In recent weeks, Yemen’s Houthis (officially known as Ansar Allah) have returned to the international agenda. A string of territorial gains by the group has strengthened their position along the Red Sea and around the Bab al-Mandab Strait, giving them greater ability to threaten one of the world’s most important maritime trade routes.
They have also renewed missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia. Riyadh is seeking help, but neither its traditional ally (the United States) nor its new partners under the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement (Pakistan and Turkey) appear willing to join a military campaign against the Houthis.
At the same time, U.S. officials have reportedly met with Houthi representatives in Oman, where the Houthis offered assurances that American vessels would not be attacked—underscoring Washington’s reluctance to enter the conflict.
That reluctance is understandable. The Trump administration is focused on a prolonged campaign against Iran, the midterm elections and an economy strained by inflation and high energy prices. It is also wary after its costly 2025 campaign against the Houthis, which ended without eliminating the threat. Washington would prefer to set the Houthi problem aside and focus on its other troubles. It is a perfectly understandable approach, and a profoundly mistaken one.
The Houthis are not merely a local problem for Saudi Arabia, as Washington would like to believe. The movement’s official slogan, emblazoned on its banner, pointedly omits Saudi Arabia and instead declares: “God is great, death to America, death to Israel, a curse upon the Jews, victory to Islam.” The enemies it names—and their order—capture key elements of the movement’s worldview: anti-Americanism, antisemitism and jihadism.
Having seized control of much of the Yemeni state and its resources, the Houthis now possess the means to act on that worldview. Their leader has repeatedly described the movement’s struggle as a jihad against the enemies of Islam, foremost among them America and Israel; rhetoric that echoes that of other enemies of America, including al-Qaeda and the Iranian regime.
The danger lies not only in the Houthis’ extreme intentions but in the formidable capabilities they have built with substantial Iranian assistance. In the past decade, they have evolved from a local militia into one of the region’s most capable non-state armed forces, fielding ballistic and cruise missiles, attack and reconnaissance drones, unmanned vessels and naval mines.
The immediate danger is clear: Missiles and drones with demonstrated ranges of at least 1,250 miles give the Houthis the ability to threaten U.S. forces and interests, as well as American allies across the region, while seaborne raids allow them to disrupt global trade whenever their leaders choose.
Above all, the United States cannot mistake inaction for strategy. The cost of delay will only rise.
The longer-term danger may be greater. Control of territory and demonstrated domestic missile and drone production capacity could support still longer ranges and raids far beyond Yemen. Over time, those same resources could support operations well outside the Arabian Peninsula.
Although the Houthis cooperate with Iran, they are not subordinate in the conventional sense. Their growing autonomy could give them a larger role within what remains of Iran’s regional “axis of resistance.” Weakening Iran, difficult as that is, therefore offers no guarantee of dealing effectively with the Houthis.
Thus, ignoring the problem means sacrificing the medium- and long-term for the short-term. It would amount to accepting a heavily armed, ideologically hostile organization as a permanent fixture in the region. Such a movement cannot safely be assumed to remain contained.
The alternative is not an open-ended American war against the Houthis. It is a long-term strategy that steadily weakens the movement, constrains its ability to threaten shipping and neighboring states, and creates conditions for more moderate Yemeni alternatives to replace Houthi rule.
Much can be done without direct American military intervention. The Houthis’ exploitation of humanitarian aid has become both an instrument of rule and a potential vulnerability. Billions of dollars in assistance have entered Yemen during the war, much of it destined for Houthi-held areas, where nearly 80% of the country’s humanitarian needs are concentrated. By controlling distribution and seizing aid and equipment, the Houthis convert relief into revenue, patronage and political control.
Beyond aid, the Houthis depend on vulnerable external supply routes, while their adversaries have yet to forge a coherent Yemeni opposition. Thus, better coordination among Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United Arab Emirates is in order, as these nations have struggled, for different reasons, to form a unified and effective coalition.
Their strategy should begin by mapping and exploiting the group’s vulnerabilities. Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi’s exceptional personal importance to the movement makes weakening his command structure and the system built around him an essential part of any long-term plan. Humanitarian aid must continue, but its delivery needs reform, independent oversight and mechanisms that reduce the Houthis’ ability to seize it. Another pillar should be disrupting supply routes from Iran, including networks running through Oman and Africa.
Economic pressure should target the group’s other lifelines, weakening its ability to terrorize and control millions of Yemenis who are not part of the Houthi movement but live under its rule. To turn that pressure into political change, the coalition must also build Yemen’s political and military opposition so a more moderate force can replace Houthi rule when the opportunity arises.
Above all, the United States cannot mistake inaction for strategy. The cost of delay will only rise.
Sept. 11 and Oct. 7 offer a common warning: Ideological hostility should not be underestimated when it is paired with proven military capabilities and a willingness to use them. The Houthis’ renewed confrontation with Saudi Arabia should serve as a similar warning.
Washington still has time to choose a strategy rather than improvise in reaction to the next crisis. It should use that time before the Houthis leave it with fewer choices.
