw Islamic regime in Iran is a governing system that, for decades, has intertwined its political survival with costly security policies, the barbaric repression of domestic opponents and intervention in regional conflicts through its support for terrorism and the deliberate creation of chaos and instability.
When such a structure perceives that its existence is in jeopardy, it may resort to intensifying domestic repression, expanding external crises and escalating deterrence measures to preserve its grip on power.
This makes predicting its future conduct both difficult and hazardous for intelligence and security institutions.
Nevertheless, the existence of a common threat does not imply that Iran and Israel share identical objectives in every respect. Iran’s national security must rest upon independence, territorial integrity, the protection of its citizens’ lives and the Iranian nation’s right to determine its own destiny.
Equally, any strategy designed to eliminate the threat posed by the Islamic Republic must take into account its humanitarian consequences, the dangers of instability and the possibility of an expanding war.
The end of a government does not, in itself, guarantee lasting security. The nature of the political transition and the establishment of the political order that follows are equally decisive.
Ultimately, the fundamental question is not whether Netanyahu will remain Israel’s prime minister or Eisenkot will succeed him. The more consequential question is how Israel’s national security establishment will assess the continuing threat posed by the Islamic Republic, and to what extent that assessment will align with the aspirations of Iranians seeking a free, independent and secure country.
Genuine national security is not defined by the changing names of political leaders; it is achieved through the elimination of enduring sources of danger.
Within this framework, the end of the Islamic Republic—provided it is accompanied by a responsible political transition and the preservation of Iran’s security and national sovereignty—could serve not only the future interests of the Iranian people but also constitute a fundamental step toward diminishing security threats against Israel and establishing more enduring stability throughout the Middle East.
The destiny of Iran belongs to the Iranian people, while the threat created by the Islamic Republic has long since extended far beyond Iran’s borders.
Nevertheless, Israel and Mossad—even in accordance with Israel’s national interests and considerations, and indeed its very survival and existence—stand alongside the Iranian people and share their objective of regime change.
For this reason, the place Israel holds in the hearts, souls and minds of the Iranian people cannot be erased by the ruling regime. Every day, under the pretext of the nightmare of Israel’s presence, innocent people are executed in what amounts to a display of the barbarism of the Islamic courts in Tehran.
A falsehood propagated by the Islamic Republic and its Marxist and Communist allies is that Israel seeks to partition and dismember Iran.
But a united, strong and free Iran could be Israel’s natural friend and ally. The reopening of Israel’s embassy in Tehran, perhaps among the first diplomatic initiatives following regime change, could herald the restoration of the ancient historical and cultural bonds between these two nations—bonds that were never entirely severed, even during the darkest decades of the Islamic Republic’s rule.
The enduring mutual affection between Iranians and Jews, and even the embrace of Judaism by some Iranians who have departed from Islam, reflects human and spiritual affinities that transcend political hostility.
This precious historical inheritance should be regarded as an auspicious sign, because following the collapse of the Islamic Republic, it could pave the way for ever-closer relations between the two peoples and the dawn of a new chapter in Iran-Israel relations.
