The recent Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani defense pact is already being described as an “Islamic NATO.” It is nothing of the sort. NATO was built around coherent strategic and political alignment. This pact brings together three countries whose interests barely overlap and often directly compete.
The pact is Saudi Arabia’s attempt to confront Iran and its armed proxies, but it does not provide the ground commitment needed to defeat Yemen’s Houthis and risks giving greater legitimacy to Turkey’s Muslim Brotherhood network—a threat no less dangerous to Riyadh.
Saudi Arabia has spent decades fighting political Islam and designated the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization. Turkey, under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is a political center, sponsor and refuge for the Muslim Brotherhood.
Thus, Saudi Arabia is caught between two expanding Islamist powers: Iran, through its armed proxies, and Turkey, through its Muslim Brotherhood network. Their competition increasingly extends across the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.
Power in the Red Sea does not lie only in states, armies and treaties. It also moves through religious institutions, political organizations, charities, educational networks, media, diaspora communities and transnational ideological relationships.
Eritrea shows how Turkey is positioning the Muslim Brotherhood to enhance its power. Change is inevitable once Eritrean dictator Isaias Afwerki passes from the scene. Turkey is preparing to fill the resulting vacuum through the Eritrean Muslim Brotherhood’s Al-Nahda Party, the successor to Al-Rabita al-Islamiyya, which emerged in the 1940s. Ankara backs the movement, whose office is based in Turkey.
Eritrea’s current leadership under Afwerki, driven by a resistance ideology, is aligned with Iran. Iran, meanwhile, is positioning itself to preserve its influence through the current leadership or inherit it through its successor.
Tigrinya nationalists, part of an ethnic group indigenous to Eritrea, oppose Iranian and Turkish influence and seek strategic partnerships with Israel, the West, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. A post-Afwerki Eritrea under such leadership could therefore become a strategic counterweight to both Iran and Turkey in the Red Sea.
Sudan has become another battleground. The Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, established in 1949 and later led by Hassan al-Turabi, evolved into the National Islamic Front, which helped bring Omar al-Bashir to power in a 1989 coup. Under Bashir, Sudan became a hub for international Islamist and terrorist networks, hosting figures such as Osama bin Laden.
Iran and Turkey compete for influence in Sudan, but their objectives differ: Iran seeks another regional proxy, while Turkey seeks to preserve its Red Sea foothold and revive its historic presence around the port city of Suakin. Sudan also offers a potential alternative to the Muslim Brotherhood’s political legacy. A civilian Sudanese order oriented toward Israel and the Gulf could therefore provide a counterweight to both Turkey and Iran.
Somalia has developed its own Brotherhood-linked movements. Al-Islah, founded in the 1970s, drew heavily on Muslim Brotherhood ideas. The affiliated movement Damul Jadid emerged from this environment and became influential in Somali politics.
Today, Turkey has established a major military, political and economic presence in Somalia. Its influence extends beyond military bases and economic agreements, giving Ankara political access to a country sitting directly on the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea’s strategic gateway.
Iran is extending its reach into Somalia, while the Somali terrorist group al-Shabaab is becoming part of the Houthi security challenge through growing cooperation in weapons, training and logistics. Saudi Arabia can work pragmatically with Somaliland while maintaining its formal ties with Somalia, strengthening its position against the Houthis and creating a practical bridge to Israeli and Emirati capabilities.
The Houthis are Saudi Arabia’s most immediate military challenge. Riyadh’s pact with Turkey and Pakistan does not establish a credible commitment to the ground campaign required to defeat the Houthis’ territorial power. The Houthis are not simply a missile threat that can be eliminated from the air. They are an entrenched territorial military and political organization.
Riyadh may hope that the pact and broader regional coalitions will pressure the Houthis into an agreement and de-escalation. But the Houthis can use negotiations to extract concessions, buy time, rebuild and rearm. De-escalation without dismantling their territorial military power risks postponing rather than ending the threat.
The pact is therefore strong on symbolism against Iran but weak on the military capability needed to defeat the Houthis, while granting greater legitimacy to Turkey’s Muslim Brotherhood network in the region.
That is the paradox of the pact: Riyadh has spent decades fighting Islamist threats. Now, in confronting Tehran, it is deepening its security relationship with Ankara, the political center and sponsor, alongside Doha, of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Therefore, Saudi Arabia should not assume that its only options are de-escalation with Iran and its proxies or deeper dependence on Turkey. It has a third option, which is to build a Red Sea coalition with partners whose interests align with its own: the Yemeni people, Somaliland, a future Eritrea under different leadership and a civilian government in Sudan.
Such a coalition would combine complementary strengths: The Horn of Africa partners would provide ground forces and strategic locations, while Israel, the UAE, the United States and other Western allies would provide air and naval power, intelligence and advanced capabilities. Together, they could defeat the Houthis, secure the Red Sea and stabilize the region.
Iran and Turkey are already competing for influence across these countries. Bringing them into this coalition would deny both powers additional ground and political and geographic depth while strengthening Saudi Arabia’s position in the Red Sea region.
Iran has built an armed Islamist network; Turkey has built a Muslim Brotherhood network. The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea are where these competing regional powers increasingly converge. Riyadh should not counter one Islamist threat by strengthening another equally dangerous one. It should confront both.
