Given the ongoing armed conflict in the region and the political and security surroundings in which Israel presently finds itself, one may wonder whether it would be at all possible, today, to reach the same type of agreement that was reached between Israel and the Palestinian leadership in the years 1993-95 with the Oslo Accords?
These were premised on basic foundational and underlying principles, first enunciated in the September 1993 Exchange of Letters between PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, in which Arafat declared, “The PLO commits itself to the Middle East peace process and to a peaceful resolution of the conflict and declares that all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations.”
This was formalized in the preambular provisions of the 1993 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Governing Arrangements (Oslo I), and repeated in the preamble to the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II).
These foundational and underlying principles included:
• Enunciation of the will of the parties to “end decades of confrontation and conflict” and to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity;
• Recognition of their mutual legitimate and political rights;
• The desire to achieve a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation; and
• That this be achieved solely through an agreed and exclusive political mechanism of dispute settlement through negotiation.
The concept of resolving disputes through negotiation did not emanate from a vacuum. It was set out in the 1945 U.N. Charter, which prohibits the use of force and calls for the lasting resolution of disputes through norms of mutual respect and legal parity, as well as through appropriate mechanisms.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 (1967), adopted following the 1967 Six-Day War, specifically called for establishing contacts with the states concerned to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the resolution’s provisions and principles.
This was further enhanced in Security Council Resolution 338 (1973), following the Yom Kippur war, which called for negotiations between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.
Accordingly, the Oslo Accords established a negotiated mechanism that combined a transitional period of governance with direct negotiations toward a permanent-status agreement.
In the final clauses of the 1995 Oslo II Accord, the PLO and Israel undertook to refrain from initiating or taking “any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.”
In fact, the principle of negotiated dispute settlement constituted the very backbone of the Middle East peace process from its very beginning, based on the assumption that only through direct negotiation could the parties develop between them a basis of mutual trust and respect that would enable the implementation of the commitments in the agreements and consolidation of a lasting relationship of peaceful coexistence and bonhomie.
The Oslo Accords made no mention of international conferences, U.N. intervention or any form of unilateral or other third-party determination. There was no reference by international leaders to prejudging or imposing a resolution of the Middle East dispute. Similarly, there was no mention of recourse to juridical intervention through international tribunals or of unilateral recognition campaigns as means of bypassing the agreed contractual negotiating framework.
The overriding foundational concept was bona fide, direct negotiation, without any outside intervention or predetermination of the negotiation’s outcome.
Changing factors adversely influenced the return to negotiation
After 30 years, while the basic assumptions leaning toward peace may have remained in place, several international, regional and local factors are now influencing the prospects for achieving peace by returning to a direct negotiating mechanism similar to the one that enabled the adoption of the Oslo Accords.
Evolving radicalization within the Islamic world, including elements advocating jihadist tendencies against Israel, the U.S. and the West, is now being generated and exported by Iranian Shi’ite extremism with the support of such Islamist states as Qatar. These impede and even obstruct more moderate elements in the Arab world.
What was once a readiness by moderate elements in the Arab world to accept Israel as a partner in the area appears to have become fractured, radicalized and fanaticized.
Even those moderate Arab states that enthusiastically joined the Abraham Accords in 2020 at the initiative of U.S. President Donald Trump appear to be apprehensive when presently faced with the still-existent jihadist Iranian regional influence and the lack of any viable and decisive Western response.
Radicalization of the international community: The organized international community is becoming monopolized by radical and non-democratic regimes, including some with jihadist tendencies, that dictate an international agenda serving their political interests. Such interests generally orient against the West and increasingly undermine and neutralize the U.N. and its ability to fulfill its aims and purposes as set out in its charter.
Politicization of international legal bodies: The tendency of international and regional bodies to resolve disputed legal questions with predetermined political conclusions, influenced by shared political and economic preferences, drastically weakens and undermines these bodies.
The manipulation and abuse by South Africa of the International Court of Justice, the main juridical arm of the U.N., under the direction and financing of Iran, in order to engage in a futile crusade against Israel, as well as ongoing Palestinian abuse and manipulation of the International Criminal Court by obliging it to engage in a similar crusade against Israel and its leaders, only serve to politicize such bodies, to weaken and prejudice their credibility and international standing and to render them basically ineffective.
The woke influence on Western governments: A progressive “woke” ideological framework is influencing Western politics and decision-making, through progressive indoctrination within Western educational and governmental systems and media, driven by popular social-justice activism.
Islamist financing of Western universities: In addition to the progressive woke educational indoctrination of Western governments and social media, billions of dollars in propaganda and social media manipulation are being funneled by Islamist state actors, especially Qatar, seeking to influence Western culture and educational institutions and governance.
The tragic events of Oct. 7, 2023, fundamentally altered Israel’s security concept of defensible borders, and those of its assumptions underlying all previous political and territorial compromises and arrangements.
The foundation of mutual trust that had generated and accompanied the peace-negotiation process up to then, as well as Israel’s assumption that the international community was a willing partner in accompanying any such negotiating process, have been basically and irreparably shattered.
The illusion of the ‘two state solution’
The insistence by international leaders, especially those of France, the U.K., Canada and Australia, as well as repeated U.N. General Assembly resolutions, in advancing the “two state solution” has become a curious, ill-advised international fixation.
It is indicative of an utter lack of understanding of the history, complexities and realities of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. In so doing, these leaders and organizations in effect seek to bypass the negotiating table and impose what they believe is the necessary solution.
While the “vision of two states living side by side in peace and security” was originally coined by U.S. President George W. Bush on June 24, 2002, as a possible outcome of the direct negotiating process, it was never intended to replace direct negotiation between the parties, nor was it intended to prejudge and impose a solution. It was nothing more than a possible outcome, should the parties agree thereto.
In fact, the Oslo Accords made no reference whatsoever to any “two-state solution.”
To the contrary, according to the accords, only through the agreed permanent-status negotiations could the parties determine the final status of the territories, whether one, two, three or more states, a federation, a confederation, a condominium, or any other combination.
The fact that the term “two-state solution” has become a form of lingua franca, enunciated unthinkingly and even off-handedly, at every opportunity by European and some North American leaders, and appearing automatically in politically motivated and partisan U.N. resolutions, does nothing to advance the settlement of the Israeli Palestinian dispute by one iota.
Palestinian leadership vacuum: The lack of any unified, responsible, accepted and authoritative Palestinian leadership that could present itself as a reliable and stable negotiating partner for Israel only enhances the notion of continuing instability and lack of any likelihood of a return to a negotiating process.
This strengthens Israel in its determination to ensure its own security, on its own.
Israel’s internal governance issues: Israel’s need to preserve its democratic legitimacy, internal democratic resilience and legal coherence are major factors in maintaining its international credibility.
Political and social elements that weaken Israel’s internal social and political cohesion serve to enhance the international perception of weakness. Israel cannot effectively defend the legitimacy of its international legal position while appearing divided over the authority of its governmental institutions, its judiciary, constitutional norms and wartime decision-making processes.
The Abraham Accords as an alternative model to Oslo
The historic series of agreements comprising the Abraham Accords, announced by Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 2020, perhaps constitutes the most significant and hopeful factor in demonstrating today the possibility and capability of achieving peaceful, mutually beneficial coexistence between Arab states and Israel, without necessarily returning to the Oslo-style negotiating framework.
In the Abraham Accords, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan agreed to “foster mutual understanding, respect, coexistence and a culture of peace between their societies in the spirit of their common ancestor, Abraham, and the new era of peace and friendly relations ushered in by this Treaty, including by cultivating people-to-people programs, interfaith dialogue and cultural, academic, youth, scientific, and other exchanges between their peoples.”
As such, the Abraham Accords can indeed be seen as proof that peaceful, lucrative relations and mutual and regional acceptance are achievable when the parties decide that their interests align with the desire for peace.
When other Arab states, including Syria, Saudi Arabia, other Gulf states and the Palestinian people reach such a realization that they have everything to benefit from entering such a framework, rather than engaging in terror and disseminating and financing jihadism, an extended version of the Abraham Accords will doubtless serve as the inspiration.
The traditional penchant of the international political and legal community to act unilaterally by imposing ineffective and unrealistic third-party solutions is indicative of international institutional blindness and naivete. This cannot serve as a replacement mechanism for direct negotiations.
As long as such a nebulous situation exists, lacking any serious international inclination to encourage negotiation for peaceful relations, Israel clearly cannot place its trust in any foreign or international mechanism and will have no other choice but to rely on its own capabilities and power.
Originally published by the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs.
