Pro-Israel supporters of U.S. President Donald Trump’s Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Iran—most prominently, Victor Davis Hanson—dismiss the president’s apparent appeasement of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and distancing from Israel by pointing to the November midterm elections.
Continued conflict over the next four months would undermine Republican prospects for retaining Congress, Hanson noted, particularly if high gas prices persist into October. “A Democratic Socialist-driven Congress would paralyze the MAGA agenda, guarantee two years of frenzied House subpoenas and prompt a nonstop impeachment circus,” he said.
Hanson asserted that Trump needs the MoU to rein in the IRGC until after the elections, when Trump will have a free hand. He explained, “Should Iran begin to ignore its promises and renege on its agreements (and it will), the regime would have no ability to keep its utilities, roads and transportation viable if the U.S. were even to spend 48 hours to knock them all out.” After Iran lies in ruins, Hanson added, the Iranian people will finish the job: “An even angrier and more restive populace ... will only ensure further fragmentation and destruction of the regime.”
Hanson’s scenario explains the MoU’s logic from Trump’s perspective.
But look at the same scenario from the IRGC’s perspective. Trump is the only U.S. president who has shown both the determination and the willingness to take the risks necessary to attack Iran directly. He demonstrated that resolve in 2020 by taking out the IRGC’s chief terrorist and commander, Qassem Soleimani; in 2025 during the 12-day war against Tehran; and again this year as part of “Operation Epic Fury.”
The IRGC knows that if the Republicans retain congressional power after the November midterms, Trump will have no meaningful restraints if he decides to eviscerate the IRGC’s hold on power. That makes the November midterms an existential election for the Iranian regime. Launching an “October surprise” is thus a necessity for the IRGC.
Such a playbook could unfold exactly as it now appears to be playing out: Act tough in public while signaling moderation in private to sympathetic negotiators like Mideast special envoy Steve Witkoff and Trump’s adviser and son-in-law Jared Kushner. To feign desperation for financial relief, agree in private to use the relief to buy agricultural products from the United States.
While playing the part of reluctant adherents to the agreement, the IRGC would focus its efforts over the next three months on amassing the resources needed to close the Strait of Hormuz in October, creating a crisis that causes a spike in oil prices and discredits Trump’s economic competence.
With the aid of the mainstream U.S. media and an IRGC social-media blitz, the October surprise could tip the American electorate toward ousting the Republicans.
Under Democratic control of Congress, Trump would face a whirlwind of opposition to any move he made. With his reputation tarnished among Republicans—many of whom would view him as both failed and a lame duck—the IRGC could weather whatever Trump might muster against it. Under a future U.S. administration, whether headed by Vice President JD Vance or a Democrat, the IRGC would thrive once more.
To date, the president has been playing tit-for-tat whenever Iran engages in limited violations of the MoU. By assuming he has cowed the IRGC and that it will allow October to pass uneventfully, he is being lulled into complacency and inviting defeat in November.
If Trump does remain complacent, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who faces elections in September or October, may not. The Israeli electorate no longer believes that Trump has its back, and it wants regime change in Iran. In what is likely Netanyahu’s last election campaign, he will be determined to secure his legacy by eliminating Iran as a threat.
Netanyahu’s predecessors defied American presidents by unilaterally taking out Iraq’s and Syria’s nuclear facilities. Netanyahu may soon do no less with Iran, presenting Trump with a crisis to manage at a time not of his choosing.
If Hanson is right that winning the midterms explains Trump’s MoU, then Trump’s only prudent course would be to immediately eliminate the IRGC and use the next few months to manage the fallout. Hoping for the best when the hope rests solely on the abject compliance of both the IRGC and Netanyahu could prove fatal to Trump’s administration and his legacy.
