The vulnerability of the Iranian regime is not only the result of structural economic mismanagement, repression or corruption. The fundamental cause lies in the erosion of its most important ideological pillar: Islam.
Particularly among the younger generation who make up the demographic majority in Iran, rejection of religious coercion and state-imposed Islam is increasingly visible. This trend affects the very legitimacy of the regime.
In the years 1974 to 1975, Iran found itself in an exceptionally favorable economic position. Oil prices had doubled, and the Shah intended to use the resulting revenues to accelerate economic growth and modernization. Yet this ambition clashed with the social reality of that moment. Nationwide surveys conducted in 1974 by Iranian state media revealed how deeply religion and conservative social relations were rooted in society.
As many as 96% of Iranians reported that they prayed regularly, while 79% observed Ramadan. In addition, 23% deliberately avoided going to the cinema because it was considered haram (“religiously forbidden”). Cinema attendance was largely a male activity; roughly 70% of men considered it inappropriate to attend a film with their wives. Women working outside the home was also widely rejected: 75% of men opposed the idea. At the same time, around 60% of the population was uneducated.
These figures illustrate a society with strong conservative social structures that was culturally and socially ill-prepared for the pace of economic modernization. The state accelerated forward, but society did not move with it.
Ali Assadi, the founder of the first national public opinion polls in Iran, described this as a phase of social dislocation in which a society abandons its familiar past without yet having developed a clear vision for the future. In such circumstances, people seek stability and meaning in structures that provide certainty. In Iran, that role was increasingly fulfilled by Islam.
Parviz Nikkhah (1939-1979), a prominent Iranian intellectual, demonstrated in his doctoral research that in many countries, economic growth and modernization typically lead to a decline in religious groups and religious education. In Iran, however, the opposite occurred. Islam functioned not only as a belief system but also developed into a social anchor within society.
In present-day Iran, the opposite trend is unfolding. Young people are increasingly distancing themselves from Islam. The rejection of Islam has grown significantly, partly due to the dictatorial regime of the past 47 years, which has committed numerous atrocities under the banner of Islam.
This stands in stark contrast to the situation in the 1970s. At that time, approximately 75% of the population supported the hijab, while Iranian media were actively promoting more modern and Western styles of clothing. Recent surveys demonstrate how dramatically attitudes have shifted. According to a large survey conducted by the research institute GAMAAN (2020), roughly 80% of Iranians oppose the mandatory hijab, and about 68% support a separation between state and Islam. Since the Woman, Life, Freedom movement of 2022-2023 and the protests in January, it is likely that these numbers have only increased.
This shift reflects a search for alternative sources of identity. Many young Iranians increasingly turn toward Persian history and the cultural identity that predates Islam. They frequently refer to Cyrus the Great, who founded the first Persian Empire and laid the foundations for one of the earliest civilizations in the world. At the same time, they often compare this heritage with Iran prior to the 1979 revolution, when the country, under the leadership of the Shah, sought to align itself with modernization and economic development.
Many young people draw a historical parallel: Just as Islam entered Iran through conquest in the seventh century, they see the 1979 Iranian Revolution as the moment when the ayatollahs imposed state Islam upon society once again, pushing Persian identity into the background. This trend among the younger generation undermines the ideological foundation on which the regime has relied for decades. The regime has attempted to control the population for nearly five decades through repression and violence; however, identity and conviction cannot be suppressed.
The regime’s most important pillar is therefore beginning to rot away. Power may still appear intact, but collapse is becoming inevitable. In the end, no bullet will be able to stop it.
