Newsletter
Newsletter Support JNS

The most dangerous spy may never steal a secret …

Some of the most consequential battles of our time are not being fought militarily, but in the realm of information, perception and influence.

Chess strategy. Credit: Eyanerick/Pixabay.
Chess strategy. Credit: Eyanerick/Pixabay.
Yuval David is an Emmy Award–winning journalist, filmmaker and actor, as well as an internationally recognized advocate for Jewish and LGBTQ rights. He serves as a strategic adviser to diplomatic missions, international NGOs and multilateral organizations, focusing on human rights, pluralism and cultural diplomacy. He also contributes to leading international news outlets and speaks at diplomatic forums, policy conferences and intergovernmental gatherings. See: Instagram.com/Yuval_David_; Twitter.com/YuvalDavid; Linkedin.com/in/yuval-david; YouTube.com/YuvalDavid.

For much of the last century, we understood espionage through the lens of the Cold War. We imagined spies stealing classified documents, passing secrets to foreign governments, or infiltrating military and intelligence agencies. National security was largely defined by physical threats, military capabilities and the protection of state secrets.

Today, that understanding is no longer sufficient.

Over the years, I have worked alongside governmental and non-governmental organizations engaged in diplomacy, civil society initiatives, international advocacy and efforts to help vulnerable populations, including LGBT individuals and women facing life-threatening circumstances, and religious minorities attacked by Muslim terrorists.

In those environments, I have repeatedly encountered a reality that many in democratic nations are only beginning to recognize, and something that particularly Israelis and now Americans, too, are recognizing: Some of the most consequential battles of our time are not being fought on military battlefields. They are being fought in the realm of information, perception, culture and influence.

The modern spy may never steal a classified document. The modern influence operation may never recruit a government official. Instead, the objective is often far more ambitious—to shape how entire societies understand themselves, their allies, their adversaries and the world around them.

This reality helps explain a question many people have been asking since the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad attacks in Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. It’s a question that intensified as people around the world began publicly supporting Palestinian terrorism, Hamas, Hezbollah and other terror groups along with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

How did so many narratives that once existed on the political and cultural fringes suddenly become mainstream? How did slogans spread across continents almost overnight? How did terrorist organizations become rebranded as “resistance movements” in socio-political movements and groups, while the world’s only Jewish state was increasingly portrayed as uniquely illegitimate among all other nations?

The answer is not that millions of people suddenly became agents of foreign governments. Modern influence operations rarely work that way.

Much of today’s influence activity exists in a gray area between activism and propaganda, civic engagement and strategic manipulation, free expression and coordinated influence campaigns.

Instead, Russia, China, Iran, Qatar and other authoritarian actors have spent years investing in forms of influence that operate below the threshold most people associate with espionage. Their goal is often not to convince Americans to become pro-Russian, pro-Chinese, pro-Iranian or pro-Qatari. Rather, it’s to increase polarization, weaken social cohesion, undermine trust in democratic institutions and create confusion about what is true.

A divided society is easier to weaken than a united one. A population that no longer trusts its institutions becomes easier to manipulate. A nation that loses confidence in itself begins to surrender ground long before any military confrontation takes place.

This is why intelligence professionals increasingly speak about cognitive warfare, narrative warfare and influence operations. The target is not territory. The target is perception.

One of the most effective methods used by hostile actors is not only the creation of entirely false narratives, but the exploitation of real grievances. Social divisions, economic frustrations, political disagreements and cultural tensions already exist within every democratic society. Foreign adversaries don’t need to invent them. They simply amplify them. They push people further apart. They encourage citizens to view one another not as fellow members of a shared society, but as enemies. The objective is not necessarily to make one side win. The objective is to make everyone lose.

The anti-Israel movement offers a particularly revealing case study. Like criticism of any democratic government, legitimate criticism of Israeli policies is both normal and necessary. However, much of what has emerged internationally extends far beyond criticism of policy. Increasingly, Israel is treated as uniquely illegitimate among nations; Jewish self-determination is treated differently from every other national movement; and terrorist organizations are often granted a level of moral justification that would never be afforded to similar groups elsewhere.

This transformation did not occur in a vacuum.

For decades, Iran and its proxies have invested heavily in media ecosystems, ideological networks, advocacy organizations and information campaigns designed to shape how Western audiences understand Israel, the United States and the broader democratic world. Russia has similarly developed sophisticated disinformation capabilities aimed at exploiting political and social divisions. China has pursued its own model through economic influence, elite engagement, technology platforms and information management.

Qatar has emerged as a different but equally significant player, using media influence, university partnerships, think tanks, charitable organizations and strategic investments to cultivate relationships and shape discourse throughout the West. In many cases, these efforts have intersected with the promotion or normalization of Islamist movements and narratives that are hostile to Israel and often at odds with liberal democratic values. While the methods differ, the strategic objective is often remarkably similar: influence without invasion.

One of the most important lessons from intelligence culture studies is that influence is often recognized through patterns rather than individuals. We tend to ask, “Who is the spy?” when the more important question may be, “What effect is being produced?” When narratives consistently deepen polarization, erode trust, weaken democratic institutions, delegitimize democratic allies and benefit authoritarian actors, it becomes necessary to examine not only the message itself but also the broader strategic environment in which it is operating.

How did so many narratives that once existed on the political and cultural fringes suddenly become mainstream?

Another challenge is that democratic societies are attempting to address 21st-century threats with legal frameworks largely designed for 20th-century conflicts. The United States and Israel have laws governing espionage, foreign agents and traditional national security threats. Yet much of today’s influence activity exists in a gray area between activism and propaganda, civic engagement and strategic manipulation, free expression and coordinated influence campaigns.

Democracies are rightly reluctant to police ideas, and they should remain so. Freedom of speech, open debate and political participation are strengths, not weaknesses. Yet those same freedoms can also be exploited by actors who do not share this commitment to democratic values.

This creates a profound asymmetry. The United States and Israel operate within legal, ethical and institutional constraints. Their adversaries often do not. Democratic societies value transparency, accountability and open discourse. Authoritarian regimes study those principles not to emulate them, but to exploit them.

The answer is not censorship. Nor is it abandoning the freedoms that define democratic societies. The answer is awareness.

Citizens must become more sophisticated consumers of information. Educational institutions must teach media literacy and influence literacy alongside civic literacy. Journalists, policymakers and community leaders must better understand how modern influence operations function and how narratives are shaped, amplified and weaponized.

The greatest threat facing democratic societies today may not be military conquest. It may be the gradual erosion of confidence in our institutions, our alliances, our shared values, and ultimately, ourselves. The battlefield has expanded beyond borders and armies. It now includes media, culture, education, technology and public discourse.

The first step toward defending democracy is recognizing that the battle is already underway.

“I have no choice but to sever all contact with Ms. Kallas,” Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar tweeted.
Alexander Filin is the 18th Israeli to be killed by Hezbollah since April 16, when Jerusalem and Beirut agreed to a U.S.-mediated ceasefire.
Morton Klein, national president of the Zionist Organization of America, told JNS that the memorandum of understanding is a “disaster” that “stabs Israel in the back.”
The senior official read aloud the text of the Trump administration’s memorandum of understanding with Iran in a call with reporters, revealing the full text.
RIAS documented 8,725 incidents in 2025, more than triple the number recorded in 2022.
“Now we are determined to bring our security cooperation to new heights, for the benefit of both peoples and for the benefit of stability in the region,” said Israel Katz.