The evolving relationship between Israel and Syria offers a rare but complex opportunity to reshape the security landscape along Israel’s northern border.
The prospect of a peace agreement between the two countries has reemerged as a topic of intense speculation following the dramatic fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, and the possibility of such an agreement offers both tantalizing opportunities and formidable challenges.
As the Syrian regime, now led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani—a former Al-Qaeda terrorist—signals openness to dialogue, Israel must balance the potential for strategic gains with the risks of engaging a regime with an untested track record.
Israel’s approach to any agreement with Syria is shaped by hard-learned lessons from past diplomatic efforts.
Former Israeli National Security Advisor Meir Ben-Shabbat warned in an interview with JNS that Israel faces a “delicate decision,” noting, “If it focuses solely on threats, it risks missing a rare opportunity to reshape the reality along its northern border… On the other hand, if it makes concessions in the style of the ‘Oslo process,’ these could prove to be a dangerous gamble.”
To navigate this, he outlined seven red lines, with the Golan Heights at the forefront. “The status of the Golan Heights is non-negotiable,” he asserted, emphasizing that “the Golan Heights without peace is preferable to peace without the Golan Heights.” Israel seeks de jure recognition of its control over the Golan, viewing it as the “strategic defense line on its eastern border.”
Beyond territorial control, Ben-Shabbat insisted on “preservation of Israel’s freedom of military action—air and ground—in Syria” for at least a decade to counter hostile entities like Iran or Hezbollah.
Israel also demands that Syria refrain from alliances that allow adversaries to operate from its territory and prohibit the development of strategic weapons, including “nuclear, chemical, biological, missiles, and precision weapons.”
Additional red lines include preventing smuggling to Lebanon and Jordan and ensuring the safety of the Druze community, underpinned by “effective enforcement” mechanisms.
During a visit to the Syrian Hermon in January, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz declared: “The IDF will remain at the summit of the Hermon and the security zone indefinitely to ensure the security of the communities of the Golan Heights and the north, as well as all the residents of Israel.”
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has stated that he will not permit forces loyal to al-Sharaa to deploy in the area south of Damascus.
Jonathan Hessen, a senior research fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, reinforced this stance, specifying to JNS that Israel will require “no deployment of forces, heavy munitions, and assets south of Damascus” to maintain a secure buffer zone.
This restriction aims to minimize direct threats to Israel’s northern frontier while addressing concerns about Iranian entrenchment.
A central pillar of Israel’s security strategy is its insistence on operational autonomy.
Ben-Shabbat was clear: “Yes, this must be Israel’s demand” to retain the ability to conduct proactive operations against terrorist activity.
“If the Syrian regime prevents such activity before Israeli intervention, it will spare itself the embarrassment,” he added.
Hessen echoed this, stating that “freedom of action must be preserved, particularly regarding Iranian entrenchment and smuggling of munitions through Syria into Lebanon.”
He suggested that Israel could coordinate such actions with Damascus to build trust, noting that operations to “thwart terror elements along the front” would be conducted “in coordination with Damascus.”
This demand reflects Israel’s new proactive security doctrine, prioritizing preemptive measures across the Middle East. The Syrian regime’s ability to curb hostile activities will be critical to proving its reliability as a partner.
The demilitarized zone (DMZ) established under the 1974 armistice remains a vital component of Israel’s security framework.
Ben-Shabbat told JNS that Israel must “continue to hold the Hermon peak as a critical observation point to block connections between Syria, Hezbollah, and Iran.”
He advocated maintaining the buffer zone for “at least the next decade,” with any withdrawal contingent on “an assessment of the Syrian regime’s stability, its implementation of commitments, and the evaluation of security risks.”
Hessen aligned with this cautious approach, noting that the arrangement will likely be “an updated version of the 1974 armistice” rather than a full peace treaty, including “Syria’s recognition of Israel, and Jerusalem’s recognition of the al-Sharaa government.”
The reluctance to cede the DMZ underscores Israel’s wariness, shaped by past agreements that failed to deliver lasting security. Any territorial concessions would require robust assurances and a proven track record from Damascus.
While security dominates the agenda, both experts told JNS they see potential for broader engagement.
Hessen highlighted Israel’s track record of supporting neighbors, noting that “Israel, which views stability in neighboring countries as a national security interest, systemically promotes assisting its neighbors… in civilian projects.”
He suggested that “the same may gradually happen with Syria,” potentially through medical, agricultural, or other collaborative efforts.
Ben-Shabbat was more reserved, stating, “It’s hard to know what the agreement will include, how, and through what gradual process things will develop,” particularly regarding civilian interactions like Israeli travel to Syria for tourism.
He also proposed an innovative idea: Syria could “resettle Palestinians from Gaza who wish to relocate,” aligning with “President Trump’s initiative.”
He maintained that “Syria could be suitable for this, as it is an Arab country, geographically close, with historical ties to the region,” and its reconstruction needs could accommodate such resettlement without “an unusual burden.”
The broader regional implications of an Israel-Syria agreement could potentially reshape demographic and political dynamics.
Both Israel and the U.S. are signaling the possibility of an announcement in the near future regarding new normalization agreements with more countries.
Ben-Shabbat advised discretion, stating, “The less we discuss them at this stage, the greater the chances of their eventual participation.”
A critical question is whether al-Sharaa can be trusted.
Ben-Shabbat expressed skepticism, describing al-Sharaa’s friendly demeanor as a potential “survival tactic rather than a genuine internal change.”
Hessen was equally blunt, stating, “No,” but added that “coupled with international assurances, along with adequate defensive preparedness, a mutually beneficial arrangement… must receive serious consideration.”
The prospect of an Israel-Syria agreement is a high-stakes endeavor, offering both opportunity and risk. Israel’s red lines—control of the Golan, operational freedom, and restrictions on Syrian alliances and weaponry—reflect a security-first approach shaped by past disappointments.
Yet, Hessen’s vision of a “mutually beneficial arrangement that directly bolsters Israel’s national security interests” suggests a path toward stability, potentially enhanced by civilian cooperation and regional realignments.
The Syrian regime’s ability to deliver on commitments, backed by international assurances, will determine whether this moment becomes a turning point.
For now, Israel’s strategy is one of vigilance tempered by strategic openness, balancing skepticism with the possibility of a transformative agreement.
As Ben-Shabbat warned, “Having been burned before, Israel has no choice but to exercise extreme caution.”